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ABSTRACT 
The ability to securely disseminate data in a timely manner is critical to military 
missions within a hostile environment. Tactical wireless sensor networks (WSN) consist 
of power-constrained devices spread throughout a region-of-interest to provide data 
extraction in real time. In this thesis, we develop cyber security mechanisms to be 
implemented on a tactical WSN using the 6LoWPAN protocol for use by the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC). Specifically, we develop an architectural framework 
for tactical WSNs by studying cyber security gaps and vulnerabilities within the 
6LoWPAN security sublayer, which is based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. We develop 
a key management scheme and a centralized routing mechanism that is non-broadcast 
but feasible in an operational scenario. In addition, we modify the 6LoWPAN enabled 
IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure to facilitate the newly developed keying and centralized 
routing mechanisms. Methods to aid in deployment planning are also discussed. The 
tactical WSN architecture was tested against a variety of well-known network 
attacks. The attacks simulated were spoofing, man-in-the-middle, and denial-of-service. 
Through MATLAB simulations, we showed the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
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The Internet of Things (IoT) embraces network connectivity of everyday, low 
power sensor devices for two-way data communications. The IoT offers the potential to 
extend connectivity to sensor devices and mobile nodes at the tactical edge of the 
battlefield at a low cost for the United States Marine Corps (USMC) within their wireless 
sensor networks (WSN). A “WSN is a group of sensor nodes that are geographically 
distributed to provide data gathering and monitoring of tasks and events” [1]. The 
implementation of tactical WSNs empowers the USMC to collect data within areas of 
interest. 
The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is a physical and data link communication protocol 
for low power wireless personal area networks Since the IEEE 802.15.4 standard only 
defines the first two layers of the Open Systems Interconnection model, another protocol 
must be used to provide full networking functionality for the WSN [2]. The Internet 
Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal 
Area Networks) is a protocol designed to work with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [2].  
Our study into the applicability of a 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 
infrastructure for USMC tactical sensor networking is focused on a structured, multi-hop 
static WSN rather than an ad hoc deployment. The objective of this thesis is to provide an 
analysis of 6LoWPAN by studying the standard’s ability to 1) provide energy 
conservation for the low power devices that are deployed, where the sensors are static; 
and 2) implement and use a key management scheme that has the ability to defend 
against a variety of cyber attacks. In order to achieve this objective, the vulnerabilities of 
the cyber security mechanisms used within 6LoWPAN WSN must be evaluated.  
The proposed network design incorporates the following network architecture 
elements: master station (MS), base station/border router (BS), and sensor nodes. The MS 
serves as the central node of the network providing a universal connection to external 
domains and accessibility and administrative privileges to the sensor nodes while located 
at a safe remote location away from the WSN. The BS, commonly known as a sink node, 
 xviii
is the transitional element within the WSN that connects the 6LoWPAN/internal 
environment to the public/external environment.. The sensor nodes are the end elements 
designed to attach to multiple types of sensors and to send data to the MS. The 
deployment of the devices is similar to that described in [3] but with some modifications 
to include the creation of the intended network, connection of the devices to the MS for 
bootstrapping, and deployment of the devices.  
The MS’s administrative control mechanisms include node control, centralized 
routing, and keying mechanisms. Node control from the MS removes the need to send an 
individual to make a modification to the BS or sensor for a new task. The centralized 
routing mechanism allows the MS to control the routing of the WSN and the current 
network status with the implementation of path indication bits. Private keys are generated 
using the AES-CCM 128 keying mechanism, where each node has a unique key that is 
only shared with the MS, and the BS has a separate keying mechanism shared with the 
MS to secure the data over the external domain. 
The proposed 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure is based on the 
structure defined in [4] with header compression schemes. We modified the frame 
structure to incorporate the above discussed cyber security mechanisms. The first 
modification incorporates the path indication bits within the Path/Hop Limit byte. The 
path indication bits identify whether a primary or secondary route is used to transmit data 
to the MS. The second modification is the implementation of the AES-CCM 128 keying 
mechanism incorporating the use of an initialization vector and the message integrity 
code (MIC).  
The experimental setup used to perform network simulations using MATLAB 
allows us to mimic multiple frames transiting the network at one time. The sensors in all 
simulations were the Magnetic Intrusion Detector (MAGID) described in [3]. We 
simulated the deployment of sensors along a two-lane intersection. There were four 
scenarios simulated, each representing a different speed of the vehicles traversing an 
intersection. These speeds are 25 miles per hour (mph), 35 mph, 45 mph and 65 mph. 
Simulated within these environments are three different types of attacks: spoofing, man-
in-the-middle (MITM), and denial-of-service (DOS), each using a different method of 
 xix
execution to exploit vulnerabilities within a network. Throughout the simulation, the 
phase transitions of the nodes and frames were documented for further analysis.  
The network within the simulation program incorporated a modified carrier-sense 
multiple access-collision avoidance with binary exponential back-off (CSMA-CA BEB) 
protocol designed specifically for the nodes within this thesis. The network topology used 
in the simulation is shown in Figure 1, where a reference number is given to each node in 
the figure. Many nodes have a primary and secondary route to send traffic, and each node 
makes a determination of which route to use. A decision to use the secondary route by 
one node does not imply the next node in the path also uses the secondary route. The 
nodes selected for each attack remain the same for all scenarios to allow for comparisons 
between the different network environments. Each scenario had six different network 
implementations with five trials/simulations per implementation. A total of 30 trials were 
conducted for each scenario, resulting in a total of 120 trials for the program. 
 
 Figure 1. Assignment of Reference Numbers to the Nodes of the Tactical WSN 
The purpose of the spoofing attack was to test the efficacy of the MIC security 
mechanism added to the IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN enabled frame. The MS was 
successfully able to perform an analysis on frames received to determine if there was a 
possible spoofing attack within the WSN and to determine which node to remove from 
the WSN to prevent further attacks, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 xx
 
 Figure 2. Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS in Each of the 
Five Trials for Scenario 2 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16 
The DOS attack was used to determine if the centralized routing scheme and the 
use of the path indication bits would be able to detect an attack or incapacitated node. 
The analysis presented in Figure 3 displays the use of the secondary routes, indicating 
possible congestion or a node malfunction, causing the WSN to operate in a non-optimal 
manner. Specifically, during the DOS attack on node 5, node 11 had an increase of 
frames utilizing the secondary route due to node 5 becoming incapacitated. 
 
 Figure 3. Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Original Hop) in 
Scenario 4 (Traffic at 65 mph) for No Attacks and 
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
 xxi
Similar to the spoofing attack, the analysis performed on the MITM attack was 
focused on the implementation of the MIC security mechanism but also the centralized 
routing mechanism using the path indication bits. The results shown in Figure 4 validated 
the MIC security mechanism’s ability to authenticate valid frames sent by the nodes. The 
MS was then able to determine where the attack was occurring and which nodes to 
remove from the WSN. 
 
 Figure 4. Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS from the 
Originating Node during a MITM Attack between Nodes 7 and 2 
The combination of the cyber security mechanisms implemented within this thesis 
reflect positive results from a cyber security aspect. The use of the MIC provided 
integrity to the WSN by preventing the authentication of 100% of the frames received by 
the MS in either the spoofing or MITM attacks. The use of the centralized routing scheme 
ensured the WSN remained functional and reliable even when one of the two nodes 
connecting the BS to the rest of the WSN was disabled during the DOS attack. The 
implementation of the indication bits within the centralized routing scheme enabled 
detection of congestion within the network resulting from either traffic density or an 
incapacitated node. We conclude that the cyber security mechanisms developed and 
network structure defined provide a foundation on which future tactical WSNs used 
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The Internet of Things (IoT) embraces network connectivity of everyday, low 
power sensor devices for two-way data communications. The IoT offers the potential to 
extend connectivity to sensor devices and mobile nodes at the tactical edge of the 
battlefield at a low cost. In this thesis, we study the security of specific IoT protocols 
such that they can be used at the tactical edge by the United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) within their wireless sensor networks (WSN). 
A. LOW POWER WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
A “WSN is a group of sensor nodes that are geographically distributed to provide 
data gathering and monitoring of tasks and events” [1]. Sensor devices collect and 
transmit data to a centralized controller, also known as a base station. WSNs can be used 
in a variety of industrial, commercial and military applications. In recent years, WSNs 
have become integral to all parts of life and continue to evolve as technology advances. 
The use of WSNs has continuously grown and are becoming fully integrated within 
commercial systems as well as our homes. Due to the growth of WSNs and the increased 
reliability of the devices used, a WSN is an attractive intelligence gathering system to the 
Department of Defense (DOD). The implementation of a WSN provides the ability to 
remotely collect intelligence on an area-of-interest, eliminating hazardous manpower 
requirements. In addition, a WSN can be used to remotely “monitor deployed systems 
and trigger alerts at a command and control site when certain events occur” [1]. The 
implementation of tactical WNSs empowers the DOD to cost effectively collect 
reconnaissance data within critical areas-of-interest, increasing the DOD’s intelligence 
gathering capabilities. 
The deployment of tactical WSNs in remote regions requires that the sensor nodes 
function independently. In order to function for a period of time without manual support, 
the sensor devices must have their own power supply as a permanent electrical 
infrastructure might not be readily available. To meet the low energy consumption 
requirement that extends the life expectancy of the device and, thereby, the network as a 
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whole, WSNs have been designed to use a minimal amount of power to perform a desired 
task.  
Tactical WSNs have been used within the military during conflicts in multiple 
ways. During the Vietnam War, WSNs were first deployed to detect movement along the 
Ho Chi Minh Trail in Operation IGLOO WHITE [2]. The deployed sensors were 
designed to perform a range of detections to include sensing truck noises and body heat. 
The devices were also designed to blend in within the jungle environment by appearing to 
be a part of the vegetation. Operation IGLOO WHITE was determined to be a great 
success as WSNs, used in combination with US Air Force bombers, accounted for 90% 
of the destruction of equipment that was transported down the Ho Chi Minh trail. 
The WSN devices in use today by the USMC for tactical networking are known 
as the AN/GSQ-257, Unattended Ground Sensor Set. The AN/GSQ-257 devices are part 
of the USMC’s Tactical Remote Sensor System and have multiple configurations that 
enable sensing of seismic/acoustic, magnetic, and/or infrared data [3]. This is helpful in 
performing perimeter enemy detection and tracking enemy movements. The use of a 
WSN allows the USMC to remove the human element from possible danger while 
maintaining situational awareness with early detection from a remote location; however, 
the limitations of these sensor devices include 1) physical attributes, the weight and size 
of these sensors are considerably higher than commercial sensor nodes, and 2) limited 
ability to airdrop, sensors with seismic sensing capability may be air dropped whereas all 
other sensing functions are only available if the sensors are hand placed. Embracing the 
technological advancements of sensor and sensor communication over the past 20 years 
will enable the USMC to modernize their network infrastructure. 
B. INTRODUCTION TO 6LOWPAN/IEEE 802.15.4 
One of the advantages of a sensor device is its ability to be deployed within harsh 
environmental conditions without a dedicated power supply. Since sensors are 
traditionally low power devices, a different type of communication protocol that 
conserves energy within the wireless environment needs to be used. The IEEE 802.15.4 
standard is a physical and data link communication protocol for low power wireless 
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personal area networks (LoWPAN). LoWPAN is commonly used in embedded 
applications for real-time data extraction covering a large geographic area requiring the 
use of many sensor nodes [4]. The sensor nodes within the LoWPAN need to be low cost 
as well as able to operate unattended, use typical batteries, and communicate over 
multiple hops [4]. 
Since the IEEE 802.15.4 standard only defines the first two layers of the Open 
Systems Interconnection model, another protocol must be used to provide full networking 
functionality for the WSN [5]. The Internet Engineering Task Force’s (IETF) 6LoWPAN 
(IPv6 over Low Power Wireless Personal Area Networks) is a protocol designed to work 
with the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [5]. Both IEEE 802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN are specifically 
tailored for IoT applications [5]. 6LoWPAN is an open standard networking technology 
that standardizes Internet connectivity for low power wireless sensor networks. It alters 
the landscape by allowing “IPv6 packets to be carried efficiently within link layer frames, 
such as those defined by IEEE 802.15.4” [6] while reducing Internet Protocol (IP) 
overhead. This low overhead is achieved using cross-layer optimizations. “A powerful 
feature of 6LoWPAN is that while originally conceived to support IEEE 802.15.4 low 
power wireless networks, it is now being adapted and used over a variety of networking 
media including Bluetooth and Wi-Fi” [6]. By connecting to an IP based infrastructure, 
low power wireless networks are then connected to other IP networks and devices via IP 
routers. 6LoWPAN takes advantage of the well-developed end-to-end IP infrastructure, 
providing open standards and interoperability [6]. 
C. RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
As the use of WSNs grows in the USMC, they will become more attractive to 
potential attackers. In order to prevent a passive or active cyber attack, multiple security 
methods must be implemented to maintain an efficient and effective WSN. 
Comprehensive defense security mechanisms must account for multiple types of attacks. 
Generally, to defend against an attack, the military develops a defense model for the 
attack. Since there are multiple types of attacks, the military has developed multiple 
models to defend against each case. The development of a single model to defend against 
 4
a variety of attacks prevents the need for an expanded arsenal of defense models, saving 
the military manpower. 
The USMC has high interest in WSNs and their ability to connect to a public 
domain. Currently, when their WSN devices are deployed in the field, they are deployed 
with a base station, known as AN/MSC-77, which contains working spaces for two 
individuals [7]. The AN/MSC-77 is also known as the Combat Operations Center (COC). 
The COC includes a dedicated power source to provide the power necessary to run all of 
the equipment within it. The COC must be placed in the vicinity of the WSN devices 
unless a repeater is used to place the unit further away, but the COC must again retain a 
line-of-sight with the repeater. The size of the COC is a concern since it is a large unit, as 
shown in Figure 1, and can be easily seen by an enemy. The current WSN used by the 
USMC requires the COC to be located near the deployed network even with the use of 
repeaters; thus, an enemy can generally avoid the area to evade detection. The current 
data flow from legacy equipment and sensor devices lacks automation. In order for the 
USMC to obtain the data from the WSN, an individual must physically go to the COC 
and extract the necessary information, as the COC does not transmit the data acquired 
from the WSN.  
To facilitate seamless data delivery to and from the sensor devices, the network 
must be connected to another secure domain using a comprehensive communication 
protocol. The use of 6LoWPAN will significantly improve the information flow as it 
currently exists by allowing multiple operators in a unit to access sensor information 
despite their location. IP based information can be easily used to inform the situational 
awareness and common operational picture of the engaged unit. 
The feasibility of using 6LoWPAN for the operational information flow scenario 
described above is based on its ability to do two things: 1) provide for secure energy 
conserving communications with regard to the limited power devices that operate over 
the network and 2) provide secure communications by improving upon the security 
sublayer currently utilized by IEEE 802.15.4. The ability to communicate using 
6LoWPAN is meaningful only if physical and cyber security considerations are in place. 
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 Figure 1. Dimensions of the COC (AN/MSC-77) Currently Used by the USMC. 
Source: [7]. 
In this thesis, we provide cyber security solutions for 6LoWPAN that pair with 
and enable current commercial sensor technology to be employed in austere and/or 
hostile environments to support USMC operations in a secure and energy conserving 
manner. 
Our study into the applicability of a 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 
infrastructure for USMC tactical sensor networking is focused on a structured, multi-hop, 
static WSN rather than an ad hoc deployment. The objective of this thesis is to better 
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understand the feasibility and effectiveness of 6LoWPAN in an operational scenario. To 
this end, the aim is to provide an analysis of the 6LoWPAN standard by studying the 
standard’s ability to 1) provide energy conservation for the low power devices that are 
deployed, where the sensors are static and 2) implement and use a key management 
scheme that has the ability to defend against a variety of cyber security attacks that could 
cause the WSNs to become inefficient and/or ineffective. In order to achieve this 
objective, the vulnerabilities of the cyber security mechanisms used within 6LoWPAN 
WSN is evaluated. A focus on cyber security gaps and vulnerabilities within the security 
sublayer, a key management scheme that is non-broadcast but also feasible within an 
operational scenario, is determined. Finally, the effectiveness of the selected key 
management scheme on different threat models is assessed. 
D. THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
To address the objectives stated above, we developed a theoretical network design 
framework for a multi-hop WSN that uses 6LoWPAN and IEEE 802.15.4 such that it can 
be deployed for tactical operations by the USMC.  
The contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
 Development of a command and control (administrative control) structure 
of the tactical WSN that incorporates node control, a unique 
defined/centralized routing model, and a selected keying mechanism for 
data confidentiality, authentication and integrity.  
 Construction of a modified 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame 
structure to incorporate the unique centralized routing model and selected 
keying mechanism. 
 Enhancement of methods to aid in the deployment planning of the secured 
tactical WSN to prevent critical vulnerabilities. 
 Simulation and evaluation of the proposed network framework against 
multiple attacks and testing for security robustness and energy 
conservation. 
It must be noted that parts of this thesis have already been published by the author 
at the time of this writing [8].  
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that actively studies the secure 
implementation of a 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 WSN for USMC operations. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The related literature 
focusing on security within 6LoWPAN is outlined in Chapter II. The theoretical 
framework of the proposed tactical WSN model, including modifications to the frame 
structure, the routing scheme and keying mechanism, is discussed in Chapter III. The 
basis and rationale of the experimental setup as well as the threat models tested against 
the developed tactical WSN are explained in Chapter IV. The simulation results and 
analysis are given in Chapter V. The conclusion and topics for future work are proposed 
in Chapter VI. All the code created and used for the implementation of the network, 
testing models and raw simulation results are provided within the Appendix. 
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided an introduction and overview of WSNs, 
6LoWPAN/IEEE 802.15.4 and their applicability within USMC tactical operations. The 
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II. RELATED WORKS 
There is an existing foundation of research in the literature that aims to achieve 
security and energy conservation within a WSN [9]. In this thesis, we focus on 
developing specific energy conserving security measures for a tactical WSN. To that end, 
we study specific tactical WSN architectures, routing mechanisms, the 6LoWPAN frame 
structure and related cyber security mechanisms. In the following sections, we examine 
current research relating to these areas to provide a basis for the work in this thesis. 
A. ARCHITECTURE OF A TACTICAL WSN 
The architecture determines how the network is physically deployed and how the 
nodes are interconnected with one another. It also determines the types of devices to be 
used within the network and their functions. There has been work published on tactical 
WSNs that serve as a foundation for our work [10], [11]. A specific view of a tactical 
WSN architecture was taken in [10] for the deployment of the network in a large scale 
environment. The authors proposed an architectural design based on a cluster-tree 
network with multi-hop capability [10]. The cluster-tree design groups nodes into 
clusters, and a node is selected to act as a cluster head. The election of the cluster head is 
based on a node’s residual energy level [10]. The role of the cluster head is rotated 
among the nodes throughout the lifespan of the deployed tactical WSN, thereby 
conserving nodal energy. In addition, because the network is multi-hop, it allows the 
network to scale to a large environment.  
The architecture model developed in [10] was also used in the model developed 
by [11], which applied the 6LoWPAN protocol. The protocol architecture for the 
deployed nodes was separated into five protocol layers. Each layer was examined, 
detailing the functions and techniques used within the layer. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
was determined to be a suitable protocol for the physical and MAC layers [11]. While 
detailing the adaptation and network layers, the authors of [11] assumed that the nodes 
would be randomly deployed, requiring the nodes to perform a self-organizing function 
through address auto-configuration. Other functions that were discussed include routing 
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protocols, header compression, fragmentation, and energy saving [11]. Within the 
transport and application layers, the authors used a military application management 
entity that contains a military operations profile specifically defining parameters required 
for tactical deployment [11]. While [10] and [11] provide architectural constraints for 
tactical WSN deployment, cyber security mechanisms and its relationship to energy 
consumption was not discussed.  
B. ROUTING 
Multiple methods of routing in a WSN exist, each of which is geared toward 
achieving a specific purpose such as energy conservation, low delay, or high throughput. 
A unique routing approach was taken in [9] where the objective was to conceal the sink 
node due to its high value as a target for an enemy attacker. In order to keep the sink node 
concealed, a routing algorithm was proposed that obfuscated the sink node’s location 
within the deployed network, reducing the risk of attack while preserving the node’s 
energy levels. While the algorithm provided an anonymity mechanism to conceal the sink 
node within the network, a cyber security mechanism for the network communications 
using encryption and authentication was not provided. The proposed routing mechanism 
within [1] focused on the development of an energy efficient cross-layer load balancing 
and routing algorithm called EZone. With the application of the EZone routing protocol, 
the network lifetime was maximized; however, the EZone algorithm does not provide a 
mechanism for secure communications. 
In [5], the Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL), which 
uses routing control messages, was proposed as a routing mechanism for networks of low 
power devices. “RPL is an end-to-end routing solution based on IPv6 communications 
and is specially adapted for the needs of specific types of traffic flow” [12] and is capable 
of supporting control messages on multiple network architectures [5]. One of the 
disadvantages of RPL is that the protocol focuses on attacks that occur externally to the 
network rather than internally to the network [5]. The ability to provide a method of 
control over the routing scheme within the network is a form of security. This type of 
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administrative control over the routing of data is a strategic decision that is applied within 
this thesis. 
C. 6LOWPAN FRAME STRUCTURE 
In order to develop a feasible, secure design for tactical WSNs using 6LoWPAN, 
it is necessary to understand its frame structure. The composition of a 6LoWPAN frame 
was given in [13]. Given that the packet is reduced to a size of 127 bytes, some header 
information has been either removed or compressed. Two of the fields within the header 
that underwent significant compression were the IP addresses for the source and the 
destination nodes. 6LoWPAN offers two types of addressing modes where the IP address 
is either used in its entirety or is compressed. The compressed address mode offers the 
administrator an option to reduce the IPv6 address from 128 bits (16 bytes) to 16 bits (2 
bytes), which saves 14 bytes per address, saving a total of 28 bytes [5]. The authors of 
[13] also demonstrate the implementation of a Compressed IPSecurity (IPSec) packet 
proposed in [14], which uses a UDP packet structure within the 6LoWPAN frame. The 
combination of the different compression methods and the implementation of compressed 
IPSec within the 6LoWPAN frame is the underpinning of our proposed frame structure in 
this thesis. 
D. SECURITY MECHANISMS 
A survey on security for the IoT was conducted in [5], which went into detail on 
the security vulnerabilities of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard in concert with the 6LoWPAN 
protocol. Within the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the authors of [5] discussed different 
security mechanisms depending on a prescribed vulnerability. The model proposed in [5] 
included the use of approved security modes, an access control list, and time 
synchronization to limit vulnerabilities, reducing the number of potential internal attacks; 
similar security mechanisms were used in [15]. The authors of [15] also provided greater 
detail on the potential attacks that could be used at each layer of the 6LoWPAN stack. 
Encryption within the 6LoWPAN environment is a requirement in order to have 
an effective tactical WSN. Encryption has been addressed in the most recent release of 
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard [5], [15]. Multiple encryption modes are presented for use, 
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and the challenge is for the researcher to determine what mode best fits the intended 
tactical WSN application. Along with encryption, there is a method to ensure data 
authentication called a Message Integrity Code (MIC). Again, the researcher must 
determine the size of the MIC needed and if the payload can sacrifice the bits needed to 
implement the integrity mechanism. Knowing how encryption methods operate helps 
determine which one to use to defend against a variety of attacks. Advanced Encryption 
Standard-Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (AES-
CCM) is the suggested method within the 6LoWPAN standard [5]. Within the encryption 
method, an Initialization Vector (IV) is used. The combined fields within the IV provide 
a unique value to be used along with the encryption key, creating a unique encrypted 
payload for each transmitted packet. The keys for encryption are either public or private. 
Public and private shared keys both have positive and negative aspects. The application 
determines the type of key to be used. 
An adaptation of the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 infrastructure developed 
in [14] incorporates the use of encryption over the typical IP infrastructure using IPSec. 
IPSec is the protocol suite used for IP communications to encrypt and authenticate IP 
packets. The IPSec suite is an immense protocol; thus, the full implementation of IPSec is 
inefficient within the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 infrastructure. The authors of 
[14] proposed a method to reduce the overhead within the IPSec protocol while 
maintaining the protocol’s core capabilities. IPSec on the typical IP infrastructure uses 
two types of headers, the Authenticated Header (AH) and the Encapsulation Security 
Payload (ESP) header. The AH provides authentication of who sent the packet but the 
data is not encrypted, whereas in the ESP header, the data is encrypted, providing 
confidentiality to the transmitted data. Additionally, both the AH and ESP headers can be 
used together within the same packet. The information fields required for the AH and 
ESP headers are able to be incorporated within the already used header compression for 
the IP address and the Next Header field. The Next Header is an 8-bit field that identifies 
the next type of header immediately following the IPv6 header. The 6LoWPAN packet 
structure including the fields of the compressed header is shown in Figure 2. The 
proposal by [14] further examines different types of encryption methods to be used 
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within the ESP packet, including some of the security modes within the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard. 
 
 Figure 2. Sample Next Header Compression (NHC) Compressed IP/UDP Packet 
Secured with ESP. Source: [14]. 
The final type of security mechanism to be discussed is Neighbor Discovery. 
Neighbor Discovery is a method of finding neighboring nodes through which the newly 
added node can route messages. Neighbor Discovery is a known vulnerability of 
6LoWPAN networks [5]. The vulnerability lies in verifying if the neighbor is a node that 
is authorized to access the WSN. Multiple methods have been proposed to deal with this 
vulnerability, including a Lightweight Secure Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and 
Lossy Networks (LSeND) addressed in [14] as well as a variety of methods presented in 
[5]. Methods presented in [14] include RFC 6775-”Neighbor Discovery Optimization for 
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6LoWPAN,” RFC 4861-”Neighbor Discovery for IPv6,” and an adaptation of RFC 3971-
”SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND).” Given the complexity and known vulnerabilities 
of having a Neighbor Discovery protocol, limiting the capabilities of the network by 
disabling Neighbor Discovery mitigates both the complexity and vulnerabilities of the 
deployed WSN. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, some of the current research pertaining to the methods used for the 
implementation of four main elements within the tactical WSN were discussed. Also 
demonstrated is that an abundance of research exists on WSNs in general, but work that 
focuses on a deployed 6LoWPAN tactical network that is secure and uses a multi-hop 
infrastructure is limited. Due to the limited research, 6LoWPAN is a focal point for 
further exploration within tactical WSNs. 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
In this chapter, we discuss the theoretical framework for the design and 
implementation of a 6LoWPAN enabled tactical WSN using IEEE 802.15.4. This 
theoretical framework is developed with a focus on the cyber security mechanisms that 
are required for tactical deployment. We discuss 1) the network design, including the 
network devices used and their purpose, 2) the command and control (i.e., Network 
administration) parameters of the WSN, which detail specific tactical characteristics 
within the network (i.e., data routing and key management), and 3) the type of encryption 
and authentication algorithm used for the transmitted data. The network design, 
administrative privileges and encryption and authentication of the network are the three 
main components of the security architecture for the tactical WSN. We then discuss the 
6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure and the modifications that are made to 
the frame in order to deal with the cyber security considerations discussed. We also 
discuss recommendations for the deployment of the WSN for USMC tactical operations. 
Finally, the three types of cyber security attacks to be performed against the network are 
discussed. These attacks are used as an evaluation tool for the security architecture that is 
developed and is discussed further in Chapters IV and V.  
A. NETWORK DESIGN 
The proposed network design includes multiple elements, each serving a specific 
purpose. The elements included within the network architecture are as follows: master 
station (MS), base station/border router (BS), and sensor nodes. In the following sections, 
a description of each element is provided along with its intended use. In addition, the 
cyber security mechanisms associated with each network element are also provided along 
with assessments on attack mitigation. The proposed network architecture is shown in 
Figure 3 and is based on a typical mesh network. 
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 Figure 3. Proposed 6LoWPAN Network Design 
1. Master Station (MS) 
The MS serves as the central node of the network, as depicted in Figure 3. The 
proposed MS is a modified AN/MSC-77 (COC) currently used by the USMC but with 
modifications. As discussed in Chapter I, the typical USMC COC/MS unit must be 
within the line-of-sight of the WSN devices. Due to its large size, a typical COC/MS 
cannot be easily concealed. Rather than place the MS within the austere environment in 
which tactical WSNs are typically deployed, we position the MS in a structured, fortified 
military base, away from the tactical WSN region-of-interest, making it easier to protect. 
The proposed MS provides accessibility and administrative privileges to the sensor nodes 
while located at a safe, remote location away from the WSN. The MS has the ability to 
connect to each node within the internal domain since each element within the WSN 
supports two-way communication links. The MS can also connect to other servers outside 
of the WSN in order to disseminate data and populate other operator databases. When 
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connected to other servers and databases, the data becomes accessible to remote 
operators, including those deployed within the WSN’s environment. The MS also 
provides the operator a secure position to manage and control the WSN while extracting 
data from the sensor nodes. The flow of information proposed in this thesis does not 
require USMC personnel to rely on physically retrieving the stored data. 
Cyber security mechanisms for the MS have already been developed and tested 
throughout the military (i.e., security mechanisms for the COC are well known). The MS 
will not be operating within the 6LoWPAN network environment but will be able to 
decipher the encrypted payloads sent to it from a 6LoWPAN device. As a security 
measure, the encrypted payloads are the only method of communication between the 
nodes and the MS.  
2. Base Station/Border Router (BS/BR) 
The BS is the transitional element within the WSN that connects the 
6LoWPAN/internal environment to the public/external environment. This is also 
commonly known as a sink node. The proposed BS is a secured router that transmits the 
data received from the sensor nodes into an external domain. The BS receives frames 
from the sensor nodes and removes unnecessary 6LoWPAN header information. It 
reassembles the payload into the compatible external network frame structure in order 
transit to the MS. The BS performs the same task in the reverse direction, removing 
unnecessary frame headers and adding the appropriate 6LoWPAN header to send the 
frame to the sensor nodes. Within the 6LoWPAN environment, the BS converts the 
addresses between the internal and external network environments since 6LoWPAN uses 
a modified addressing mode. The BS does not interfere with the payload because it is 
encrypted. The BS only contains the necessary encryption in order to connect to the MS; 
therefore, the frame payload to be transmitted remains secure. The actual transition of 
frames from one domain to the other is not the focus of this thesis and is not discussed at 
length. 
The BS is restricted to 63 hops from the furthest node since the hop limit field 
within the frame structure consists of only six bits. The hop-limit field is further 
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discussed in Section D. Since the BS connects the WSN to an external network, it 
requires either a dedicated electrical supply, a generator, or robust battery supply as more 
power is needed to transmit a signal strong enough to reach the external domain. The BS 
is also able to withstand the harsh environments in which it is deployed and is much 
smaller than the COC since it does not need to have workstations available within the 
unit. The smaller size of the BS also allows it to be concealed more easily within the 
deployed environment. The BS should also contain anti-tamper technology to prevent 
physical modifications or reverse engineering of the device. Anti-tampering is already 
implemented on deployed USMC sensor devices [3]. We assume that the same tamper 
proof mechanisms can be implemented on the BS as well.  
3. Sensor Node 
The sensor nodes are the end elements. Each node is designed to attach to 
multiple types of sensors and to send data to the MS for compilation and analysis. The 
node is assumed to have the sensor capabilities as described in [3], including which 
sensors can be connected and which modes of operation are offered. The nodes have the 
ability to withstand the harsh environment and the capability to relay frames to the 
intended destinations. The node remains at its deployed location in order to maintain a 
static network. This facilitates our ability to sustain its continued connection to the MS 
and to monitor each node’s energy use. The sensor nodes communicate with the MS only 
through encrypted payload routed through the BS. The nodes are deployed and contain 
anti-tamper physical security measures as noted in the USMC manual [3]. 
4. Attack Mitigation for Network Design 
Vulnerabilities associated with the design of this tactical WSN include single 
points-of-failure and physical protection of the sensor nodes. The MS and BS are single 
points-of-failure to the WSN, and if removed, the network is no longer accessible and 
unable to be used. A denial-of-service (DOS) attack exploits this type of vulnerability. 
The MS has a greater impact on the WSN since it provides reachability, accessibility, and 
administrative privileges to the sensor nodes. The BS can be replaced by another BS 
without affecting the encryption or payload data transmission between the nodes and MS. 
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The vulnerability of the MS and BS is not the focus of this thesis, but the military does 
have similar devices in place today. Lastly, the physical protection of the nodes and BS 
remains an accepted risk. The deployed nodes will be able to detect an enemy 
approaching since the sensors can detect threatening events. The ability to sense 
potentially hostile events allows the sensor nodes to report suspicious data before 
becoming compromised, and if compromised, the node is removed by the MS to prevent 
further corruption within the WSN. In the end, the node is still able to perform the job it 
was deployed to do by detecting the enemy’s presence even if it becomes compromised.  
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL (ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL) 
The administrative control aspects of the WSN are critically related to its 
functionality as well as the implementation of its cyber security mechanisms. In this 
thesis, the cyber security mechanisms that are implemented enable only the necessary 
features required for the WSN to function. These mechanisms are controlled by the MS. 
The control mechanisms of the MS include node control, centralized routing, and keying 
mechanisms. Using a centralized entity, such as the MS, to perform these functions, we 
limit attacks on the network.  
1. Node Control 
The MS maintains a directory of all of the networks connected to the BS as well 
as the sensor nodes within each network. The sensor nodes in the network are controlled 
by the MS via encrypted payload. The encrypted payload contains information that 
includes when the node provides real-time coverage or when the node stores detected 
events and transmits them in bulk at a later time [3]. Since all of the control messages are 
encrypted within the payload, the encryption provides the ability to securely control each 
node. The control of each node is limited to the MS. The MS serves as a centralized 
controller of all network functions. This centralization of control removes the need to 
send an individual to make a modification to the BS or sensor for a new task; instead the 
node can be adjusted immediately from the MS. In the event a node is in the process of 
being compromised, the MS can remove the node from the network as well as reset the 
node to delete its cryptographic and routing information, preventing the enemy from 
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obtaining any data. The ability to remove the node either before, during, or after it has 
been compromised is a mitigating factor to the risks of a node deployed in a hostile 
environment.  
2. Centralized Routing 
As has been stated, the MS contains a directory of all nodes connected in the 
network. The MS implements centralized routing functions by controlling each sensor 
node’s routing table. In the network, data is either routed upstream, from the sensor node 
to the MS, or downstream, from the MS to the sensor nodes. For upstream data, each 
sensor node is only able to route data to two neighboring sensor nodes; each node has a 
primary path to the MS through one neighbor and a secondary path to the MS through the 
second neighbor. Exceptions to this include sensor nodes that are directly connected to 
the BS or when a sensor node is deployed to a location in which only one other node 
(neighbor) is within its wireless range. The sensor node also performs in the same manner 
downstream, but the limitation of two nodes is not enforced in order to compensate for 
network expansion. This gives the MS the ability to implement energy cost saving 
measures within the network by adjusting the routing scheme to alleviate the workload of 
drained nodes. Controlling the frame flow within the network is also a way to protect the 
network from outside attacks by not receiving and routing frames from invalid sources. 
The centralized routing scheme allows the MS to add new nodes to the network 
by adding the new node’s address information into the neighboring node’s routing table 
via the encrypted payload. The MS also adds the necessary routing table information to 
the new node during the network setup. This method prevents the need for a neighbor 
discovery protocol, which is noted as a vulnerability within 6LoWPAN [5], [15]. The MS 
can also remove compromised or expired nodes by removing the node from the 
neighboring nodes’ routing tables; thus, any data sent from the obsolete node(s) is not 
routed. 
An example of the centralized routing scheme of deployed sensors at an 
intersection is shown in Figure 4. An intersection was used as an example since these 
devices track not only personnel but tanks or other manned vehicles [3]. The sensors are 
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not limited to deployment at an intersection as they may also be deployed along a 
perimeter of a base or along a path of intended traffic. If an anomaly within the traffic 
flow occurs, it may mean an impending attack or an attack by the enemy is already 
underway within the area. To provide full coverage of an intersection, sensors are placed 
on each side of the road. The primary and secondary routing paths are marked, with every 
node having a secondary path except for the nodes with a direct link to the BS. 
 
 Figure 4. Centralized Routing Scheme that Depicts the Primary and 
Secondary Paths for Each Node 
As discussed within the description of the MS, administrative control of the nodes 
is performed by the MS via encrypted payloads. If a node were to become compromised, 
the MS edits the nearby nodes’ routing tables via the encrypted payloads and then 
removes the compromised node from the network. An example of a compromised node 
and the adjustments made to the primary and secondary paths of the surrounding devices 
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is shown in Figure 5. In Figure 5, node 17 is the compromised node. The centralized 
routing scheme is adjusted to not allow a frame to be transmitted to or from the 
compromised node (node 17) as it is no longer in the routing tables of any node within 
the WSN. The routing adjustments depicted in Figure 5 include nodes 12, 13, 16, 18 and 
21. Each of these nodes loses its secondary routes, thereby limiting its ability to transmit 
to only one other node. Essentially, all paths that contain node 17 are removed, thereby 
isolating the compromised node. The adjustments in the routing path force some nodes to 
assume additional traffic loads, but the WSN is able to remain effective until the 
compromised node is repaired or replaced. 
 
 Figure 5. Centralized Routing Scheme With a Compromised Node that Depicts the 
Changes to the Primary and Secondary Paths of the Surrounding Devices 
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3. Data Transfer / Hidden Node Mitigations 
A mechanism to transport data between nodes needs to be determined; however, 
the transporting mechanism to be used within an energy constrained environment must 
limit the creation of new network traffic. The authors of [14] use the User Datagram 
Protocol (UDP) as the basis of their packet structure, which in turn is the basis of the 
frame structure employed in this thesis. Unlike the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), 
UDP does not use a handshake dialog for connection establishment and does not transmit 
acknowledgements for packets received. This allows the transfer of data to occur much 
faster and with less overhead [16]. UDP also supports broadcast, multi-cast, and 
unidirectional communications. We focus on unidirectional UDP communications as it is 
better suited for the keying mechanism that is developed and used in this thesis. We 
discuss this further in the next subsections.  
As mentioned above, UDP is a connectionless, best-effort mechanism used to 
route network traffic. This means that the sending nodes do not receive confirmation that 
the transmitted frame was correctly received [16]. To provide assurance that frames are 
received correctly within an unreliable transport protocol (i.e., UDP), we use a unique 
implicit acknowledgement detection mechanism. This unique implicit detection 
mechanism operates as described in the following paragraphs. 
As previously mentioned, the communication links between the nodes are 
reciprocal; therefore, each node is able to see the next-hop transmission of the frame. 
This confirms that the frame was properly received without errors and forwarded. If the 
sending node does not see the next-hop node’s transmission, the sending node determines 
the frame needs to be retransmitted and performs the retransmission after the 
predetermined back-off period. If the transmitting node is forwarding to a relay node to 
funnel the traffic to the BS, a small random increment of time (seed number) is added to 
the back-off period. The predetermined back-off period is similar to carrier-sense 
multiple access-collision avoidance (CSMA-CA) with binary exponential back-off (BEB) 
in which the time between retransmissions doubles after each failed transmission attempt 
[17]. The seed number is applied in order to prevent repeated attempts at transmitting a 
frame at the same time as a neighboring node. If the sending node does not see the 
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transmission of the frame from the follow-on node after four re-transmissions, the 
sending node repeats the same process with the node designated in the routing table as 
the secondary route. 
The primary advantage to using an implicit acknowledgment detection 
mechanism is the ability to ensure that a frame was received by the next-hop node 
without the extra network traffic required to set up sessions or send feedback control 
messages (acknowledgement frames) as used by other types of protocols. Essentially, this 
implicit acknowledgement detection mechanism takes advantage of the listening 
capability that each node has to detect transmissions within its transmission range. A 
disadvantage to this mechanism is the possibility of the originating node detecting the 
transmission of the follow-on node, which is transmitting a previously received frame 
from another node. The receiving node then uses the transmitted frame by the follow-on 
node as confirmation of a successful receipt.  
This implicit acknowledgement detection mechanism cannot be applied to the 
nodes next to the BS as a result of the BS’s transition and subsequent transmittal of the 
frame into the public domain. The neighboring nodes of the BS is not able to detect the 
follow-on transmission the BS makes since it is beyond the node’s capabilities. With the 
assumption that the BS has a dedicated power supply, the BS is continuously awake and 
ready to receive any frame sent to it. All of the traffic within the network is then funneled 
into the nodes surrounding the BS, which increases the network traffic. By limiting the 
BS’s neighboring nodes to one transmission per frame, we reduce the possibility of 
congestion. With the increase in traffic density of the BS’s surrounding nodes, hidden 
nodes also become a factor to consider. A hidden node scenario is illustrated in Figure 6, 
where node A and C are not able to detect each other’s transmission while transmitting to 
node B; therefore, node A is hidden to node C and vice versa. Hidden nodes within the 
network also create congestion because transmissions can collide, causing the received 
frame to be corrupted. 
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 Figure 6. Hidden Node Diagram 
In order to mitigate hidden nodes near the BS, extra relay nodes are used to funnel 
the traffic toward the BS, thereby removing possible hidden nodes from around the BS. A 
network implementation without the use of the extra relay nodes to funnel the network 
traffic is shown in Figure 7. Nodes 1 through 4 can transmit to the BS; however, nodes 1 
and 2 cannot see node 4 and nodes 3 and 4 cannot see node 1, creating a hidden node 
problem. If nodes 1 and 4 transmitted at the same time, a collision would occur, and the 
frame would be lost. The use of utilizing extra relay nodes within the vicinity of the BS to 
avoid hidden node problems is shown in Figure 8. Within the network design and prior to 
deployment, the BS is moved further away from nodes 1 through 4 to allow for the 
addition of nodes 25 and 26 to the network. The BS is then far enough away to not be 
affected by nodes 1 through 4 and can only see nodes 25 and 26, while node 25 can only 
see 1, 2, 26 and the BS and, similarly, node 26 can only see nodes 3, 4, 25 and the BS. 
Nodes 25 and 26 are now functioning as a relay/sensing node and can see each other 
within the network. Since the extra relay nodes can see each other, the nodes do not 
transmit at the same time, preventing collisions from occurring at the BS. Also since 
nodes 25 and 26 are extra relay sensing nodes, they are able to concentrate on sensing the 
area around the BS to provide further physical security to the high value device.  
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One final modification was made to the delay in time between the first and second 
transmissions of a node. The first transmission is typically used to wake-up the receiving 
node, which affects the implementation of the BEB protocol. Traditionally, the BEB 
waits zero or one time slot before attempting a first transmission. Thereafter, the wait 
time doubles (two slots, four slots, eight slots, etc.) before each re-transmission. In our 
implementation, the BEB is modified as follows. A node waits 6.0 ms after the first 
transmission before trying to re-transmit. The transmitting node does not know if the 
next-hop node is awake, thus this time permits the next-hop node to wake-up in 
preparation to receive the incoming frame for the second retransmission. The BEB begins 
after the second transmission but with an initial back-off time delay of 10.0 ms which 
then doubles after each successive unsuccessful attempt to transmit to the follow-on 
node. Thus, in our implementation, back-off times between the first and second 
transmissions do not follow the typical BEB delay of zero or one time slots; doubling of 
wait time does not occur until after the second transmission. 
 
 Figure 7. Network Design Without the Use of Extra Relay Nodes  
to Illustrate the Hidden Node Problem 
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 Figure 8. Network Design With the Use of Extra Relay Nodes (Nodes 25 and 26)  
to Illustrate a Remedy for the Hidden Node Problem 
Each node has the ability to store frames that cannot be successfully forwarded. 
After a period of time, the node repeats the same process to forward the stored frame. By 
waiting a period of time without retransmitting, the node does not add to network 
congestion, thereby reducing possible collisions or delays. This is a capability already 
demonstrated within [3] in its ability to store all events and transmit them at a specified 
time given by the network administrator. 
4. Keying Mechanisms 
A keying mechanism is needed to protect the information being transported 
between the nodes and the MS. Multiple keying mechanisms may be implemented, such 
as a private keying mechanism, in which each node has its own unique key, or a public 
keying mechanism, in which each node has both a private key specific to each node and a 
public key that is shared between all of the nodes. Previous research from [5] determined 
that after evaluating the energy requirements of public keying, private keying is the most 
efficient method to encrypt the payload. Public keying was also determined to have 
vulnerabilities, including an increase in transmissions throughout the network to update 
the keys. The focus of this thesis is to evaluate a non-broadcast key management method; 
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therefore, individual frames are also used to disseminate each key update, creating more 
transmissions and, in turn, increasing energy use.  
With the use of a private key, each node has a unique key that is only shared with 
the MS. As mentioned previously, the BS does not have any of the encryption keys 
shared between the nodes and the MS, but the BS does have a separate keying 
mechanism shared with the MS. The external network and, specifically, the keying 
mechanism for the external network are already in use in other areas within the military 
and is not the focus of this thesis. 
5. Attack Mitigation for Administrative Control 
Administrative control allows for mitigating factors if the WSN has nodes that are 
attacked via man-in-the-middle (MITM) or DOS. Each of these attacks requires an 
individual or remote device to be near the WSN, but the attacker is detected prior to 
performing the attack due to the sensing capabilities of the sensor node as previously 
mentioned above [3]. The centralized routing scheme prevents the intruder from further 
infecting and draining the rest of the network’s power resources. Use of a keying 
mechanism also protects the data during transportation over the network; therefore, 
MITM or spoofing attacks are not able to change any of the data nor are they able to 
eavesdrop. 
C. ENCRYPTION 
Multiple encryption algorithms based on private keying are available. The 
algorithms include the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC), and RSA. Each encryption method is authorized by the National 
Security Agency (NSA), which sets the encryption standards for the Department of 
Defense and establishes key lengths for various classification levels [18]. The most recent 
IEEE 802.15.4 standard lists eight security modes ranging from no encryption (one 
mode) to different versions of AES (seven modes) [5]. As a result, AES is used as the 
keying mechanism in this thesis. The seven modes of AES boast different levels of 
encryption and authentication. Since the devices being used can be located within a 
hostile environment and are interacting with government networks, the highest levels of 
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security are required within the WSN; therefore, the data must be encrypted and 
authenticated. To meet these requirements, AES-CCM with 128 bit keys is used as the 
keying mechanism to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. It is shown 
that the selected encryption method also protects against MITM and spoofing. The 
keying mechanism is further discussed in the next section. 
D. 6LOWPAN ENABLED IEEE 802.15.4 FRAME STRUCTURE 
The proposed 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame structure is shown in 
Figure 9 and is based on the structure defined in [14] with header compression schemes. 
In this thesis, we modified the frame structure to incorporate the previously discussed 
cyber security mechanisms. The fields within the frame structure are defined in the 
following subsections. 
1. Frame Control (2 Bytes) 
This field has been defined by the 802.15.4 standard [13]. 
2. Source MAC Address / Destination MAC Address (8 Bytes Each) 
This field has been defined by the 802.15.4 standard [13]. 
 
 Figure 9. Proposed 6LoWPAN Frame Structure 


















3. LOWPAN IPHC(2 Bytes) 
This field has been defined by RFC 6282 [19] with no changes made. 
4. Path (2 Bits) /Hop Limit (6 Bits) 
The proposed centralized routing mechanism defined in this thesis limits the 
direction each frame can take to reach the BS from the transmitting node. This 
mechanism is a modification from the proposed frame structure in [14]. We use the 
Path/Hop Limit field in the following manner. The Path/Hop Limit field is a total of eight 
bits (one byte). Within the Path/Hop Limit byte, the first two bits are used to help the MS 
determine if there is an issue with a node routing frames. Specifically, the first two bits 
are used individually to determine whether the frame was transmitted over a primary or 
secondary route. The second bit is used only by the source node. In the event the primary 
route is used to send the frame, the bit is 0. If the secondary route is used, then the bit is 
1. The same method is applied to the first bit and is used by all nodes except the 
originating node. When the MS receives the frame, it is known if a node was not able to 
transmit to a designated primary node. Depending on the modes of operation selected, the 
MS may be able to determine which node may be off line or compromised instead of 
waiting for a response or detection. The final six bits limit the number of hops a frame 
can take to 26–1, or 63 hops. Limiting the number of hops to 63 does not present an issue 
since the nodes adjacent/neighboring to the BS are not able to support a large network of 
nodes. In other words, we want to maintain energy efficiency within the network. By 
reducing the possible number of hops within the network, we provide battery relief to 
those nodes, particularly those near the BS, that have to transmit data regularly.  
5. Initialization Vector (16 Bytes) 
The IV is used to help protect against replay attacks and is also used in the CCM 
process to encrypt the payload [5]. The IV is shown as the shaded portion of the frame in 
Figure 9. To prevent replay attacks, the IV is a combination of unique identifiers. These 
identifiers include a frame counter (four bytes), source and destination IP address (two 
bytes each), source and destination port address (two bytes each), flags (one byte), and 
length of packet (one byte). The combination of these parameters is unique and prevents 
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duplicate IVs; in addition, an IV cannot be repeated during the life of the network. The 
sequence number field has been removed from the frame structure originally given in 
[14].  
a. Source IP Address / Destination IP Address (2 Bytes Each)  
The addresses are in the compressed 16-bit mode, thus incurring smaller overhead 
as described within [14]. 
b. LOWPAN NHC(2 Bytes) 
This field is defined by RFC 6282 [19] with no changes made. 
c. Flags (1 Byte) 
This field is reserved for the originating source and each bit is designated by the 
administrator of the WSN. 
d. Frame Counter (4 Bytes) 
The field keeps track of the sequential order of frames sent; therefore, a separate 
sequence number field outside of the IV is not required. 
e. Source Port /Destination Port (2 Bytes Each) 
These fields have no changes or compression modifications [14]. 
f. Length of IP Header (1 Byte) 
This field is reduced to one byte since the maximum frame size is 127 bytes. 
6. Payload (71 Bytes) 
The payload is the amount of data that can actually be transmitted. The data is 
encrypted, providing confidentiality during data transmission using the combination of 
the IV and the AES-CCM 128 bit key.  
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7. Message Integrity Code (16 Bytes) 
To provide authentication and integrity, a MIC is created within the AES-CCM 
mode of encryption and is attached to the end of the frame. The MIC is a hash unique to 
the packet and is used to verify that no changes were made to the original message. The 
MIC provides another layer of protection against any attack that tries to inject or change 
data being transmitted. 
8. Next Header (1 Byte) 
This is used in higher layers and remains unchanged [14]. 
9. CRC (2 Bytes Each) 
This field has no changes or compression modifications [14]. 
E. TRANSITION 
As previously mentioned, the transition of the frame from one domain to the other 
must be completed by the BS. Since the 6LoWPAN frame contains information that the 
MS needs to properly assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the WSN, the BS must 
transfer information from the necessary fields of the 6LoWPAN frame to the frame used 
on the external domain. Fields needed by the MS include the Path, IV, Payload, Next 
Header, and MIC. Not included in the IV but needed by the MS to analyze the route 
taken within the WSN are the path indicator bits; however, this field is only required 
when the BS is transitioning a frame from the WSN to the MS. The path indicator bits are 
not required when making the transition from the MS to the WSN since the nodes 
deployed within the WSN do not have the capability to perform that type of analysis.  
F. DEPLOYMENT OF NODES 
The deployment of the WSN is similar to [3] but with some modifications. It is 
proposed to first create the intended network, then connect the devices to the MS, and 
finally deploy the devices. Creating the network first requires setup of the key exchange 
for encryption purposes, the routing table to be loaded, and evaluation of ideal physical 
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placements for the nodes. The administrator determines the physical location of the node 
within the designated network. 
1. Key Exchange/Routing Table 
After the network is designed and all of the routing tables have been constructed, 
the information for each node needs to be transferred to the node and BS. Each node and 
BS is physically connected to the MS for bootstrapping. The private key for the device 
and the constructed routing table is transferred to the node and BS. The routing table is 
transferred to the nodes by the MS to enable the nodes to connect to the network. The key 
exchange consists of a private key that is only shared between the MS and the node. The 
physical transfer of each unique key exists to prevent an enemy from gaining access to an 
entire network’s information simply by obtaining the key from one node. By using a 
private key unique to each node, the enemy only has access to that node’s information. 
This also allows the MS to remove the node from the network by adjusting routing tables 
of surrounding nodes without compromising the rest of the network. Using a key also 
allows the MS to perform other security procedures, including resetting the node 
completely before it is compromised, thus preventing the enemy from obtaining 
information stored on the node. 
2. Physical Placement 
While connected, the MS is able to maintain a geographical map of deployed 
nodes and map the deployment of any new node. This helps determine if the pending 
placement of the new node is able to connect to surrounding nodes. This is critical to the 
deployment of the WSN since it helps track enemy movements and position. Since the 
MS is also able to compile data from all deployed nodes, this allows the data to be 
utilized by more entities. For example, warning messages can be automatically 
disseminated to surrounding units if a certain threshold is met, alerting them of enemy 
activity within the area. 
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3. Network Connection 
Since the physical location of the node is known and the surrounding nodes 
within reach, the placement of the nodes within the network can be determined. The MS 
can then add the node to the desired network. If the node can be added to multiple 
networks, then the MS must determine which network is the most energy efficient 
network to add the node. 
G. PROPOSED ATTACKS 
Three different types of attacks are conducted in the simulated environment: 
spoofing, MITM, and DOS. Each attack uses a different method of execution and exploits 
different vulnerabilities within a network, but as previously reviewed, the implemented 
cyber security mechanism can either prevent or lead to the detection of an attack, which 
triggers the deployment of mitigation methods that maintain the integrity of the network. 
The attacker in each of the following scenarios is assumed to be an experienced hacker. 
Under this assumption, the attacker knows what MAC and IP addresses to use within the 
injection frame as well as the key used for the cyclic redundancy check (CRC); however, 
it is assumed that knowledge of the pre-shared key between the node and the MS is not 
known. 
1. Spoofing 
Spoofing is simulated by a rogue node pretending to be a legitimate node within 
the network. To conduct the attack, a device is required to be within range of the next-
hop node. The frame is then transmitted to the next-hop node to increase the probability 
that it will traverse the network. Operating under the assumption that the attacker is 
experienced, the frame successfully reaches the MS. The MS then examines the frame 
and determines the frame is not authentic since the MIC does not match, therefore 
dropping the frame. The MS also records the node the frame was from for future 
comparison. After multiple frames have been received, the MS can analyze the results 
and determine if there is a rogue node within the network. The actions of the rogue node 
can be mitigated by removing the node that was initially spoofed, denying all traffic sent 
by either of the nodes. 
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2. MITM
A MITM attack is simulated by placing a node between two network nodes. 
When a network node transmits a frame, the attacking node intercepts and changes the 
data within the frame before transmitting the original frame to the next-hop node. The 
frame still transits the network and reaches the MS. The MS examines the frame and 
determines it is not authentic while recording the result within its logs. Since a MITM 
attack affects more than one node, it is assumed that the MS can rapidly determine that a 
rogue node has invaded the network. The neighboring nodes affected by the attacking 
node can then be removed from the network. 
3. DOS
A DOS attack is the disruption of services to a specific node within the network. 
To simulate a DOS attack on a node, a continuously transmitting rogue node is placed 
near a network node. This keeps the affected node constantly receiving from the rogue 
node, which prevents the network node from transmitting any detected events or 
forwarding any frames from other nodes. Using the path indicator bits within the frame, 
the MS can determine where the disruption is occurring and modify the networks routing 
tables to mitigate the disabled node. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Within this chapter technical, physical and administrative controls were discussed 
in order to provide a secure networking environment for a deployed tactical WSN. The 
physical infrastructure of the network design was discussed along with technical controls 
for each element within the design. To provide administrative controls over the deployed 
tactical WSN, a centralized routing mechanism is used in conjunction with a route 
indicator (path bits). A modified implicit detection mechanism is also implemented to 
provide assurance of transmitted frames between nodes. Next a keying mechanism was 
selected to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication to the information sent. 
In order to implement the proposed network design, centralized routing mechanism, and 
keying mechanism, the frame structure was modified and discussed. Finally, in order to 
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deploy a secure, tactical WSN, the preparation of the tactical WSN was discussed and 
critical steps were recommended. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this chapter, we discuss the experimental setup used to perform network 
simulations using MATLAB. These simulations test the efficacy of the cyber security 
mechanisms implemented in the theoretical framework. We start by describing the 
characteristics of the sensor nodes used in the simulations, the phases of operation of 
each sensor node and the frame parameters. We then describe the network parameters in 
relation to the simulation. Lastly, we discuss the simulation program including the 
different WSN modules that were developed, the required user files, and the simulation 
logs. 
A. SENSOR PARAMETERS 
The sensor-node attachment for the purpose of detecting events is not the focus of 
this thesis; however, some detection parameters are assumed in order to have a fully 
functioning network simulation. The sensors in all simulations are the Magnetic Intrusion 
Detector (MAGID) described within [3]. This sensor is designed to detect large vehicles 
such as tanks and small vehicles as well as individuals; although, detection ranges vary 
depending on the power level being used and the element size. 
During the simulations, sensors are set on a low power setting and emplaced 
along a two-lane intersection. The deployment of the nodes with an attached MAGID are 
shown in Figure 10. The low power setting has a maximum range of 15.0 m for the 
detection of vehicles, whereas the maximum range for the detection of individuals is 4.0 
m [3]. The ranges are illustrated by the ellipses in Figure 10 to exhibit the detection areas 
of the deployed sensors. The extra relay nodes near the BS are not shown in Figure 10 
since the focus of the figure is to illustrate sensor coverage.  
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 Figure 10. MADIG Deployment Coverage of an Intersection (Extra Relay Nodes 
Providing Coverage to the BS are Not Displayed) 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the extra relay nodes are used to funnel the network 
traffic to the BS and prevent hidden nodes. In addition, the extra relay nodes provide 
coverage to the WSN’s only single point of failure, the BS. A close up view of the BS, 
demonstrating how the extra relay nodes function together as a sensing node and the 
resulting coverage is shown in Figure 11. 
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 Figure 11. Close-up View of the MAGID Deployment Coverage of the Extra Relay 
Nodes Used to Funnel Traffic to the BS and Avoid Hidden Nodes 
B. NODE CHARACTERISTICS 
Each node transitions between multiple phases of operation/execution. The 
various phases of node operation along with the amount of power (in mW) that is used at 
each phase and the duration of each phase (in ms) are outlined in Table 1. These metrics 
identify the amount of time and energy used by the node to perform its functions in the 
simulations. The duration times shown in Table 1 were adopted from [20]; however, we 
rounded these times to the nearest millisecond because the simulation program we 
developed is based on one millisecond increments.  
The Receive-Transmit (RX-TX) requires the node to switch from receiving to 
transmitting in order to transmit the frame and then switch back to receiving; thus, the 
execution of transmitting a frame requires two RX-TX phases, one to switch from 
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receiving to transmitting and two to switch from transmitting to receiving. The RX-TX 
phase within [20] has a period of 0.4 ms, which totals 0.8 ms during the transmission and 
receiving process of a frame. Since our simulation program’s smallest increment in time 
is 1.0 ms, 0.8 ms is rounded to 1.0 ms and is used to represent the two RX-TX switching 
phases detailed in Table 1. 
To complete a frame transmission, the node must execute the following phases, 
totaling a period of 7.0 ms: CSMA, RX-TX switch, transmit, and RX-TX switch. 
 Table 1.  Phases of Node Operation. Adapted from [20]. 
Multiple logs record the status of the node throughout the lifespan of the network. 
One log only records each time a node transitions from one phase to another, while 
another log tracks the status in which the node is currently, and a third log is used to 
record the node’s time in phase by the millisecond. The node’s status logs are critical 
since they are used by multiple modules within the simulation program. The node’s status 
logs include the expiration time for the phase in which the node is to prevent the node 
from performing/entering another phase. In most simulation programs, detailed status 
change logs and current node status logs are not available to the researcher, limiting a 
researcher’s ability to troubleshoot any errors. As this network is meant to be deployed 
by the USMC, the ability to troubleshoot is imperative; thus, we provide the researcher 
with the pertinent logs. These logs are further discussed in Section G of this chapter.  
Within [20], encryption was not addressed. We assumed encryption was not 












the time and power draw for encryption into the simulation. In [21], metrics for various 
brands of sensor nodes performing multiple methods of encryption with varying key sizes 
are given. To give the best results, we chose to use the TelosB platform since it is more 
power efficient [21]. Within the TelosB platform, we used the power draw and times 
obtained from the implementation of AES 128 to match our WSN model. The power 
draw and time metrics with AES 128 incorporated are shown in Table 2. 
 Table 2.  Power Draw and Duration Time to Perform 
AES-128 Encryption. Adapted from [21]. 
The nodes within the simulation are only awake for the time period in which there 
is activity. If a node does not have any activity for 25.0 ms, it transitions to the sleep 
phase. The duration of 25.0 ms was chosen to compensate for transmissions occurring 
when the node is processing a received frame from a node that is hidden from the 
transmitting node. The duration of 25.0 ms accounts for the time between the third and 
fourth transmissions, CSMA-CA, and both the RX-TX switch phases between actual 
transmissions of a frame, allowing the follow-on node to see the retransmission before 
entering its sleep phase. 
There may be instances when the transmitting node cycles through both the 
primary and secondary routes without a confirmation of the next hop node transmitting 
the frame. In this situation, the transmitting node stores the packet and waits 1.0 s plus a 
seed number between 1 and 200. This provides enough time for the network to clear any 
data congestion, transmit all the frames to the BS, and allow all the nodes to enter their 
sleep phase. 
C. FRAME PARAMETERS 
As with a node, the frame also transitions through multiple phases. The phases 
include creation (unprocessed), transmission, processing, and completion. A log is also 
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maintained, which tracks the status of the frame as it transitions between phases. Within 
the log, a phase expiration is attached to each node’s entry and coincides with the 
duration metrics used for the nodes. 
D. NETWORK PARAMETERS 
As previously discussed, the network implements a modified CSMA-CA BEB 
protocol with an additional seed number added to the BEB for frames transiting from the 
neighboring nodes to the BS. The primary focus of this section is to discuss the modified 
CSMA-CA BEB and the parameters used. We also discuss the addition of the seed 
number for the nodes forwarding traffic to the BS via an extra relay node.  
1. Modified CSMA-CA BEB
CSMA-CA BEB is a protocol that determines a set time period between 
transmissions of the same frame to avoid collisions with other transmissions from other 
nodes. Once the initial time period is determined, each retransmission doubles the 
previous time period between the transmitted frames [17]; however, this model is used 
within the IEEE 802.11 standard and assumes that each node is awake and receiving the 
frame [17]. Within the simulated network, when the nodes are no longer forwarding or 
sensing other events, they go to sleep to conserve energy. This sleep feature requires the 
transmitting node to send a frame to wake-up the next hop node. Even though it only 
takes 1.0 ms for a node to wake up, the transmitting node must take into account that the 
next-hop node might already be awake and receive the frame successfully; thus, the time 
the transmitting node must wait before beginning the second transmission process is 6.0 
ms, which permits receipt of the next-hop node’s transmission. 
After the second transmission, the typical BEB takes place with the initial back-
off period of 10.0 ms, then 20.0 ms after the third transmission and 40.0 ms after the 
fourth transmission. If forwarding of the frame has not been detected after completing the 
fourth transmission, the transmitting node switches the frames next-hop destination to the 
secondary route. The transmitting node then performs the same sequence again while 
simultaneously adjusting the designated path bits within the header. 
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2. Seed Number
The CSMA-CA BEB protocol also provides a method to alleviate network 
congestion in the node by retransmitting at different set time intervals [17]. To prevent 
the occurrence of two nodes transmitting at the same time near the BS, a seed number 
between 1.0 and 4.0 ms is added to the back-off time. The seed number creates disparity 
between the back-off times between transmitting nodes. With the application of the seed 
number, neighboring nodes that initially transmit at the same time has a smaller 
probability of retransmitting at the same time since each node applies a random seed 
number to the BEB. This helps mitigate congestion caused by collisions as the network 
begins to taper to the BS. 
E. SIMULATION PROGRAM 
To replicate the network, the simulation must be able to mimic multiple frames 
transiting the network at one time. Multiple parts of the network must also be able to 
function simultaneously. Given these factors into consideration, the driving mechanism 
of the program is time based. For every iteration, each function is cycled through the 
network while logs track each node’s status, time in phase, frame status, and the creation 
of new events within the network. In the following subsections, the different modules that 
were programmed in MATLAB to deal with the various network functions performed 
within the simulated environment are discussed. 
1. Main
The cornerstone of the simulation program is the module, Main. In Main, the 
network is created when multiple modules assign user supplied files to simulate an 
already deployed network. The files contain the routing table, node addresses, events to 
simulate, and empty logs for the simulation. Logs created within the simulation include a 
PCAP log, a transiting packets log, and each node’s time in phase log. Within the Main 
module, the researcher may select which event table to use during the simulation. The 
event table provides sensor detections which simulates a series of real-life events that 
trigger a node to create a frame which is subsequently transmitted to the MS. Main is also 
where the researcher can select the type of attack and determine which node the attack 
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targets within the network. This information is then used by the other modules within the 
simulation program. 
2. Run Simulation 
Within Run Simulation, the timer begins at 0.0 ms and increases by 1.0 ms after 
cycling through all functions. The timer appends a 10.0 s cushion after the last event to 
ensure the network is clear and all retransmissions have been completed. Without an 
added cushion, the nodes within the network are not able to complete all phases; the time 
cushion ensures the network is free from active packets. Once the simulation time is 
computed, the simulation begins cycling through the major functions 1.0 ms at a time. 
These functions mimic multiple aspects of the network, which including detecting 
collisions, ensuring the nodes and frames transition to the next phase, the creation of new 
packets due to a triggered event, and the tracking of the nodes phase status to calculate its 
total power draw. 
3. Check For Errors 
The Check For Errors module is one of the sub modules within the Run 
Simulation module. It cycles through all open frames within the network. The module 
specifically looks for nodes that are transmitting and compares them to a precompiled list 
of nodes that affect the receiving node. If a neighboring node of the receiving node is also 
transmitting, a collision occurs and data is not correctly received. The affected frames are 
then marked with an error and are not successful during the processing of the frame, 
resulting in retransmission from the transmitting node. 
4. Check Node Status 
The next sub module within the Run Simulation module is the Check Node Status 
module. This module performs the necessary transitions to ensure each node transitions 
to its next phase at the appropriate time as the nodes within the network cycle through 
different phases. The Check Node Status module checks the node’s current status and 
compares the phase expiration time within the log and the current time. If the phase 
expiration time is reached, the node’s status is changed by removing the node from its 
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current phase and placing it in a waiting phase; this allows the node to transition into 
another phase in the following modules. Multiple logs are maintained to record each 
phase transition of the nodes; however, the transition is not yet recorded in the time in 
phase log since the node may transition into another phase in later modules.  
5. Check For Open Packets 
The Check For Open Packets is also a sub module contained within the Run 
Simulation module. It cycles through all of the active or open frames within the network, 
checking the phase expiration times attached to each frame. When the phase expiration 
time of the frame is over, the next phase to be executed for the frame is initiated. This 
module is used to perform the processing of a new or received frame and transmit the 
packet. Before executing the next phase, the node status is also checked to ensure the 
node is available to perform the next phase of the frame. The following are sub modules 
contained within the Check For Open Packets module. 
a. Transmission 
The main function of the Transmission module is to simulate the frame’s 
transmission within the network. The module checks the neighboring nodes to determine 
if one is transmitting by listening to see if the channel is clear, a key piece of the CSMA-
CA protocol implemented within the simulation. After determining the neighboring 
nodes are not transmitting, the node then transitions into a transmitting state. At this 
point, the transmitting node transitions and the module cycles through all of the 
neighboring nodes while performing the necessary node transitions. 
b. Processed Received Packet 
The Processed Received Packet module contains a simulation of bit errors in 
which one bit error is inserted for every 100,000 bits. The bit errors are executed by a 
function that randomly inserts the bit error, so this has the potential to occur anywhere 
within the frame. The frame is then checked for the correct addresses, and the frame’s 
CRC is calculated and compared to the transmitted CRC to determine if any errors were 
observed. The CRC code was obtained from [22] and modified to fit the CRC length 
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required by the network. If the frame passes all of the checks, the frame’s header is 
appended with the addresses required for the next transmission. 
6. New Events
The New Events module (also a sub module of the Run Simulation module) 
checks the event table for the established time threshold at which event detection occurs. 
Once the time threshold is reached, a data frame is created. To prevent skipping over the 
triggered detection, the simulation references the frame’s status log, which ensures that 
the frame cycles through each phase along with the affected node. The encryption of the 
frame and the appending of the MIC are also performed within this module. The code for 
the encryption was obtained from [23] and modified to perform both the encryption as 
well as MIC within the simulation. Finally, the module checks the status of the triggered 
node to determine if and when the transition must take place. The New Events module 
must be the last transitioning stage due to the fact that the node continues until it has 
completed the current process before entering the waiting phase. 
7. Check For Energy Use
At the end of every cycle within the Run Simulation module, each node’s current 
status is tallied and entered into the node time in phase log. This log is then utilized to 
determine the power draw for each node during the simulation timeframe. 
8. Attack Modules
There are three different types of attacks conducted within the simulation 
program, and each has its own module. Subsections of code have been added within the 
other modules to facilitate simulation of the following attacks.  
a. Spoofing
In the spoofing attack, the node selected by the researcher is imitated, and spoofed 
frames are injected into the network at the next-hop node. The intent of the spoofed node 
within this thesis is to inject frames with incorrect information while blending in with 
network traffic. To blend in with the network traffic, the frame injection occurs when the 
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receiving node is still awake, which can be done by the rogue node observing the 
receiving node’s transmission behavior. By only injecting when the node is awake, we 
can infer that an event detection has occurred within the WSN. Since the injected frame 
transits at nearly the same time as the traffic generated from valid transmissions, the 
injected frame does not stand out. Considering the frames are injected when the receiving 
node is awake, the number of injected frames is dependent on the receiving node’s 
activity and varies between each simulation trial. 
To simulate the rogue node’s monitoring of the receiving node, the rogue node 
checks the receiving node’s status every 100.0 ms. If the receiving node’s status is in the 
waiting phase and none of the neighboring nodes are transmitting, the rogue node injects 
a frame. After injecting the frame, the rogue node does not perform another injection 
until 1.0 s later.  
b. DOS
In the DOS attack simulation, the researcher selects a node to be affected. To 
simulate the attack, a rogue node that is constantly transmitting frames is placed near the 
desired node and noted by the researcher within the transmission file. The rogue node’s 
continuous transmission forces the receiving node’s status to stay in the receiving phase. 
While in the receiving phase, the affected node does not perform any other functions 
within the network, rendering the node incapacitated. 
c. MITM
The MITM attack requires the researcher to select two neighboring nodes since 
the attack occurs during the frame transmission. Once the nodes are selected by the 
researcher, a frame sent by an affected node is changed prior to the processing of the 
receiving node. The change of the frame between the transmission and processing phases 
simulates a rogue node between the two nodes performing a MITM attack. Unlike the 




The Display module displays the results and a log analysis after the conclusion of 
the simulation. The analysis is similar to what the MS performs in an actual deployed 
network. The analysis includes determining whether secondary routes were used for each 
node and the number of frames sent by each node that was not authenticated. Part of the 
analysis performed within the simulation but not able to be performed by the MS includes 
the percentage of successful frames that transited the network, the amount of time each 
node spent within a phase, and the power draw of each node in the simulation.  
F. SIMULATION USER FILES 
The module Main requires user provided files to build the network prior to 
executing the simulation. These files setup the devices by defining their capabilities as 
well as the network’s capabilities. Within the files, the nodes and frames also receive a 
reference number to simplify the process. The reference number prevents the need for a 
researcher to reference each node by its address and each frame by its IP address and 
sequence number. Within this simulation program, the reference number for each node 
ranges from 1 to 27 and each frame obtains its reference number in sequential order from 
one in whole increments until there are no more frames carrying event information. 
1. Nodes (Create Nodes) 
Within this simulation 27 nodes are created with node 27 acting as the BS. Each 
node is assigned an IP and MAC address as well as a randomly generated key that is 
shared with the MS.  
2. Routing Table (Create Routing Table to Master) 
The routing table used contains both the primary and secondary paths for all of 
the nodes. 
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3. Affected Nodes (Create Energy Table)
To determine which neighboring nodes are affected during the transmission of a 
frame, the researcher provides a file containing a list of all of the nodes and which nodes 
it affects when transmitting. 
4. Events (Create Event Table)
The event table is used to trigger the detections within the program. Each event 
entry denotes a time the event is triggered and the node that detected the event. The 
actual event is not necessary and is not recorded since it is not the focus of this thesis. 
Within this thesis four event tables were used. Each table focuses on a speed a vehicle 
would likely travel. The speeds for each of the four tables are 25, 35, 45, and 65 miles per 
hour (mph). Each table also contains event triggers of an individual walking alongside a 
street to increase the number of detections, which in turn creates more traffic within the 
tactical WSN. When vehicles are transiting the intersection, a spacing of 2.0 to 3.0 s is 
used to simulate a typical roadway environment. The parameters within each scenario are 
shown in Table 3. 
 Table 3.  Parameters Used for each of the Four Scenarios that Are Simulated 
G. SIMULATION LOGS 
Mentioned throughout this chapter is the use of logs within the simulation. This is 
beneficial to the researcher as it provides a way to examine how the frame transits the 
network and aides in network troubleshooting. Similar logs are used within other well-
known simulation programs such as NS3 but do not provide the in-depth network logging 
that this simulation program provides. 
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1. PCAP 
The PCAP log records every transmission that is made by a node within the 
network. The entry contains the frame number, time at which the transmission occurred, 
the source node number, the destination node number, and the entire binary form of the 
frame. 
2. Open Packets 
The open packets log contains every individual frame created during the 
simulation. Each line within the log is assigned to a frame, and the recorded data 
represents the functions through which the frame transits. Each line in the log contains 
the frame number, phase expiration time, the status of the frame, the number of 
transmission attempts made by the current node, the source node number, destination 
node number, and any incurred errors. 
3. Node Status 
The node status log records the current status of each node. Each node is assigned 
a line within the log. Contained within the log are the node number, phase expiration 
time, the phase the node is in, and the sequence number of the last frame that originated 
from the node. 
4. Node Status Table 
The node status table records every transition made by a node. In this log, the 
node is not assigned a line, but a new entry is made when a node transitions between 
phases. Within each entry is the node number, the time the transition occurred, the phase 
the node was in, and the phase to which the node transitioned. 
5. Time in Phase 
Within this log, each node is assigned a line, and the time spent within each phase 
is recorded. This log is updated within the Check For Energy Use module, where the 
phase of the node is checked and the value within the respective phase for the node is 
incremented by one. Ultimately, the log provides the researcher with the amount of time 
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the node spent within each phase, which is then used to determine the power draw of the 
node. 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the sensors used within the simulation along with their 
deployment methodology were examined. In addition, the node parameters used to 
determine power draw upon the completion of the simulation were examined in-depth. 
The incorporation of the phases into the frame and network parameters was then 
discussed. The modules within the simulation program were determined by detailing the 
critical modules within the program, including the test modules. The different files 
programmed in MATLAB to build the network were explained in depth. A detailed 
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V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
An assessment of the proposed 6LoWPAN WSN is needed in order to validate the 
effectiveness of the implemented cyber security mechanisms. While the focus is on the 
cyber security mechanisms within a 6LoWPAN enabled WSN, it must be anticipated that 
these WSNs can be deployed to different types of environments. The different types of 
environments create varying levels of network traffic. We simulate these different 
environments using four scenarios that mimic the varying levels of traffic density. The 
scenarios developed within this thesis mimic vehicles transiting an intersection at 
different speeds. These scenarios then allow the researcher to determine the effects of the 
implementation of the proposed cyber security mechanisms within a variety of simulated 
network environments with each simulation listed as a trial. 
The network topology used in the simulation is shown in Figure 12. A reference 
number is given to each node in the figure. The reference number provides a simple 
method for the researcher to reference a node within the program and within the user 
created files. There are four scenarios simulated, each representing a specific speed of 
vehicles traversing an intersection. The first scenario represents vehicles traveling at 25 
miles per hour (mph), the second at 35 mph, the third at 45 mph, and the last scenario 
represents vehicles traveling at 65 mph. Each of the four scenarios are initially simulated 
with no attacks occurring. These trials act as the normal conditions of the tactical WSN, 
creating a baseline to compare the results from simulations that incorporate attacks 
performed on the WSN.  
The nodes selected for each attack remain the same for all scenarios to allow for 
comparisons between the different network environments. The total number of trials 
conducted for each scenario is as follows: five trials with no attack, five trials with a 
spoofing attack on node 24, five trials with a spoofing attack on node 16, a DOS attack 
on node 5, a DOS attack on node 25, and an MITM attack between nodes 7 and 2. In 
total, each scenario has six different network implementations with five trials per 
implementation, resulting in a total of 30 trials for each scenario. This results in a total of 
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120 trials for the program. Due to space, we show and discuss only a subset of the results 
obtained.  
In the following subsections, each attack is discussed and analyzed. An analysis 
of each of the attacks is displayed from the view of the MS with the implemented cyber 
security mechanisms in place; these mechanisms lead to either the detection or mitigation 
of the attack. The power draw for each node, which is not analyzed by the MS, is also 
discussed. Within the analysis slight variations within the results may be observed due to 
the implementation of frame errors. The frame errors are caused by frames being dropped 
or not properly received and can occur undetected on the last hop to the BS. 
 




The purpose of the spoofing attack is to test the efficacy of the MIC security 
mechanism added to the IEEE 802.15.4 6LoWPAN enabled frame. The two nodes 
imitated in the spoofing attack are nodes 16 and 24. Node 16 was chosen since the 
surrounding nodes have a higher traffic density than a node on the edge of the network. 
Node 24 was selected since it is on the edge of the network with limited network traffic 
flow and is one of the least protected nodes in the WSN. In order to detect a spoofed node 
within the WSN, the MIC security mechanism is used to authenticate the frames received 
by the MS. 
The number of spoofed frames detected by the MS and sent by the rogue node 
imitating node 16 is shown for Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figures 13 and 14, respectively. As 
expected, the number of detected, spoofed frames varies between trials due to the activity 
of the receiving node. The number of detected, spoofed frames also varies between 
scenarios. This was determined through further analysis of the logs maintained during 
each trial. It is observed that fewer frames were injected as the speed of the vehicles 
being simulated increased.  
We calculate and analyze the rate of the frames injected. The average number of 
frames injected for the five trials performed for Scenario 2 was 43 (Figure 13), while 38 
frames were injected in Scenario 3 (Figure 14). The rate for frame injection per second 
was computed using  
 _ _/ ( )FI Avg Last Frame First FrameR FI T T   (1) 
where FIR  is the rate at which a frame is injected, AvgFI  denotes the average number of 
frame injections within the scenario, and T  is the time of the first and last frames within 
the scenario. The FIR  for Scenario 2 was 0.365 frames per second, resulting in an 
average of an injected frame every 2.74 s. The FIR for Scenario 3 was 0.495 frames per 
second, resulting in an average of an injected frame every 2.02 s. Even though the 
number of injections is less as the speed increased from one scenario to the next, the rate 
of injections increased, which demonstrates that frames are injected at the faster speeds if 
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the scenarios are executed for the same amount of time. The increased rate of frame 
injections was expected due to the increased activity level for each node. 
Since the simulation program performing the analysis of the MS can only tell if 
the frames being processed are spoofed, the logs were examined to determine if a spoofed 
frame was not detected and processed. After reviewing the logs and determining which 
frames were spoofed, 100% of the spoofed frames received by the BS within the program 
were detected and denoted as non-authenticated by the MS. Within the logs, it was also 
noted that not all spoofed frames were received, as a small percentage were either lost or 
received in error by the BS. 
 
 Figure 13. Number of Non-Authenticated Frames Received by the MS in each of the 
Five Trials for Scenario 2 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16 
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 Figure 14. Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS in each of the 
Five Trials for Scenario 3 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16 
The number of frames detected by the MS that were sent by the rogue node 
imitating node 24 are shown for Scenarios 2 and 3 in Figures 15 and 16, respectively. 
Nodes 16 and 24 share similar characteristics in the slight variation of injected frames 
between trials for a given scenario as well as between the scenarios; however, since node 
24 is on the edge of the network and has a low density of network traffic, the node is 
asleep more than node 16. This explains the difference in the average number of frame 
injections. The average number of frames injected for the five trials performed on 
Scenario 2 was 26 (Figure 15) while Scenario 3’s average was 23 (Figure 16). The 
calculated rates were also similar to those for node 16; for node 24 for Scenario 2, FIR
was 0.221 frames per second, resulting in an injected frame every 4.52 s. The FIR  for 
Scenario 3 was 0.238 frames per second, resulting in an injected frame every 4.20 s. 
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 Figure 15. Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received By the MS in each of the 
Five Trials for Scenario 2 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 24 
 
 Figure 16. Number of Non-authenticated Frames received by the MS in each of the 
Five Trails for Scenario 3 Simulating a Spoofing Attack on Node 16 
The average power draw for each network environment is displayed in Table 4. 
The spoofed node is highlighted yellow, the green shaded results signify the primary 
route used by the spoofed node to send a frame to the MS, and the red shaded results 
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signify neighboring nodes along the primary route. As expected, the nodes that are on the 
primary route (green shaded) to the MS exhibited a minor increase in power draw as well 
as the neighboring nodes (red shaded). The increase in power draw is expected because 
the neighboring nodes are affected by the spoofed frames. This increases the number of 
frames being transmitted by the primary route nodes, causing the neighboring nodes to 
receive and process the increased number of transmitted frames. The small power draw 
increase is noticeable but would only cause a minimal impact on the affected node’s 
lifespan if the spoofing attack is mitigated. 
 Table 4.  Power Draw in mW for the Spoofing Attacks on Nodes 16 and 24 
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The ability of the MS to perform an analysis on received frames to determine if 
there is a possible spoofing attack within the WSN, as well as to determine which node to 
remove from the WSN to prevent further attacks, is illustrated in Figures 13 through 16. 
The analysis focused on the use of the implementation of the MIC security mechanism to 
authenticate valid frames sent by the nodes. Variations were also visible within the results 
between the trials and scenarios being run, but they were expected and were accounted 
for in the network logs. The assumption that the frame would continue to transit the 
network to the MS before being detected as well as the small increase in power draw 
along the spoofed frames’ primary route to the MS were also confirmed by the results in 
Table 4. Overall, the MIC security mechanism is able to provide data integrity by 
allowing the MS to authenticate each received frame. In addition, while the increase in 
the number of frames transmitted has an impact on the power draw, it is minimal, 
keeping the WSN functional. 
2. DOS
The DOS attack was used to determine if the centralized routing scheme and the 
use of the path indication bits could detect an attack or incapacitated node. The two nodes 
for the DOS attack are nodes 5 and 25 due to their differing characteristics within the 
WSN. Node 5 is on the edge of the network with limited network traffic flow and is also 
able to be physically accessed undetected by an individual due to the MAGID coverage. 
The implementation of the DOS attack on node 5 is displayed in Figure 17. Node 25 is 
one of the extra relay nodes deployed near the BS and handles half of the traffic within 
the network. An attack on Node 25 demonstrates the ability of the WSN to remain 
reliable if an extra relay node is incapacitated. Specifically, a DOS attack on node 25 
validates the network’s ability to utilize the secondary route of the centralized routing 
mechanism. In addition, it also validates the WSN’s capability to accommodate an 
increased traffic load. Scenario 1 and Scenario 4 are used to compare the DOS results.  
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 Figure 17. Deployment of a Rogue Node Performing a DOS Attack on Node 5 
a. Original Hop
Our analysis of the DOS attack examines the centralized routing mechanism 
executed by the MS. Specifically, we first look at the number of frames the originating 
node failed to successfully send along the primary route. These results are shown in 
Figure 18 for Scenario 1 and Figure 19 for Scenario 4. Nodes 1, 2 and 11 are observed to 
have a significant increase in number of frames transiting to the next-hop node from the 
originating node. The increase for nodes 1 and 2 occurred during the trials in which there 
was a DOS attack on node 25, and the increase for node 11 occurred during the trials in 
which there was a DOS attack on node 5. This is expected since the primary route for 
node 11 is through node 5, and the primary route for nodes 1 and 2 is through node 25.  
A closer examination of Figure 18 indicates that a limited number of frames from 
nodes 7, 8, 16, and 17 also took secondary next-hop routes. These anomalies can be 
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attributed to a small amount of congestion within the network as it occurs even when no 
attacks are executed as denoted by the results in red in Figure 18. Also shown in Figure 
19 are the same anomalies that occurred in Figure 18. As shown in Figure 19, a moderate 
number of frames from nodes 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 also took secondary next-hop routes. This 
is attributed to the increased congestion from not only the DOS attack on node 25 but 
also the increased density of the traffic due to the faster detection rate. The network was 
not able to clear the congestion quickly enough, and the congestion began to spread to 
nodes two to three hops from the attacked node. Even though there was a greater amount 
of congestion in the network, it remained secure and continued to reliably deliver frames 
from affected nodes with near real-time precision. 
 Figure 18. Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Original Hop) 
in Scenario 1 (Vehicular Traffic at 25 mph) for No Attacks and 
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
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 Figure 19. Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Original Hop) 
in Scenario 4 (Vehicular Traffic at 65 mph) for No Attacks and 
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
The analysis presented in Figures 18 and 19 is based on the implementation of the 
centralized routing mechanism with the utilization of the path indication bits. The path 
indication bits alert the MS that the frame was not able to successfully transit the WSN 
along the primary route from the originating node. The use of the secondary route is an 
indication of possible congestion or a node malfunctioning, causing the WSN to operate 
in a non-optimal manner. Furthermore, this increases the power draw of multiple nodes 
and possibly causes more network congestion. Using the information gained from the 
path indication bits, we see that the MS adjusts the centralized routing mechanism for 
optimization. 
b. Follow-on Hop
The DOS attack is further examined through the analysis of the number of frames 
that were unsuccessfully transmitted along the primary route by the follow-on nodes. 
These results are shown in Figure 20 for Scenario 1 and Figure 21 for Scenario 4. As 
shown in Figure 20, a DOS attack on node 5 does not produce any significant changes in 
terms of the number of unsuccessful transmitted frames. This is expected since node 5 is 
64
only a primary route for node 11 and is not a primary route for any other nodes within the 
network; however, the analysis of the DOS attack on node 25 shows a significant 
increase in nodes that sent frames that utilized a secondary route at a follow-on node. The 
significant increase in the utilization of secondary routes at follow-on nodes is expected 
since node 25 is the primary route for half of the WSN to the BS. Minor escalations at 
nodes 13, 17, 18, 21, 22, and 24 can be explained by congestion experienced from the 
surge of network traffic utilizing the secondary routes. This is more evident in Figure 21 
due to the increased density of network traffic in Scenario 4. 
 Figure 20. Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Follow-on Hops) 
in Scenario 1 (Vehicular Traffic at 25 mph) for No Attacks and 
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
The analysis presented in Figures 20 and 21, like Figures 18 and 19 but for 
follow-on hops, are possible due to the implementation of the centralized routing 
mechanism with the utilization of the path indication bits. The secondary route 
information data provides an additional awareness of the WSN’s status, which the MS 
uses in order to determine if and/or how much congestion is within the WSN. The 
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combination of the follow-on hop data as well as the original hop data provides a near 
real-time status of the WSN to the MS. 
 Figure 21. Frames Transmitted via Secondary Route per Node (Follow-on Hops) 
in Scenario 4 (Vehicular Traffic at 65 mph) for No Attacks and 
DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
c. Power Draw
The average power draw for each node during the simulations of Scenarios 1 and 
4, in conjunction with either a DOS attack on node 5 or a DOS attack on node 25 as well 
as no attacks, are shown in Figure 22 and 23. As shown in Figure 22, there are minimal 
changes in the power draw between no attack and the DOS attack on node 5 trials except 
for node 5. The increase in power draw for node 5 is expected because node 5 is 
constantly receiving a signal from the rogue node performing the DOS attack. It is also 
observed in Figure 22 that the DOS attack on node 25 affects all of the nodes up to two 
hops from the BS as well as nodes 7 and 8, which are three hops from the BS. This is 
attributed to the increase in network traffic causing congestion, which in turn increases 
the power draw of the affected nodes. Similar characteristics are also seen in Figure 23, 
with the same nodes having an increase in their power draw for both attack simulations. 
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The results shown in Figures 22 and 23 have a strong correlation to the results 
shown in Figures 18 and 19. The nodes from Figures 18 and 19, which utilized secondary 
routes to transmit the frame from the original hop, correspond to the same nodes with an 
increase in power draw in Figures 22 and 23. The increase in the power draw for the 
surrounding nodes is expected since it requires the originating node to first transmit to the 
primary route four times prior to transmitting to the secondary route. After further 
examination of the results in Figures 22 and 23, we find that the nodes in Figure 23 had a 
much larger power draw than those in Figure 22. As mentioned before, Scenario 4, 
shown in Figure 23, simulates an environment in which detections occur at a rate 
approximately two times greater than Scenario 1, shown in Figure 22. These results are 
expected since the nodes have less time to sleep and spend more time awake, which 
increases the power draw for the nodes.  
 Figure 22. Average Power Draw per Node in Scenario 1 (Vehicular Traffic 
at 25 mph) for No Attacks and DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
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 Figure 23. Average Power Draw per Node in Scenario 4 (Vehicular Traffic 
at 65 mph) for No Attacks and DOS Attacks at Nodes 5 and 25 
3. MITM
Similar to the spoofing attack, the analysis performed on the MITM attack is 
focused on the implementation of the MIC security mechanism but also the centralized 
routing mechanism using the path indication bits. The wireless connection between nodes 
7 and 2 was selected as the point of attack since it has a high density of traffic affecting a 
large portion of the network but not the entire network. The power draw of the nodes was 
not impacted as much as the Spoofing and DOS attacks. Shown in Figure 24 is the 
analysis of the power draw for no attacks and an MITM attack between nodes 7 and 2. 
The differences between the MITM simulations and no attack simulations are negligible 
since the power draw for each node is the same.  
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 Figure 24. Average Power Draw per Node in mW when no Attack Occurs and 
during the MITM Attack Simulations between Nodes 7 and 2 
The average number of non-authenticated frames over the five conducted trials 
for Scenario 1 is shown in Figure 25. Nodes 7, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20 and 23 have primary 
routes through node 7 to node 2, and these nodes had the most non-authenticated frames. 
The number of detections per node is 45 with a frame generated for each detection. A 
slight variation between the frames sent by nodes and the frames received by the MS is 
shown in Figure 25. The variation is accounted for by either a node along a frame’s path 
utilizing a secondary route, resulting in the frame not transitioning through the affected 
nodes, or the frame being lost or dropped at the BS. The non-authenticated frames from 
nodes 17 and 18 are due to congestion within the network and the utilization of the 
secondary route, which ultimately went through the affected nodes 7 and 2. 
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 Figure 25. Number of Non-authenticated Frames Received by the MS from the 
Originating Node During a MITM Attack between Nodes 7 and 2 
The results displayed in Table 5 are the averages of the five trials modeling the 
MITM attack in Scenario 3. The table has three main parameters that were quantified 
over each of the five trials for all 26 nodes. These parameters are 1) the number of frames 
that were not authenticated by the MS, 2) the number of frames that took the secondary 
route at the originating node, and 3) the number of frames that took a secondary route 
along the follow-on hops. Within Scenario 3, each node has 41 instances in which the 
node has a detection and transmits a frame alerting the MS to the detection. 
Node 7 is significant since the number of non-authenticated frames is drastically 
different from the 41 frames expected to be received by the MS and not authenticated. By 
comparing the results of the non-authenticated frames of each node and the paths taken 
by the frames from the originating node, we can explain the anomaly. Node 7 had an 
average of 26.6 frames not authenticated by the MS. This is well below the anticipated 41 
frames; however, since an average of 14.4 frames transited along node 7’s secondary 
route, the frames were not affected by the rogue node performing the MITM attack. For 
instance, by adding the 27 frames that were not authenticated during trial 1 (shown in 
Table 3) and the 14 frames utilizing the secondary route from the originating node for 
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trial 1 (shown in Table 3), the number of frames sent by node 7 equals 41; however, this 
is not the case for all of the nodes. 
 Table 5.  Average Results of the Five Trials of MITM Attacks 
Conducted on Scenario 3 
 
 
Node 17 shares the opposite characteristics as the node’s primary path to the MS 
does not transit through the affected nodes, but the node’s secondary path does. Node 17 
has a secondary route from the originating node to node 16, which then goes through 
nodes 7 and 2. Comparing each trial within the non-authenticated frames to the secondary 
routes taken at node 17, we see that the results are equal. 
Just like spoofing, the MS is able to perform an analysis on received frames to 
determine if there is a possible attack within the WSN. These results are shown in Figure 
24. Unlike in a spoofing attack, where only the follow-on nodes from the spoofing attack 
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are affected, the nodes prior to the MITM attack are the ones affected (as shown in Table 
3). With the use of the MIC security mechanism to authenticate valid frames sent by the 
nodes as well as the routing information within the centralized routing mechanism, the 
MS is able to determine where the attack is occurring and which nodes to remove from 
the WSN. Overall, the MIC security mechanism is able to provide data integrity in that it 
allows the MS to authenticate each received frame. The centralized routing mechanism 
used in conjunction with the utilization of designated path bits helps determine which 
nodes to remove in order to provide network reliability. 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
We began this chapter by describing the simplified method of referencing each 
node by a number in order to comprehend the results given within each subsection for the 
different types of attacks considered. The first attack examined was the spoofing attack 
that was meant to test the MIC security mechanism implementation. The second was the 
DOS attack that tested the detection of the attack by the centralized routing mechanism 
implementation. The final attack, the MITM attack, tested both the centralized routing 
mechanism as well as the MIC security mechanism implementations. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we studied the implementation of the 6LoWPAN protocol for 
tactical WSNs and examined the need for 6LoWPAN in tactical WSNs used by the 
USMC in operational scenarios. Through the use of 6LoWPAN, our aim was to reduce 
the manpower required to maintain the tactical WSN by allowing the WSN to be 
managed from a remote, secure location. Ultimately, 6LoWPAN provides automation to 
the data flow by eliminating the need of an individual to physically retrieve data from the 
COC. The 6LoWPAN protocol, with the addition of necessary cyber security 
mechanisms, can be implemented and used by the USMC to boost the abilities of its 
current WSNs.  
In this thesis, we developed and discussed a comprehensive tactical WSN 
framework using 6LoWPAN that includes a hierarchical network design using defined 
network devices. The use of a structured/centralized network design allows for secure 
network reachability and accessibility. We implemented multiple cyber security 
mechanisms within the 6LoWPAN protocol. These security features included a 
centralized routing scheme, encryption, authentication and integrity. These features were 
applied/implemented into the 6LoWPAN frame structure. The combination of these 
various cyber security mechanisms and frame structure modifications create an effective 
and efficient tactical WSN that can be utilized by the USMC.  
We evaluated our framework using MATLAB and tested it against three well-
known attacks. Results obtained from the simulations focused on the effectiveness of the 
cyber security implementations and the power draw of each node. The results for the 
effectiveness of the cyber security implementations were derived from the metrics 
provided by the MS within the simulation. Specifically, the cyber security mechanisms 
that can be analyzed by the MS are the implementation of the MIC and centralized 
routing scheme with the use of indication bits.  
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The use of the MIC provided integrity to the WSN by preventing the 
authentication of 100% of the frames received by the MS in either the spoofing or MITM 
attacks. The use of the centralized routing scheme ensured the WSN remained functional 
and reliable even when one of the two nodes connecting the BS to the rest of the WSN 
was disabled during the DOS attack. The implementation of indication bits within the 
modified 6LoWPAN frame structure enabled the MS to determine that there was 
congestion within the network resulting from either traffic density or an incapacitated 
node.  
The power draw for each node, which is not analyzed by the MS, was also 
examined. The effects of the spoofing attack demonstrated that while the injected frame 
within the network was not authenticated by the MS, the surrounding nodes along the 
frame’s path to the MS were affected with an increased power draw, shortening the 
node’s lifespan. The DOS attack had a much larger impact, especially on the node being 
attacked as well as on nodes up to two hops away, resulting in an increase in power draw 
either from the congestion or the utilization of the secondary route of the centralized 
routing scheme. As expected, the MITM attacks had little effect on a node’s power draw.  
Within this thesis we provided an effective and efficient tactical WSN using 
6LoWPAN that can remain reliable and secure while deployed within harsh 
environments. We conclude that the developed cyber security mechanisms and network 
structure provide a foundation on which future tactical WSNs used within the USMC can 
be based. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
The objective of this thesis was to implement a secure tactical WSN that can be 
deployed in a variety of environmental conditions supporting the USMC mission. The 
contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 Development of a command and control (administrative control) structure 
of the tactical WSN that incorporates node control, a unique 
defined/centralized routing model, and a selected keying mechanism for 
data confidentiality, authentication and integrity.  
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 Construction of a modified 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 frame 
structure to incorporate the unique centralized routing model and selected 
keying mechanism. 
 Enhancement of methods to aid in the deployment planning of the secured 
tactical WSN to prevent critical vulnerabilities. 
 Simulation and evaluation of the proposed network framework against 
multiple attacks and testing for security robustness and energy 
conservation. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of a secure 
6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4 WSN for the USMC tactical space that has been 
evaluated against well-known attacks. 
C. FUTURE WORK 
The combination of energy conservation for energy constrained devices and the 
implementations of enhanced cyber security mechanisms are critical for military WSN 
applications. The initial groundwork to achieve the security needs for the USMC tactical 
WSN were provided within this thesis. Future work is suggested as follows. 
1. Application of Sink Node Anonymity 
The theoretical framework developed in this thesis introduces a single point of 
failure among the deployable devices within the WSN. This single point of failure is the 
BS, which is a critical asset in the network. Previous research was completed on the 
privacy of the BS in [9]; however, cybersecurity methods were not addressed. Providing 
privacy to the BS with the use of the methods given in [9] and integrating it with the 
security framework developed in this thesis will provide another layer of defense for the 
critical asset and make it harder for the enemy to identify the BS and disrupt or disable 
the WSN. 
2. Implementation of the BS 
The BS is a critical element within the WSN and performs the transition between 
the 6LoWPAN enabled IEEE 802.15.4WSN and the selected public domain. The 
development and implementation of a BS that is able to perform the transitions from the 
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WSN to multiple types of networks within one device is vital. The BS needs to be able to 
connect to multiple types of public infrastructures including cellular, Wi-Fi, and Ethernet 
as well as other possible external military IP communication forms currently in use. The 
development of one device with all of the capabilities also allows for the universal 
deployment of the WSN, not just within a restricted location in which the designated 
infrastructure is present. 
3. Implementation of Cyber Security on a Mobile WSN 
The routing mechanisms used within this thesis is static due to the nature of the 
devices being used; however, the use of WSNs within a mobile environment is also of 
value to military applications. The WSNs can be attached to individuals, providing 
valuable information in regard to the individual’s location or biometric readings 
enhancing situational awareness of the deployed force. Neighbor discovery methods and 
authentication were not examined within this thesis but would be required for the 
implementation of a mobile WSN since nodes could connect within the WSN at any 
point. The determination of how the nodes could reliably discover each other as well as 
the development of a keying mechanism to provide authentication are required. The 
routing mechanism also needs to be adjusted continuously among the deployed devices to 




APPENDIX. SIMULATION PROGRAM 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 








































% Where do you want the information to be stored for each run? 
fileID = fopen('results/test.txt','w'); 
 
% Which Scenario would you like to run? 
Selection = 1; 
 





% Directed Denial of Service 
% To activate the DDOS attack, uncomment and select which node you  
% would like to perform the attack on. 
% To simulate the attack the node will not be able to send or 
% receive packets, therefore the node's status will be set to a level  
% that it will not be able to interact with the deployed network. 
% Node to be attacked (must be between 1 and 26 
DDOS_Node = 28; 
if DDOS_Node < 28 
    DDOS(1); 
end 
 
% Spoofing attack 
% Packets will be sent from a separate node pretending to be a node  
% within the network. The spoofing node will use a neighbor node's MAC  
% and IPaddresses as well as the CRC sequence. The packet is then sent  
% to the Master Station where it would determine if it would pass the  
% integrity check. 
% Select a node to spoof (must be between 1-26) 
Spoofed_Node = 28; 
    Spoofing(); 
 
% Man in the Middle attack 
% In this type of attack the contents of the packet will be modified  
% while in transmission. It will make its way through until it reaches  
% the Master Station, and at that point the MAC is tested and would  
% fail. 
 MITM_Nodes = [28,29]; 
 
% Initialize the Timer! 






























% Create_Nodes % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
function Create_Nodes() 











% number of transmissions per node 
NodeTX = [ 
    1       0; 
    2       0; 
    3       0; 
    4       0; 
    5       0; 
    6       0; 
    7       0; 
    8       0; 
    9       0;  
    10      0; 
    11      0; 
    12      0; 
    13      0; 
    14      0; 
    15      0; 
    16      0; 
    17      0; 
    18      0; 
    19      0; 
    20      0; 
    21      0; 
    22      0; 
    23      0; 
    24      0; 
    25      0; 
    26      0; 
    27      0; 
    ]; 
 
%number of receptions per node 
NodeRX = . 
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    1       0; 
    2       0; 
    3       0; 
    4       0; 
    5       0; 
    6       0; 
    7       0; 
    8       0; 
    9       0;  
    10      0; 
    11      0; 
    12      0; 
    13      0; 
    14      0; 
    15      0; 
    16      0; 
    17      0; 
    18      0; 
    19      0; 
    20      0; 
    21      0; 
    22      0; 
    23      0; 
    24      0; 
    25      0; 
    26      0; 
    27      0; 
    ]; 
 
%   Node#   Byte 1       |    Byte 2        |    Byte 3        |    
Byte 4        |    Byte 5        |    Byte 6        |    Byte 7        
|    Byte 8        | 
Node_Address = [ 
    001 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    002 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    003 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    004 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    005 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    006 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    007 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
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    008 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    009 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,1; 
    010 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,1,0; 
    011 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    012 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    013 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    014 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    015 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    016 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    017 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    018 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    019 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    020 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    021 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    022 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    023 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    024 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    025 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
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    026 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    027 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
 
    ]; 
 
Node_MAC = [ 
    001 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    002 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    003 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    004 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    005 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    006 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    007 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    008 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    009 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,1; 
    010 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,1,0; 
    011 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    012 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    013 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    014 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    015 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
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    016 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    017 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    018 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    019 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    020 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    021 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1; 
    022 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,1,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,1,0,0; 
    023 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    024 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,0,1,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    025 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,0,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,0,1; 
    026 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,0; 
    027 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 
1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 1,1,1,1,  1,1,1,1, 0,0,0,0,  
0,0,0,0, 0,0,0,0,  0,0,1,1;     
    ]; 
 
 
%   Node #  X Axis     Y Axis 
Node_Location = [ 
    001     5          -22.5; 
    002     5          -12.5; 
    003     12.5          -5; 
    004     22.5          -5; 
    005     5          -32.5; 
    006     -5         -22.5; 
    007     -5         -12.5; 
    008     12.5           5; 
    009     12.5           5; 
    010     32.5          -5; 
    011     -5         -32.5;    
    012     -12.5         -5; 
    013     5           12.5; 
    014     32.5           5; 
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    015     -22.5         -5; 
    016     -12.5          5; 
    017     -5          12.5; 
    018     5           22.5; 
    019     -32.5         -5; 
    020     -22.5          5; 
    021     -5          22.5; 
    022     5           32.5; 
    023     -32.5          5; 
    024     -5          32.5; 
    025     12.5       -17.5;   
    026     17.5       -12.5; 




%   Node#   Status   Stat Time chg  Errors?     Seq #           
Node_Status = [ 
    1       0           0               0       0; 
    2       0           0               0       0; 
    3       0           0               0       0; 
    4       0           0               0       0; 
    5       0           0               0       0; 
    6       0           0               0       0; 
    7       0           0               0       0; 
    8       0           0               0       0; 
    9       0           0               0       0; 
    10      0           0               0       0; 
    11      0           0               0       0; 
    12      0           0               0       0; 
    13      0           0               0       0; 
    14      0           0               0       0; 
    15      0           0               0       0; 
    16      0           0               0       0; 
    17      0           0               0       0; 
    18      0           0               0       0; 
    19      0           0               0       0; 
    20      0           0               0       0; 
    21      0           0               0       0; 
    22      0           0               0       0; 
    23      0           0               0       0; 
    24      0           0               0       0; 
    25      0           0               0       0; 
    26      0           0               0       0; 
    27      2           0               0       0; 
    ]; 
 
 
% Node    Time 
Wait_Time = [ 
    1       0; 
    2       0; 
    3       0; 
    4       0; 
    5       0; 
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    6       0; 
    7       0; 
    8       0; 
    9       0; 
    10      0; 
    11      0; 
    12      0; 
    13      0; 
    14      0; 
    15      0; 
    16      0; 
    17      0; 
    18      0; 
    19      0; 
    20      0; 
    21      0; 
    22      0; 
    23      0; 
    24      0; 
    25      0; 
    26      0; 
    27      0; 
    ]; 
 
%Node       Time    Action from     Action to 
Node_Status_Table = [ 
    0       0      0      0; 
    ]; 
 
%random keys generated for each node to be shared with the MS 
for n = 1:27 













% Below is the Routing table to be used 
global Routing_Table; 
%Catergory 1=Send Pri   2=Send Sec 
% Node#     Category    Next Hop 
Routing_Table = [ 
    1       1           25; 
    2       1           25; 
    3       1           26; 
    4       1           26; 
    5       1           1; 
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    6       1           1; 
    7       1           2; 
    8       1           3; 
    9       1           4; 
    10      1           4; 
    11      1           5; 
    12      1           7; 
    13      1           8; 
    14      1           10; 
    15      1           12; 
    16      1           12; 
    17      1           13; 
    18      1           13; 
    19      1           15; 
    20      1           15; 
    21      1           18; 
    22      1           18; 
    23      1           19; 
    24      1           22; 
    25      1           27; 
    26      1           27; 
    1       2           2; 
    2       2           3; 
    3       2           2; 
    4       2           3; 
    5       2           11; 
    6       2           7; 
    7       2           6; 
    8       2           9; 
    9       2           8; 
    10      2           14; 
    11      2           6; 
    12      2           16; 
    13      2           17; 
    14      2           9; 
    15      2           20; 
    16      2           17; 
    17      2           16; 
    18      2           21; 
    19      2           23; 
    20      2           16; 
    21      2           17; 
    22      2           24; 
    23      2           20; 
    24      2           21; 
    25      2           27; 
    26      2           27; 
























Packets = zeros(1,3); 
 
Retrans = 0; 
 
% Initialize Packet variable 
Packet(1,1:1016) = zeros(1,1016); 
 
% Initialize Packet Retransmit Tracker 
% Packet number   NewPack# Trans-Node Timer 
Packet_Retrans_Tracker(1,1:4)= [0 0 0 0]; 
 
%Packet#   timer   event   # of trans     TransNode RecNode     Errors 
Open_Packets = [ 
    0       0       0           0           0           0        99 
    ]; 
 
% Frame Control  
Starter_Packet(1:16) = [0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0];  
 
% Source MAC Address  
Starter_Packet(17:80) = ones(1,64); 
 
%Destination MAC Address   





% Path/Hop Limit   
Starter_Packet(161:162) = [0,0];     % Path 
Starter_Packet(163:168) = ones(1,6); % Hop Limit 
 
% Iniialization Vector   
% Source Address                    
    Starter_Packet(169:184) = ones(1,16); 
 
% Destination Address                
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    Starter_Packet(185:200) = ones(1,16); 
 
% LOWPAN NHC                         
    Starter_Packet(201:216) =  randi([0,1],1,16);  
 
%Flags                               
    Starter_Packet(217:224) =  randi([0,1],1,8);        
 
%Sequence Number                     
    Starter_Packet(225:256) = ones(1,32);     
 
% Source Port                        
    Starter_Packet(257:272) =  randi([0,1],1,16); 
 
% Destination Port                   
    Starter_Packet(273:288) =  randi([0,1],1,16); 
 
% Length                             
    Starter_Packet(289:296) =  randi([0,1],1,8);        
 
% Payload  
aa = 297; 
bb = aa + 7; 
for n = 1:16 
    Starter_Packet(aa:bb) = [1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1]; 
    aa = aa + 8; 
    bb = aa + 7; 
end 
 
Initial_Payload(1:128) = Starter_Packet(297:424); 
 
% Padding  
Starter_Packet(425:864) = randi([0,1],1,440); 
 
% Message Integrity Code  
Starter_Packet(865:992) = ones(1,128); 
 
% Next Header  
Starter_Packet(993:1000) = ones(1,8); 
 
% Field Check Sum (CRC)  
Starter_Packet(1001:1016) = ones(1,16); 
 
for n = 1:24 


















%   TransNode   Affected Node 
Energy_Table = [ 
    1           2; 
    1           5; 
    1           6; 
    1           25; 
    2           7; 
    2           3; 
    2           1; 
    2           25; 
    3           8; 
    3           4; 
    3           2; 
    3           26; 
    4           9; 
    4           10; 
    4           3; 
    4           26; 
    5           1; 
    5           11; 
    6           11; 
    6           1; 
    6           7; 
    7           6; 
    7           2; 
    7           12; 
    8           13; 
    8           3; 
    8           9; 
    9           8; 
    9           4; 
    9           14; 
    10          14; 
    10          4; 
    11          5; 
    11          6; 
    12          7; 
    12          15; 
    12          16; 
    13          8; 
    13          17; 
    13          18; 
    14          10; 
    14          9; 
    15          12; 
    15          19; 
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    15          20; 
    16          17; 
    16          12; 
    16          20; 
    17          16; 
    17          13; 
    17          21; 
    18          13; 
    18          21; 
    18          22; 
    19          23; 
    19          15; 
    20          15; 
    20          16; 
    20          23; 
    21          17; 
    21          18; 
    21          24; 
    22          18; 
    22          24; 
    23          19; 
    23          20; 
    24          21; 
    24          22; 
    25          1; 
    25          2; 
    25          26; 
    25          27; 
    26          3; 
    26          4; 
    26          25; 
    26          27; 
    27          25; 
















% Node  Wakeup  Process   Trans   Rec     Waiting  Go2Slp Post-T-Wait 
Sleep 
Energy_Use = [ 
    1     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    2     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
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    3     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    4     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    5     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    6     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    7     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    8     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    9     0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    10    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    11    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    12    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    13    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    14    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    15    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    16    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    17    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    18    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    19    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    20    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    21    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    22    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    23    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    24    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    25    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    26    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0; 
    27    0         0       0       0       0       0       0       0;     










% This is what initiates the events. Events are put in to create the 







global Scenario_4;  
global fileID;  
global Enc; 
 
%Choose which one you would like but comment out the others 
Event_Table(); 
 
% or build your own setup 
 




% which events to upload per the user's determination in "main" file 
if Selection == 1 
    Events = Scenario_1; 
elseif Selection == 2 
    Events = Scenario_2; 
elseif Selection == 3 
    Events = Scenario_3; 
elseif Selection == 4 
    Events = Scenario_4;     
end 
 
% logs for the events 
[a,b] = size(Events); 
Orig_Events = a; 
Enc = zeros(1,26); 
for n = 1:a 
    Enc(Events(n,2)) = Enc(Events(n,2)) + 1; 
end 
 
fprintf('A total of %i detections were orignally uploaded. \n',a); 










% This is what initiates the events. Events are put in to create the 
% sensing events that are simulated within the program. 
 




















%time   originating node        destination node 
Scenario_1 = [ 
0       14  27 
0       19  27 
447     10  27 
447     23  27 
894     9   27 
894     15  27 
1342    4   27 
1342    20  27 
1789    8   27 
1789    12  27 
2000    14  27 
2000    19  27 
2236    3   27 
2236    16  27 
4000    5   27 
4000    24  27 
4025    3   27 
4025    16  27 
4447    11  27 
4447    22  27 
4472    8   27 
4472    12  27 
4894    1   27 
4894    21  27 
4919    4   27 
4919    20  27 
5342    6   27 
5342    18  27 
5367    9   27 
5367    15  27 
5789    2   27 
5789    17  27 
5814    10  27 
5814    23  27 
6236    7   27 
6236    13  27 
6261    14  27 
6261    19  27 
7000    14  27 
7000    19  27 
7447    10  27 
7447    23  27 
7894    9   27 
7894    15  27 
8025    7   27 
8025    13  27 
8342    4   27 
8342    20  27 
8472    2   27 
8472    17  27 
8789    8   27 
8789    12  27 
8919    6   27 
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8919    18  27 
9000    14  27 
9000    19  27 
9194    9   27 
9194    15  27 
9236    3   27 
9236    16  27 
9367    1   27 
9367    21  27 
9447    10  27 
9447    23  27 
9814    11  27 
9814    22  27 
9894    9   27 
9894    15  27 
10261   5   27 
10261   24  27 
10342   4   27 
10342   20  27 
10789   8   27 
10789   12  27 
11025   3   27 
11025   16  27 
11236   3   27 
11236   16  27 
11472   8   27 
11472   12  27 
11919   4   27 
11919   20  27 
12367   9   27 
12367   15  27 
12814   10  27 
12814   23  27 
13000   5   27 
13000   24  27 
13025   3   27 
13025   16  27 
13261   14  27 
13261   19  27 
13447   11  27 
13447   22  27 
13472   8   27 
13472   12  27 
13894   1   27 
13894   21  27 
13919   4   27 
13919   20  27 
14342   6   27 
14342   18  27 
14367   9   27 
14367   15  27 
14789   2   27 
14789   17  27 
14814   10  27 
14814   23  27 
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15000   5   27 
15000   24  27 
15236   7   27 
15236   13  27 
15261   14  27 
15261   19  27 
15447   11  27 
15447   22  27 
15894   1   27 
15894   21  27 
16342   6   27 
16342   18  27 
16388   8   27 
16388   12  27 
16789   2   27 
16789   17  27 
17025   7   27 
17025   13  27 
17236   7   27 
17236   13  27 
17472   2   27 
17472   17  27 
17919   6   27 
17919   18  27 
18367   1   27 
18367   21  27 
18814   11  27 
18814   22  27 
19000   14  27 
19000   19  27 
19025   7   27 
19025   13  27 
19261   5   27 
19261   24  27 
19447   10  27 
19447   23  27 
19472   2   27 
19472   17  27 
19894   9   27 
19894   15  27 
19919   6   27 
19919   18  27 
20000   5   27 
20000   24  27 
20342   4   27 
20342   20  27 
20367   1   27 
20367   21  27 
20789   8   27 
20789   12  27 
20814   11  27 
20814   22  27 
21236   3   27 
21236   16  27 
21261   5   27 
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21261   24  27 
22000   14  27 
22000   19  27 
22447   10  27 
22447   23  27 
22894   9   27 
22894   15  27 
23025   3   27 
23025   16  27 
23342   4   27 
23342   20  27 
23472   8   27 
23472   12  27 
23789   8   27 
23789   12  27 
23919   4   27 
23919   20  27 
24236   3   27 
24236   16  27 
24367   9   27 
24367   15  27 
24814   10  27 
24814   23  27 
25000   14  27 
25000   19  27 
25261   14  27 
25261   19  27 
25447   10  27 
25447   23  27 
25894   9   27 
25894   15  27 
26025   3   27 
26025   16  27 
26342   4   27 
26342   20  27 
26472   8   27 
26472   12  27 
26789   8   27 
26789   12  27 
26919   4   27 
26919   20  27 
27194   1   27 
27194   21  27 
27236   3   27 
27236   16  27 
27367   9   27 
27367   15  27 
27814   10  27 
27814   23  27 
28261   14  27 
28261   19  27 
29025   3   27 
29025   16  27 
29472   8   27 
29472   12  27 
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29919   4   27 
29919   20  27 
30000   5   27 
30000   24  27 
30367   9   27 
30367   15  27 
30447   11  27 
30447   22  27 
30814   10  27 
30814   23  27 
30894   1   27 
30894   21  27 
31261   14  27 
31261   19  27 
31342   6   27 
31342   18  27 
31789   2   27 
31789   17  27 
32000   5   27 
32000   24  27 
32236   7   27 
32236   13  27 
32447   11  27 
32447   22  27 
32894   1   27 
32894   21  27 
33342   6   27 
33342   18  27 
33789   2   27 
33789   17  27 
34000   5   27 
34000   24  27 
34025   7   27 
34025   13  27 
34236   7   27 
34236   13  27 
34374   3   27 
34374   16  27 
34388   2   27 
34388   17  27 
34447   11  27 
34447   22  27 
34472   2   27 
34472   17  27 
34894   1   27 
34894   21  27 
34919   6   27 
34919   18  27 
35342   6   27 
35342   18  27 
35367   1   27 
35367   21  27 
35789   2   27 
35789   17  27 
35814   11  27 
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35814   22  27 
36025   7   27 
36025   13  27 
36236   7   27 
36236   13  27 
36261   5   27 
36261   24  27 
36472   2   27 
36472   17  27 
36919   6   27 
36919   18  27 
37367   1   27 
37367   21  27 
37814   11  27 
37814   22  27 
38025   7   27 
38025   13  27 
38261   5   27 
38261   24  27 
38472   2   27 
38472   17  27 
38919   6   27 
38919   18  27 
39367   1   27 
39367   21  27 
39814   11  27 
39814   22  27 
40000   14  27 
40000   19  27 
40261   5   27 
40261   24  27 
40447   10  27 
40447   23  27 
40894   9   27 
40894   15  27 
41342   4   27 
41342   20  27 
41568   4   27 
41568   20  27 
41789   8   27 
41789   12  27 
42000   14  27 
42000   19  27 
42236   3   27 
42236   16  27 
42447   10  27 
42447   23  27 
42894   9   27 
42894   15  27 
43342   4   27 
43342   20  27 
43789   8   27 
43789   12  27 
44000   14  27 
44000   19  27 
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44025   3   27 
44025   16  27 
44236   3   27 
44236   16  27 
44447   10  27 
44447   23  27 
44472   8   27 
44472   12  27 
44894   9   27 
44894   15  27 
44919   4   27 
44919   20  27 
45342   4   27 
45342   20  27 
45367   9   27 
45367   15  27 
45789   8   27 
45789   12  27 
45814   10  27 
45814   23  27 
46000   14  27 
46000   19  27 
46025   3   27 
46025   16  27 
46236   3   27 
46236   16  27 
46261   14  27 
46261   19  27 
46447   10  27 
46447   23  27 
46472   8   27 
46472   12  27 
46894   9   27 
46894   15  27 
46919   4   27 
46919   20  27 
47342   4   27 
47342   20  27 
47367   9   27 
47367   15  27 
47789   8   27 
47789   12  27 
47814   10  27 
47814   23  27 
48025   3   27 
48025   16  27 
48236   3   27 
48236   16  27 
48261   14  27 
48261   19  27 
48472   8   27 
48472   12  27 
48763   10  27 
48763   23  27 
48919   4   27 
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48919   20  27 
49367   9   27 
49367   15  27 
49814   10  27 
49814   23  27 
50025   3   27 
50025   16  27 
50261   14  27 
50261   19  27 
50472   8   27 
50472   12  27 
50919   4   27 
50919   20  27 
51367   9   27 
51367   15  27 
51814   10  27 
51814   23  27 
52000   5   27 
52000   24  27 
52261   14  27 
52261   19  27 
52374   7   27 
52374   13  27 
52447   11  27 
52447   22  27 
52894   1   27 
52894   21  27 
53342   6   27 
53342   18  27 
53789   2   27 
53789   17  27 
54000   5   27 
54000   24  27 
54236   7   27 
54236   13  27 
54447   11  27 
54447   22  27 
54894   1   27 
54894   21  27 
55342   6   27 
55342   18  27 
55789   2   27 
55789   17  27 
56000   5   27 
56000   24  27 
56025   7   27 
56025   13  27 
56236   7   27 
56236   13  27 
56447   11  27 
56447   22  27 
56472   2   27 
56472   17  27 
56894   1   27 
56894   21  27 
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56919   6   27 
56919   18  27 
57342   6   27 
57342   18  27 
57367   1   27 
57367   21  27 
57789   2   27 
57789   17  27 
57814   11  27 
57814   22  27 
58000   5   27 
58000   24  27 
58025   7   27 
58025   13  27 
58236   7   27 
58236   13  27 
58261   5   27 
58261   24  27 
58447   11  27 
58447   22  27 
58472   2   27 
58472   17  27 
58894   1   27 
58894   21  27 
58919   6   27 
58919   18  27 
59342   6   27 
59342   18  27 
59367   1   27 
59367   21  27 
59568   6   27 
59568   18  27 
59789   2   27 
59789   17  27 
59814   11  27 
59814   22  27 
60025   7   27 
60025   13  27 
60236   7   27 
60236   13  27 
60261   5   27 
60261   24  27 
60472   2   27 
60472   17  27 
60919   6   27 
60919   18  27 
61367   1   27 
61367   21  27 
61814   11  27 
61814   22  27 
62025   7   27 
62025   13  27 
62261   5   27 
62261   24  27 
62472   2   27 
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62472   17  27 
62919   6   27 
62919   18  27 
63367   1   27 
63367   21  27 
63814   11  27 
63814   22  27 
64261   5   27 
64261   24  27 
65000   14  27 
65000   19  27 
65447   10  27 
65447   23  27 
65894   9   27 
65894   15  27 
66342   4   27 
66342   20  27 
66763   11  27 
66763   22  27 
66789   8   27 
66789   12  27 
67236   3   27 
67236   16  27 
68000   14  27 
68000   19  27 
68447   10  27 
68447   23  27 
68894   9   27 
68894   15  27 
69025   3   27 
69025   16  27 
69342   4   27 
69342   20  27 
69472   8   27 
69472   12  27 
69789   8   27 
69789   12  27 
69919   4   27 
69919   20  27 
70236   3   27 
70236   16  27 
70367   15  27 
70367   9   27 
70814   10  27 
70814   23  27 
71000   14  27 
71000   19  27 
71261   14  27 
71261   19  27 
71447   10  27 
71447   23  27 
71894   9   27 
71894   15  27 
72025   3   27 
72025   16  27 
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72342   4   27 
72342   20  27 
72472   8   27 
72472   12  27 
72789   8   27 
72789   12  27 
72919   4   27 
72919   20  27 
73236   3   27 
73236   16  27 
73367   9   27 
73367   15  27 
73814   10  27 
73814   23  27 
74000   14  27 
74000   19  27 
74261   14  27 
74261   19  27 
74447   10  27 
74447   23  27 
74894   9   27 
74894   15  27 
75025   3   27 
75025   16  27 
75342   4   27 
75342   20  27 
75472   8   27 
75472   12  27 
75789   8   27 
75789   12  27 
75919   4   27 
75919   20  27 
76236   3   27 
76236   16  27 
76367   9   27 
76367   15  27 
76814   10  27 
76814   23  27 
77000   14  27 
77000   19  27 
77261   14  27 
77261   19  27 
77447   10  27 
77447   23  27 
77894   9   27 
77894   15  27 
78025   3   27 
78025   16  27 
78342   4   27 
78342   20  27 
78472   8   27 
78472   12  27 
78789   8   27 
78789   12  27 
78919   4   27 
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78919   20  27 
79236   3   27 
79236   16  27 
79367   9   27 
79367   15  27 
79814   10  27 
79814   23  27 
80261   14  27 
80261   19  27 
81025   3   27 
81025   16  27 
81472   8   27 
81472   12  27 
81919   4   27 
81919   20  27 
82367   9   27 
82367   15  27 
82814   10  27 
82814   23  27 
83261   14  27 
83261   19  27 
85000   5   27 
85000   24  27 
85447   11  27 
85447   22  27 
85894   1   27 
85894   21  27 
86342   6   27 
86342   18  27 
86789   2   27 
86789   17  27 
87236   7   27 
87236   13  27 
88000   5   27 
88000   24  27 
88447   11  27 
88447   22  27 
88894   1   27 
88894   21  27 
89025   7   27 
89025   13  27 
89342   6   27 
89342   18  27 
89472   2   27 
89472   17  27 
89789   2   27 
89789   17  27 
89919   6   27 
89919   18  27 
90236   7   27 
90236   13  27 
90367   1   27 
90367   21  27 
90814   11  27 
90814   22  27 
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91000   5   27 
91000   24  27 
91261   5   27 
91261   24  27 
91447   11  27 
91447   22  27 
91894   1   27 
91894   21  27 
92025   7   27 
92025   13  27 
92342   6   27 
92342   18  27 
92472   2   27 
92472   17  27 
92789   2   27 
92789   17  27 
92919   6   27 
92919   18  27 
93236   7   27 
93236   13  27 
93367   1   27 
93367   21  27 
93814   11  27 
93814   22  27 
94000   5   27 
94000   24  27 
94261   5   27 
94261   24  27 
94447   11  27 
94447   22  27 
94894   1   27 
94894   21  27 
95025   7   27 
95025   13  27 
95342   6   27 
95342   18  27 
95472   2   27 
95472   17  27 
95789   2   27 
95789   17  27 
95919   6   27 
95919   18  27 
96236   7   27 
96236   13  27 
96367   1   27 
96367   21  27 
96814   11  27 
96814   22  27 
97000   5   27 
97000   24  27 
97261   5   27 
97261   24  27 
97447   11  27 
97447   22  27 
97894   1   27 
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97894   21  27 
98025   7   27 
98025   13  27 
98342   6   27 
98342   18  27 
98472   2   27 
98472   17  27 
98789   2   27 
98789   17  27 
98919   6   27 
98919   18  27 
99236   7   27 
99236   13  27 
99367   1   27 
99367   21  27 
99814   11  27 
99814   22  27 
100261  5   27 
100261  24  27 
101025  7   27 
101025  13  27 
101472  2   27 
101472  17  27 
101919  6   27 
101919  18  27 
102000  14  27 
102000  19  27 
102367  1   27 
102367  21  27 
102447  10  27 
102447  23  27 
102814  11  27 
102814  22  27 
102894  9   27 
102894  15  27 
103261  5   27 
103261  24  27 
103342  4   27 
103342  20  27 
103789  8   27 
103789  12  27 
104236  3   27 
104236  16  27 
105000  14  27 
105000  14  27 
105000  19  27 
105000  19  27 
105447  10  27 
105447  23  27 
105894  9   27 
105894  15  27 
106000  14  27 
106000  19  27 
106025  3   27 
106025  16  27 
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106342  4   27 
106342  20  27 
106472  8   27 
106472  12  27 
106789  8   27 
106789  12  27 
106919  4   27 
106919  20  27 
107236  3   27 
107236  16  27 
107367  9   27 
107367  15  27 
107814  10  27 
107814  23  27 
108000  14  27 
108000  19  27 
108261  14  27 
108261  19  27 
108447  10  27 
108447  23  27 
108894  9   27 
108894  15  27 
109025  3   27 
109025  16  27 
109342  4   27 
109342  20  27 
109472  8   27 
109472  12  27 
109789  8   27 
109789  12  27 
109919  4   27 
109919  20  27 
110236  3   27 
110236  16  27 
110367  9   27 
110367  15  27 
110814  10  27 
110814  23  27 
111000  14  27 
111000  19  27 
111261  14  27 
111261  19  27 
111447  10  27 
111447  23  27 
111894  9   27 
111894  15  27 
112000  5   27 
112000  24  27 
112025  3   27 
112025  16  27 
112194  9   27 
112194  15  27 
112342  4   27 
112342  20  27 
112472  8   27 
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112472  12  27 
112789  8   27 
112789  12  27 
112919  4   27 
112919  20  27 
113000  5   27 
113000  24  27 
113194  9   27 
113194  15  27 
113236  3   27 
113236  16  27 
113367  9   27 
113367  15  27 
113814  10  27 
113814  23  27 
114000  14  27 
114000  19  27 
114261  14  27 
114261  19  27 
114447  10  27 
114447  23  27 
114894  9   27 
114894  15  27 
115025  3   27 
115025  16  27 
115342  4   27 
115342  20  27 
115472  8   27 
115472  12  27 
115789  8   27 
115789  12  27 
115919  4   27 
115919  20  27 
116236  3   27 
116236  16  27 
116367  9   27 
116367  15  27 
116814  10  27 
116814  23  27 
117000  14  27 
117000  19  27 
117261  14  27 
117261  19  27 
117447  10  27 
117447  23  27 
117894  9   27 
117894  15  27 
118025  3   27 
118025  16  27 
118342  4   27 
118342  20  27 
118472  8   27 
118472  12  27 
118789  8   27 
118789  12  27 
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118919  4   27 
118919  20  27 
119194  1   27 
119194  21  27 
119236  3   27 
119236  16  27 
119367  9   27 
119367  15  27 
119388  8   27 
119388  12  27 
119814  10  27 
119814  23  27 
120194  1   27 
120194  21  27 
120261  14  27 
120261  19  27 
120388  8   27 
120388  12  27 
121025  3   27 
121025  16  27 
121472  8   27 
121472  12  27 
121919  4   27 
121919  20  27 
122000  5   27 
122000  24  27 
122367  9   27 
122367  15  27 
122447  11  27 
122447  22  27 
122814  10  27 
122814  23  27 
122894  1   27 
122894  21  27 
123261  14  27 
123261  19  27 
123342  6   27 
123342  18  27 
123789  2   27 
123789  17  27 
124236  7   27 
124236  13  27 
125000  5   27 
125000  24  27 
125447  11  27 
125447  22  27 
125894  1   27 
125894  21  27 
126025  7   27 
126025  13  27 
126342  6   27 
126342  18  27 
126388  2   27 
126388  17  27 
126472  2   27 
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126472  17  27 
126789  2   27 
126789  17  27 
126919  6   27 
126919  18  27 
127236  7   27 
127236  13  27 
127367  1   27 
127367  21  27 
127388  2   27 
127388  17  27 
127814  11  27 
127814  22  27 
128000  5   27 
128000  24  27 
128261  5   27 
128261  24  27 
128447  11  27 
128447  22  27 
128894  1   27 
128894  21  27 
129025  7   27 
129025  13  27 
129342  6   27 
129342  18  27 
129472  2   27 
129472  17  27 
129789  2   27 
129789  17  27 
129919  6   27 
129919  18  27 
130236  7   27 
130236  13  27 
130367  1   27 
130367  21  27 
130814  11  27 
130814  22  27 
131000  5   27 
131000  24  27 
131261  5   27 
131261  24  27 
131447  11  27 
131447  22  27 
131894  1   27 
131894  21  27 
132025  7   27 
132025  13  27 
132342  6   27 
132342  18  27 
132472  2   27 
132472  17  27 
132789  2   27 
132789  17  27 
132919  6   27 
132919  18  27 
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133236  7   27 
133236  13  27 
133367  1   27 
133367  21  27 
133814  11  27 
133814  22  27 
134000  5   27 
134000  24  27 
134261  5   27 
134261  24  27 
134447  11  27 
134447  22  27 
134894  1   27 
134894  21  27 
135025  7   27 
135025  13  27 
135342  6   27 
135342  18  27 
135472  2   27 
135472  17  27 
135789  2   27 
135789  17  27 
135919  6   27 
135919  18  27 
136236  7   27 
136236  13  27 
136367  1   27 
136367  21  27 
136814  11  27 
136814  22  27 
137000  5   27 
137000  24  27 
137261  5   27 
137261  24  27 
137374  3   27 
137374  16  27 
137447  11  27 
137447  22  27 
137894  1   27 
137894  21  27 
138025  7   27 
138025  13  27 
138342  6   27 
138342  18  27 
138374  3   27 
138374  16  27 
138472  2   27 
138472  17  27 
138789  2   27 
138789  17  27 
138919  6   27 
138919  18  27 
139236  7   27 
139236  13  27 
139367  1   27 
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139367  21  27 
139814  11  27 
139814  22  27 
140261  5   27 
140261  24  27 
141025  7   27 
141025  13  27 
141472  2   27 
141472  17  27 
141919  6   27 
141919  18  27 
142367  1   27 
142367  21  27 
142814  11  27 
142814  22  27 
143261  5   27 
143261  24  27 
144374  7   27 
144374  13  27 
144568  4   27 
144568  20  27 
145374  7   27 
145374  13  27 
145568  4   27 
145568  20  27 
151568  6   27 
151568  18  27 
151763  10  27 
151763  23  27 
152568  6   27 
152568  18  27 
152763  10  27 
152763  23  27 
158763  11  27 
158763  22  27 
159763  11  27 















Scenario_2 = [ 
0       14  27 
0       19  27 
 113
319     10  27 
319     23  27 
639     9   27 
639     15  27 
958     4   27 
958     20  27 
1278    8   27 
1278    12  27 
1597    3   27 
1597    16  27 
2875    3   27 
2875    16  27 
3195    8   27 
3195    12  27 
3514    4   27 
3514    20  27 
3834    9   27 
3834    15  27 
4153    10  27 
4153    23  27 
4473    14  27 
4473    19  27 
5000    5   27 
5000    24  27 
5319    11  27 
5319    22  27 
5639    1   27 
5639    21  27 
5958    6   27 
5958    18  27 
6278    2   27 
6278    17  27 
6597    7   27 
6597    13  27 
7875    7   27 
7875    13  27 
8195    2   27 
8195    17  27 
8514    6   27 
8514    18  27 
8834    1   27 
8834    21  27 
9153    11  27 
9153    22  27 
9473    5   27 
9473    24  27 
10000   14  27 
10000   19  27 
10319   10  27 
10319   23  27 
10639   9   27 
10639   15  27 
10958   4   27 
10958   20  27 
11278   8   27 
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11278   12  27 
11597   3   27 
11597   16  27 
12000   14  27 
12000   19  27 
12319   10  27 
12319   23  27 
12639   9   27 
12639   15  27 
12875   3   27 
12875   16  27 
12958   4   27 
12958   20  27 
13195   8   27 
13195   12  27 
13278   8   27 
13278   12  27 
13514   4   27 
13514   20  27 
13597   3   27 
13597   16  27 
13834   9   27 
13834   15  27 
14153   10  27 
14153   23  27 
14473   14  27 
14473   19  27 
14875   3   27 
14875   16  27 
15195   8   27 
15195   12  27 
15514   4   27 
15514   20  27 
15834   9   27 
15834   15  27 
16153   10  27 
16153   23  27 
16473   14  27 
16473   19  27 
17000   5   27 
17000   24  27 
17319   11  27 
17319   22  27 
17639   1   27 
17639   21  27 
17958   6   27 
17958   18  27 
18278   2   27 
18278   17  27 
18597   7   27 
18597   13  27 
19000   5   27 
19000   24  27 
19319   11  27 
19319   22  27 
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19639   1   27 
19639   21  27 
19875   7   27 
19875   13  27 
19958   6   27 
19958   18  27 
20195   2   27 
20195   17  27 
20278   2   27 
20278   17  27 
20514   6   27 
20514   18  27 
20597   7   27 
20597   13  27 
20834   1   27 
20834   21  27 
21153   11  27 
21153   22  27 
21473   5   27 
21473   24  27 
21875   7   27 
21875   13  27 
22195   2   27 
22195   17  27 
22514   6   27 
22514   18  27 
22834   1   27 
22834   21  27 
23000   14  27 
23000   19  27 
23153   11  27 
23153   22  27 
23319   10  27 
23319   23  27 
23473   5   27 
23473   24  27 
23639   9   27 
23639   15  27 
23958   4   27 
23958   20  27 
24278   8   27 
24278   12  27 
24597   3   27 
24597   16  27 
25000   14  27 
25000   19  27 
25319   10  27 
25319   23  27 
25639   9   27 
25639   15  27 
25875   3   27 
25875   16  27 
25958   4   27 
25958   20  27 
26195   8   27 
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26195   12  27 
26278   8   27 
26278   12  27 
26514   4   27 
26514   20  27 
26597   3   27 
26597   16  27 
26834   9   27 
26834   15  27 
27000   14  27 
27000   19  27 
27153   10  27 
27153   23  27 
27319   10  27 
27319   23  27 
27473   14  27 
27473   19  27 
27639   9   27 
27639   15  27 
27875   3   27 
27875   16  27 
27958   4   27 
27958   20  27 
28195   8   27 
28195   12  27 
28278   8   27 
28278   12  27 
28514   4   27 
28514   20  27 
28597   3   27 
28597   16  27 
28834   9   27 
28834   15  27 
29153   10  27 
29153   23  27 
29473   14  27 
29473   19  27 
29875   3   27 
29875   16  27 
30195   8   27 
30195   12  27 
30514   4   27 
30514   20  27 
30834   9   27 
30834   15  27 
31000   5   27 
31000   24  27 
31153   10  27 
31153   23  27 
31319   11  27 
31319   22  27 
31473   14  27 
31473   19  27 
31639   1   27 
31639   21  27 
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31958   6   27 
31958   18  27 
32278   2   27 
32278   17  27 
32597   7   27 
32597   13  27 
33000   5   27 
33000   24  27 
33319   11  27 
33319   22  27 
33639   1   27 
33639   21  27 
33875   7   27 
33875   13  27 
33958   6   27 
33958   18  27 
34195   2   27 
34195   17  27 
34278   2   27 
34278   17  27 
34514   6   27 
34514   18  27 
34597   7   27 
34597   13  27 
34834   1   27 
34834   21  27 
35000   5   27 
35000   24  27 
35153   11  27 
35153   22  27 
35319   11  27 
35319   22  27 
35473   5   27 
35473   24  27 
35639   1   27 
35639   21  27 
35875   7   27 
35875   13  27 
35958   6   27 
35958   18  27 
36195   2   27 
36195   17  27 
36278   2   27 
36278   17  27 
36514   6   27 
36514   18  27 
36597   7   27 
36597   13  27 
36834   1   27 
36834   21  27 
37153   11  27 
37153   22  27 
37473   5   27 
37473   24  27 
37875   7   27 
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37875   13  27 
38195   2   27 
38195   17  27 
38514   6   27 
38514   18  27 
38834   1   27 
38834   21  27 
39153   11  27 
39153   22  27 
39473   5   27 
39473   24  27 
41000   14  27 
41000   19  27 
41319   10  27 
41319   23  27 
41639   9   27 
41639   15  27 
41958   4   27 
41958   20  27 
42278   8   27 
42278   12  27 
42597   3   27 
42597   16  27 
43000   14  27 
43000   19  27 
43319   10  27 
43319   23  27 
43639   9   27 
43639   15  27 
43875   3   27 
43875   16  27 
43958   4   27 
43958   20  27 
44195   8   27 
44195   12  27 
44278   8   27 
44278   12  27 
44514   4   27 
44514   20  27 
44597   3   27 
44597   16  27 
44834   9   27 
44834   15  27 
45000   14  27 
45000   19  27 
45153   10  27 
45153   23  27 
45319   10  27 
45319   23  27 
45473   14  27 
45473   19  27 
45639   9   27 
45639   15  27 
45875   3   27 
45875   16  27 
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45958   4   27 
45958   20  27 
46195   8   27 
46195   12  27 
46278   8   27 
46278   12  27 
46514   4   27 
46514   20  27 
46597   3   27 
46597   16  27 
46834   9   27 
46834   15  27 
47000   14  27 
47000   19  27 
47153   10  27 
47153   23  27 
47319   10  27 
47319   23  27 
47473   14  27 
47473   19  27 
47639   9   27 
47639   15  27 
47875   3   27 
47875   16  27 
47958   4   27 
47958   20  27 
48195   8   27 
48195   12  27 
48278   8   27 
48278   12  27 
48514   4   27 
48514   20  27 
48597   3   27 
48597   16  27 
48834   9   27 
48834   15  27 
49153   10  27 
49153   23  27 
49473   14  27 
49473   19  27 
49875   3   27 
49875   16  27 
50000   5   27 
50000   24  27 
50195   8   27 
50195   12  27 
50319   11  27 
50319   22  27 
50514   4   27 
50514   20  27 
50639   1   27 
50639   21  27 
50834   9   27 
50834   15  27 
50958   6   27 
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50958   18  27 
51153   10  27 
51153   23  27 
51278   2   27 
51278   17  27 
51473   14  27 
51473   19  27 
51597   7   27 
51597   13  27 
52000   5   27 
52000   24  27 
52319   11  27 
52319   22  27 
52639   1   27 
52639   21  27 
52875   7   27 
52875   13  27 
52958   6   27 
52958   18  27 
53195   2   27 
53195   17  27 
53278   2   27 
53278   17  27 
53514   6   27 
53514   18  27 
53597   7   27 
53597   13  27 
53834   1   27 
53834   21  27 
54000   5   27 
54000   24  27 
54153   11  27 
54153   22  27 
54319   11  27 
54319   22  27 
54473   5   27 
54473   24  27 
54639   1   27 
54639   21  27 
54875   7   27 
54875   13  27 
54958   6   27 
54958   18  27 
55195   2   27 
55195   17  27 
55278   2   27 
55278   17  27 
55514   6   27 
55514   18  27 
55597   7   27 
55597   13  27 
55834   1   27 
55834   21  27 
56000   5   27 
56000   24  27 
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56153   11  27 
56153   22  27 
56319   11  27 
56319   22  27 
56473   5   27 
56473   24  27 
56639   1   27 
56639   21  27 
56875   7   27 
56875   13  27 
56958   6   27 
56958   18  27 
57195   2   27 
57195   17  27 
57278   2   27 
57278   17  27 
57514   6   27 
57514   18  27 
57597   7   27 
57597   13  27 
57834   1   27 
57834   21  27 
58153   11  27 
58153   22  27 
58473   5   27 
58473   24  27 
58875   7   27 
58875   13  27 
59195   2   27 
59195   17  27 
59514   6   27 
59514   18  27 
59834   1   27 
59834   21  27 
60000   14  27 
60000   14  27 
60000   19  27 
60000   19  27 
60153   11  27 
60153   22  27 
60319   10  27 
60319   23  27 
60473   5   27 
60473   24  27 
60500   14  27 
60500   19  27 
60639   9   27 
60639   15  27 
60958   4   27 
60958   20  27 
61000   19  27 
61000   14  27 
61278   8   27 
61278   12  27 
61500   19  27 
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61500   14  27 
61597   3   27 
61597   16  27 
62000   14  27 
62000   19  27 
62319   10  27 
62319   23  27 
62639   9   27 
62639   15  27 
62875   3   27 
62875   16  27 
62958   4   27 
62958   20  27 
63195   8   27 
63195   12  27 
63278   8   27 
63278   12  27 
63514   4   27 
63514   20  27 
63597   3   27 
63597   16  27 
63834   9   27 
63834   15  27 
64000   14  27 
64000   19  27 
64153   10  27 
64153   23  27 
64319   10  27 
64319   23  27 
64473   14  27 
64473   19  27 
64639   9   27 
64639   15  27 
64875   3   27 
64875   16  27 
64958   4   27 
64958   20  27 
65195   8   27 
65195   12  27 
65278   8   27 
65278   12  27 
65514   4   27 
65514   20  27 
65597   3   27 
65597   16  27 
65834   9   27 
65834   15  27 
66000   14  27 
66000   19  27 
66153   10  27 
66153   23  27 
66319   10  27 
66319   23  27 
66473   14  27 
66473   19  27 
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66639   9   27 
66639   15  27 
66875   3   27 
66875   16  27 
66958   4   27 
66958   20  27 
67194   9   27 
67194   15  27 
67195   8   27 
67195   12  27 
67278   8   27 
67278   12  27 
67514   4   27 
67514   20  27 
67597   3   27 
67597   16  27 
67694   9   27 
67694   15  27 
67834   9   27 
67834   15  27 
68000   14  27 
68000   19  27 
68153   10  27 
68153   23  27 
68194   15  27 
68194   9   27 
68319   10  27 
68319   23  27 
68473   14  27 
68473   19  27 
68639   9   27 
68639   15  27 
68694   15  27 
68694   9   27 
68875   3   27 
68875   16  27 
68958   4   27 
68958   20  27 
69195   8   27 
69195   12  27 
69278   8   27 
69278   12  27 
69514   4   27 
69514   20  27 
69597   3   27 
69597   16  27 
69834   9   27 
69834   15  27 
70000   5   27 
70000   24  27 
70153   10  27 
70153   23  27 
70473   14  27 
70473   19  27 
70875   3   27 
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70875   16  27 
71000   5   27 
71000   24  27 
71195   8   27 
71195   12  27 
71514   4   27 
71514   20  27 
71834   9   27 
71834   15  27 
72000   5   27 
72000   24  27 
72153   10  27 
72153   23  27 
72319   11  27 
72319   22  27 
72473   14  27 
72473   19  27 
72639   1   27 
72639   21  27 
72958   6   27 
72958   18  27 
73278   2   27 
73278   17  27 
73597   7   27 
73597   13  27 
74000   5   27 
74000   24  27 
74319   11  27 
74319   22  27 
74388   8   27 
74388   12  27 
74639   1   27 
74639   21  27 
74875   7   27 
74875   13  27 
74888   8   27 
74888   12  27 
74958   6   27 
74958   18  27 
75195   2   27 
75195   17  27 
75278   2   27 
75278   17  27 
75388   12  27 
75388   8   27 
75514   6   27 
75514   18  27 
75597   7   27 
75597   13  27 
75834   1   27 
75834   21  27 
75888   12  27 
75888   8   27 
76000   5   27 
76000   5   27 
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76000   24  27 
76000   24  27 
76153   11  27 
76153   22  27 
76319   11  27 
76319   11  27 
76319   22  27 
76319   22  27 
76473   5   27 
76473   24  27 
76639   1   27 
76639   1   27 
76639   21  27 
76639   21  27 
76875   7   27 
76875   13  27 
76958   6   27 
76958   6   27 
76958   18  27 
76958   18  27 
77194   1   27 
77194   21  27 
77195   2   27 
77195   17  27 
77278   2   27 
77278   2   27 
77278   17  27 
77278   17  27 
77514   6   27 
77514   18  27 
77597   7   27 
77597   7   27 
77597   13  27 
77597   13  27 
77834   1   27 
77834   21  27 
78000   5   27 
78000   24  27 
78153   11  27 
78153   22  27 
78194   1   27 
78194   21  27 
78319   11  27 
78319   22  27 
78473   5   27 
78473   24  27 
78639   1   27 
78639   21  27 
78875   7   27 
78875   7   27 
78875   13  27 
78875   13  27 
78958   6   27 
78958   18  27 
79195   2   27 
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79195   2   27 
79195   17  27 
79195   17  27 
79278   2   27 
79278   17  27 
79514   6   27 
79514   6   27 
79514   18  27 
79514   18  27 
79597   7   27 
79597   13  27 
79834   1   27 
79834   1   27 
79834   21  27 
79834   21  27 
80000   5   27 
80000   24  27 
80153   11  27 
80153   11  27 
80153   22  27 
80153   22  27 
80319   11  27 
80319   22  27 
80473   5   27 
80473   5   27 
80473   24  27 
80473   24  27 
80639   1   27 
80639   21  27 
80875   7   27 
80875   13  27 
80958   6   27 
80958   18  27 
81195   2   27 
81195   17  27 
81278   2   27 
81278   17  27 
81514   6   27 
81514   18  27 
81597   7   27 
81597   13  27 
81834   1   27 
81834   21  27 
82153   11  27 
82153   22  27 
82473   5   27 
82473   24  27 
82875   7   27 
82875   13  27 
83195   2   27 
83195   17  27 
83514   6   27 
83514   18  27 
83834   1   27 
83834   21  27 
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84153   11  27 
84153   22  27 
84388   2   27 
84388   17  27 
84473   5   27 
84473   24  27 
85000   14  27 
85000   19  27 
85319   10  27 
85319   23  27 
85388   2   27 
85388   17  27 
85639   9   27 
85639   15  27 
85958   4   27 
85958   20  27 
86278   8   27 
86278   12  27 
86597   3   27 
86597   16  27 
87000   14  27 
87000   19  27 
87319   10  27 
87319   23  27 
87639   9   27 
87639   15  27 
87875   3   27 
87875   16  27 
87958   4   27 
87958   20  27 
88195   8   27 
88195   12  27 
88278   8   27 
88278   12  27 
88514   4   27 
88514   20  27 
88597   3   27 
88597   16  27 
88834   9   27 
88834   15  27 
89000   14  27 
89000   19  27 
89153   10  27 
89153   23  27 
89319   10  27 
89319   23  27 
89473   14  27 
89473   19  27 
89639   9   27 
89639   15  27 
89875   3   27 
89875   16  27 
89958   4   27 
89958   20  27 
90195   8   27 
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90195   12  27 
90278   8   27 
90278   12  27 
90514   4   27 
90514   20  27 
90597   3   27 
90597   16  27 
90834   9   27 
90834   15  27 
91000   14  27 
91000   19  27 
91153   10  27 
91153   23  27 
91319   10  27 
91319   23  27 
91473   14  27 
91473   19  27 
91639   9   27 
91639   15  27 
91875   3   27 
91875   16  27 
91958   4   27 
91958   20  27 
92195   8   27 
92195   12  27 
92278   8   27 
92278   12  27 
92374   3   27 
92374   16  27 
92514   4   27 
92514   20  27 
92597   3   27 
92597   16  27 
92834   9   27 
92834   15  27 
92874   3   27 
92874   16  27 
93000   14  27 
93000   19  27 
93153   10  27 
93153   23  27 
93319   10  27 
93319   23  27 
93374   3   27 
93374   16  27 
93473   14  27 
93473   19  27 
93639   9   27 
93639   15  27 
93874   3   27 
93874   16  27 
93875   3   27 
93875   16  27 
93958   4   27 
93958   20  27 
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94195   8   27 
94195   12  27 
94278   8   27 
94278   12  27 
94514   4   27 
94514   20  27 
94597   3   27 
94597   16  27 
94834   9   27 
94834   15  27 
95000   14  27 
95000   19  27 
95153   10  27 
95153   23  27 
95319   10  27 
95319   23  27 
95473   14  27 
95473   19  27 
95639   9   27 
95639   15  27 
95875   3   27 
95875   16  27 
95958   4   27 
95958   20  27 
96195   8   27 
96195   12  27 
96278   8   27 
96278   12  27 
96514   4   27 
96514   20  27 
96597   3   27 
96597   16  27 
96834   9   27 
96834   15  27 
97153   10  27 
97153   23  27 
97473   14  27 
97473   19  27 
97875   3   27 
97875   16  27 
98195   8   27 
98195   12  27 
98514   4   27 
98514   20  27 
98834   9   27 
98834   15  27 
99153   10  27 
99153   23  27 
99473   14  27 
99473   19  27 
99568   4   27 
99568   20  27 
100000  5   27 
100000  24  27 
100068  4   27 
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100068  20  27 
100319  11  27 
100319  22  27 
100568  4   27 
100568  20  27 
100639  1   27 
100639  21  27 
100958  6   27 
100958  18  27 
101068  4   27 
101068  20  27 
101278  2   27 
101278  17  27 
101597  7   27 
101597  13  27 
102000  5   27 
102000  24  27 
102319  11  27 
102319  22  27 
102374  7   27 
102374  13  27 
102639  1   27 
102639  21  27 
102875  7   27 
102875  13  27 
102958  6   27 
102958  18  27 
103195  2   27 
103195  17  27 
103278  2   27 
103278  17  27 
103374  7   27 
103374  13  27 
103514  6   27 
103514  18  27 
103597  7   27 
103597  13  27 
103834  1   27 
103834  21  27 
104000  5   27 
104000  24  27 
104153  11  27 
104153  22  27 
104319  11  27 
104319  22  27 
104473  5   27 
104473  24  27 
104639  1   27 
104639  21  27 
104875  7   27 
104875  13  27 
104958  6   27 
104958  18  27 
105195  2   27 
105195  17  27 
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105278  2   27 
105278  17  27 
105514  6   27 
105514  18  27 
105597  7   27 
105597  13  27 
105834  1   27 
105834  21  27 
106000  5   27 
106000  24  27 
106153  11  27 
106153  22  27 
106319  11  27 
106319  22  27 
106473  5   27 
106473  24  27 
106639  1   27 
106639  21  27 
106763  10  27 
106763  23  27 
106875  7   27 
106875  13  27 
106958  6   27 
106958  18  27 
107195  2   27 
107195  17  27 
107263  10  27 
107263  23  27 
107278  2   27 
107278  17  27 
107514  6   27 
107514  18  27 
107597  7   27 
107597  13  27 
107763  10  27 
107763  23  27 
107834  1   27 
107834  21  27 
108000  5   27 
108000  24  27 
108153  11  27 
108153  22  27 
108263  10  27 
108263  23  27 
108319  11  27 
108319  22  27 
108473  5   27 
108473  24  27 
108639  1   27 
108639  21  27 
108875  7   27 
108875  13  27 
108958  6   27 
108958  18  27 
109195  2   27 
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109195  17  27 
109278  2   27 
109278  17  27 
109514  6   27 
109514  18  27 
109568  6   27 
109568  18  27 
109597  7   27 
109597  13  27 
109834  1   27 
109834  21  27 
110000  5   27 
110000  24  27 
110153  11  27 
110153  22  27 
110319  11  27 
110319  22  27 
110473  5   27 
110473  24  27 
110568  6   27 
110568  18  27 
110639  1   27 
110639  21  27 
110875  7   27 
110875  13  27 
110958  6   27 
110958  18  27 
111195  2   27 
111195  17  27 
111278  2   27 
111278  17  27 
111514  6   27 
111514  18  27 
111597  7   27 
111597  13  27 
111834  1   27 
111834  21  27 
112153  11  27 
112153  22  27 
112473  5   27 
112473  24  27 
112875  7   27 
112875  13  27 
113195  2   27 
113195  17  27 
113514  6   27 
113514  18  27 
113834  1   27 
113834  21  27 
114153  11  27 
114153  22  27 
114473  5   27 
114473  24  27 
116763  11  27 
116763  22  27 
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117763  11  27 















%time   originating node        destination node 
Scenario_3 = [ 
0       19  27 
0       14  27 
249     23  27 
249     10  27 
497     15  27 
497     9   27 
746     20  27 
746     4   27 
994     12  27 
994     8   27 
1243    16  27 
1243    3   27 
2000    19  27 
2000    14  27 
2237    3   27 
2237    16  27 
2249    23  27 
2249    10  27 
2485    8   27 
2485    12  27 
2497    15  27 
2497    9   27 
2734    4   27 
2734    20  27 
2746    20  27 
2746    4   27 
2982    9   27 
2982    15  27 
2994    12  27 
2994    8   27 
3231    10  27 
3231    23  27 
3243    16  27 
3243    3   27 
3479    14  27 
3479    19  27 
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4000    19  27 
4000    14  27 
4237    3   27 
4237    16  27 
4249    23  27 
4249    10  27 
4485    8   27 
4485    12  27 
4497    15  27 
4497    9   27 
4734    4   27 
4734    20  27 
4746    20  27 
4746    4   27 
4982    9   27 
4982    15  27 
4994    12  27 
4994    8   27 
5231    10  27 
5231    23  27 
5243    16  27 
5243    3   27 
5479    14  27 
5479    19  27 
6000    19  27 
6000    14  27 
6237    3   27 
6237    16  27 
6249    23  27 
6249    10  27 
6485    8   27 
6485    12  27 
6497    15  27 
6497    9   27 
6734    4   27 
6734    20  27 
6746    20  27 
6746    4   27 
6982    9   27 
6982    15  27 
6994    12  27 
6994    8   27 
7231    10  27 
7231    23  27 
7243    16  27 
7243    3   27 
7479    14  27 
7479    19  27 
8000    19  27 
8000    14  27 
8237    3   27 
8237    16  27 
8249    23  27 
8249    10  27 
8485    8   27 
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8485    12  27 
8497    15  27 
8497    9   27 
8734    4   27 
8734    20  27 
8746    20  27 
8746    4   27 
8982    9   27 
8982    15  27 
8994    12  27 
8994    8   27 
9231    10  27 
9231    23  27 
9243    16  27 
9243    3   27 
9479    14  27 
9479    19  27 
10237   3   27 
10237   16  27 
10485   8   27 
10485   12  27 
10734   4   27 
10734   20  27 
10982   9   27 
10982   15  27 
11231   10  27 
11231   23  27 
11479   14  27 
11479   19  27 
12000   24  27 
12000   5   27 
12249   22  27 
12249   11  27 
12497   21  27 
12497   1   27 
12746   18  27 
12746   6   27 
12994   17  27 
12994   2   27 
13243   13  27 
13243   7   27 
14000   24  27 
14000   5   27 
14237   7   27 
14237   13  27 
14249   22  27 
14249   11  27 
14485   2   27 
14485   17  27 
14497   21  27 
14497   1   27 
14734   6   27 
14734   18  27 
14746   18  27 
14746   6   27 
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14982   1   27 
14982   21  27 
14994   17  27 
14994   2   27 
15231   11  27 
15231   22  27 
15243   13  27 
15243   7   27 
15479   5   27 
15479   24  27 
16000   24  27 
16000   5   27 
16237   7   27 
16237   13  27 
16249   22  27 
16249   11  27 
16485   2   27 
16485   17  27 
16497   21  27 
16497   1   27 
16734   6   27 
16734   18  27 
16746   18  27 
16746   6   27 
16982   1   27 
16982   21  27 
16994   17  27 
16994   2   27 
17231   11  27 
17231   22  27 
17243   13  27 
17243   7   27 
17479   5   27 
17479   24  27 
18000   24  27 
18000   5   27 
18237   7   27 
18237   13  27 
18249   22  27 
18249   11  27 
18485   2   27 
18485   17  27 
18497   21  27 
18497   1   27 
18734   6   27 
18734   18  27 
18746   18  27 
18746   6   27 
18982   1   27 
18982   21  27 
18994   17  27 
18994   2   27 
19231   11  27 
19231   22  27 
19243   13  27 
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19243   7   27 
19479   5   27 
19479   24  27 
20000   24  27 
20000   5   27 
20237   7   27 
20237   13  27 
20249   22  27 
20249   11  27 
20485   2   27 
20485   17  27 
20497   21  27 
20497   1   27 
20734   6   27 
20734   18  27 
20746   18  27 
20746   6   27 
20982   1   27 
20982   21  27 
20994   17  27 
20994   2   27 
21231   11  27 
21231   22  27 
21243   13  27 
21243   7   27 
21479   5   27 
21479   24  27 
22237   7   27 
22237   13  27 
22485   2   27 
22485   17  27 
22734   6   27 
22734   18  27 
22982   1   27 
22982   21  27 
23231   11  27 
23231   22  27 
23479   5   27 
23479   24  27 
24000   19  27 
24000   14  27 
24249   23  27 
24249   10  27 
24497   15  27 
24497   9   27 
24746   20  27 
24746   4   27 
24994   12  27 
24994   8   27 
25243   16  27 
25243   3   27 
26000   19  27 
26000   14  27 
26237   3   27 
26237   16  27 
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26249   23  27 
26249   10  27 
26485   8   27 
26485   12  27 
26497   15  27 
26497   9   27 
26734   4   27 
26734   20  27 
26746   20  27 
26746   4   27 
26982   9   27 
26982   15  27 
26994   12  27 
26994   8   27 
27231   10  27 
27231   23  27 
27243   16  27 
27243   3   27 
27479   14  27 
27479   19  27 
28000   19  27 
28000   14  27 
28237   3   27 
28237   16  27 
28249   23  27 
28249   10  27 
28485   8   27 
28485   12  27 
28497   15  27 
28497   9   27 
28734   4   27 
28734   20  27 
28746   20  27 
28746   4   27 
28982   9   27 
28982   15  27 
28994   12  27 
28994   8   27 
29231   10  27 
29231   23  27 
29243   16  27 
29243   3   27 
29479   14  27 
29479   19  27 
30000   19  27 
30000   14  27 
30000   19  27 
30000   14  27 
30237   3   27 
30237   16  27 
30249   23  27 
30249   10  27 
30485   8   27 
30485   12  27 
30497   15  27 
 139
30497   9   27 
30734   4   27 
30734   20  27 
30746   20  27 
30746   4   27 
30982   9   27 
30982   15  27 
30994   12  27 
30994   8   27 
31231   10  27 
31231   23  27 
31243   16  27 
31243   3   27 
31479   14  27 
31479   19  27 
32000   19  27 
32000   14  27 
32237   3   27 
32237   16  27 
32249   23  27 
32249   10  27 
32485   8   27 
32485   12  27 
32497   15  27 
32497   9   27 
32734   4   27 
32734   20  27 
32746   20  27 
32746   4   27 
32982   9   27 
32982   15  27 
32994   12  27 
32994   8   27 
33231   10  27 
33231   23  27 
33243   16  27 
33243   3   27 
33479   14  27 
33479   19  27 
34237   3   27 
34237   16  27 
34485   8   27 
34485   12  27 
34734   4   27 
34734   20  27 
34982   9   27 
34982   15  27 
35231   10  27 
35231   23  27 
35479   14  27 
35479   19  27 
36000   24  27 
36000   5   27 
36249   22  27 
36249   11  27 
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36497   21  27 
36497   1   27 
36746   18  27 
36746   6   27 
36994   17  27 
36994   2   27 
37194   15  27 
37194   9   27 
37243   13  27 
37243   7   27 
38000   24  27 
38000   5   27 
38237   7   27 
38237   13  27 
38249   22  27 
38249   11  27 
38485   2   27 
38485   17  27 
38497   21  27 
38497   1   27 
38734   6   27 
38734   18  27 
38746   18  27 
38746   6   27 
38982   1   27 
38982   21  27 
38994   17  27 
38994   2   27 
39231   11  27 
39231   22  27 
39243   13  27 
39243   7   27 
39479   5   27 
39479   24  27 
40000   24  27 
40000   5   27 
40237   7   27 
40237   13  27 
40249   22  27 
40249   11  27 
40485   2   27 
40485   17  27 
40497   21  27 
40497   1   27 
40734   6   27 
40734   18  27 
40746   18  27 
40746   6   27 
40982   1   27 
40982   21  27 
40994   17  27 
40994   2   27 
41231   11  27 
41231   22  27 
41243   13  27 
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41243   7   27 
41479   5   27 
41479   24  27 
42000   24  27 
42000   5   27 
42237   7   27 
42237   13  27 
42249   22  27 
42249   11  27 
42485   2   27 
42485   17  27 
42497   21  27 
42497   1   27 
42734   6   27 
42734   18  27 
42746   18  27 
42746   6   27 
42982   1   27 
42982   21  27 
42994   17  27 
42994   2   27 
43231   11  27 
43231   22  27 
43243   13  27 
43243   7   27 
43479   5   27 
43479   24  27 
44000   24  27 
44000   5   27 
44237   7   27 
44237   13  27 
44249   22  27 
44249   11  27 
44388   12  27 
44388   8   27 
44485   2   27 
44485   17  27 
44497   21  27 
44497   1   27 
44734   6   27 
44734   18  27 
44746   18  27 
44746   6   27 
44982   1   27 
44982   21  27 
44994   17  27 
44994   2   27 
45231   11  27 
45231   22  27 
45243   13  27 
45243   7   27 
45479   5   27 
45479   24  27 
46237   7   27 
46237   13  27 
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46485   2   27 
46485   17  27 
46734   6   27 
46734   18  27 
46982   1   27 
46982   21  27 
47231   11  27 
47231   22  27 
47479   5   27 
47479   24  27 
48000   19  27 
48000   14  27 
48249   23  27 
48249   10  27 
48497   15  27 
48497   9   27 
48746   20  27 
48746   4   27 
48994   12  27 
48994   8   27 
49243   16  27 
49243   3   27 
50000   19  27 
50000   14  27 
50000   5   27 
50000   24  27 
50237   3   27 
50237   16  27 
50249   23  27 
50249   10  27 
50485   8   27 
50485   12  27 
50497   15  27 
50497   9   27 
50734   4   27 
50734   20  27 
50746   20  27 
50746   4   27 
50982   9   27 
50982   15  27 
50994   12  27 
50994   8   27 
51231   10  27 
51231   23  27 
51243   16  27 
51243   3   27 
51479   14  27 
51479   19  27 
52000   19  27 
52000   14  27 
52237   3   27 
52237   16  27 
52249   23  27 
52249   10  27 
52485   8   27 
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52485   12  27 
52497   15  27 
52497   9   27 
52734   4   27 
52734   20  27 
52746   20  27 
52746   4   27 
52982   9   27 
52982   15  27 
52994   12  27 
52994   8   27 
53231   10  27 
53231   23  27 
53243   16  27 
53243   3   27 
53479   14  27 
53479   19  27 
54000   19  27 
54000   14  27 
54237   3   27 
54237   16  27 
54249   23  27 
54249   10  27 
54485   8   27 
54485   12  27 
54497   15  27 
54497   9   27 
54734   4   27 
54734   20  27 
54746   20  27 
54746   4   27 
54982   9   27 
54982   15  27 
54994   12  27 
54994   8   27 
55231   10  27 
55231   23  27 
55243   16  27 
55243   3   27 
55479   14  27 
55479   19  27 
56000   19  27 
56000   14  27 
56237   3   27 
56237   16  27 
56249   23  27 
56249   10  27 
56485   8   27 
56485   12  27 
56497   15  27 
56497   9   27 
56734   4   27 
56734   20  27 
56746   20  27 
56746   4   27 
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56982   9   27 
56982   15  27 
56994   12  27 
56994   8   27 
57194   1   27 
57194   21  27 
57231   10  27 
57231   23  27 
57243   16  27 
57243   3   27 
57479   14  27 
57479   19  27 
58237   3   27 
58237   16  27 
58485   8   27 
58485   12  27 
58734   4   27 
58734   20  27 
58982   9   27 
58982   15  27 
59231   10  27 
59231   23  27 
59479   14  27 
59479   19  27 
60000   24  27 
60000   5   27 
60249   22  27 
60249   11  27 
60497   21  27 
60497   1   27 
60746   18  27 
60746   6   27 
60994   17  27 
60994   2   27 
61243   13  27 
61243   7   27 
62000   24  27 
62000   5   27 
62237   7   27 
62237   13  27 
62249   22  27 
62249   11  27 
62374   3   27 
62374   16  27 
62485   2   27 
62485   17  27 
62497   21  27 
62497   1   27 
62734   6   27 
62734   18  27 
62746   18  27 
62746   6   27 
62982   1   27 
62982   21  27 
62994   17  27 
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62994   2   27 
63231   11  27 
63231   22  27 
63243   13  27 
63243   7   27 
63479   5   27 
63479   24  27 
64000   24  27 
64000   5   27 
64237   7   27 
64237   13  27 
64249   22  27 
64249   11  27 
64388   2   27 
64388   17  27 
64485   2   27 
64485   17  27 
64497   21  27 
64497   1   27 
64734   6   27 
64734   18  27 
64746   18  27 
64746   6   27 
64982   1   27 
64982   21  27 
64994   17  27 
64994   2   27 
65231   11  27 
65231   22  27 
65243   13  27 
65243   7   27 
65479   5   27 
65479   24  27 
66000   24  27 
66000   5   27 
66237   7   27 
66237   13  27 
66249   22  27 
66249   11  27 
66485   2   27 
66485   17  27 
66497   21  27 
66497   1   27 
66734   6   27 
66734   18  27 
66746   18  27 
66746   6   27 
66982   1   27 
66982   21  27 
66994   17  27 
66994   2   27 
67231   11  27 
67231   22  27 
67243   13  27 
67243   7   27 
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67479   5   27 
67479   24  27 
68000   24  27 
68000   5   27 
68237   7   27 
68237   13  27 
68249   22  27 
68249   11  27 
68485   2   27 
68485   17  27 
68497   21  27 
68497   1   27 
68734   6   27 
68734   18  27 
68746   18  27 
68746   6   27 
68982   1   27 
68982   21  27 
68994   17  27 
68994   2   27 
69231   11  27 
69231   22  27 
69243   13  27 
69243   7   27 
69479   5   27 
69479   24  27 
69568   4   27 
69568   20  27 
70237   7   27 
70237   13  27 
70485   2   27 
70485   17  27 
70734   6   27 
70734   18  27 
70982   1   27 
70982   21  27 
71231   11  27 
71231   22  27 
71479   5   27 
71479   24  27 
72000   19  27 
72000   14  27 
72249   23  27 
72249   10  27 
72497   15  27 
72497   9   27 
72746   20  27 
72746   4   27 
72994   12  27 
72994   8   27 
73243   16  27 
73243   3   27 
74000   19  27 
74000   14  27 
74237   3   27 
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74237   16  27 
74249   23  27 
74249   10  27 
74485   8   27 
74485   12  27 
74497   15  27 
74497   9   27 
74734   4   27 
74734   20  27 
74746   20  27 
74746   4   27 
74982   9   27 
74982   15  27 
74994   12  27 
74994   8   27 
75231   10  27 
75231   23  27 
75243   16  27 
75243   3   27 
75479   14  27 
75479   19  27 
76000   19  27 
76000   14  27 
76237   3   27 
76237   16  27 
76249   23  27 
76249   10  27 
76485   8   27 
76485   12  27 
76497   15  27 
76497   9   27 
76734   4   27 
76734   20  27 
76746   20  27 
76746   4   27 
76763   10  27 
76763   23  27 
76982   9   27 
76982   15  27 
76994   12  27 
76994   8   27 
77231   10  27 
77231   23  27 
77243   16  27 
77243   3   27 
77479   14  27 
77479   19  27 
78000   19  27 
78000   14  27 
78237   3   27 
78237   16  27 
78249   23  27 
78249   10  27 
78485   8   27 
78485   12  27 
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78497   15  27 
78497   9   27 
78734   4   27 
78734   20  27 
78746   20  27 
78746   4   27 
78982   9   27 
78982   15  27 
78994   12  27 
78994   8   27 
79231   10  27 
79231   23  27 
79243   16  27 
79243   3   27 
79479   14  27 
79479   19  27 
80000   19  27 
80000   14  27 
80237   3   27 
80237   16  27 
80249   23  27 
80249   10  27 
80485   8   27 
80485   12  27 
80497   15  27 
80497   9   27 
80734   4   27 
80734   20  27 
80746   20  27 
80746   4   27 
80982   9   27 
80982   15  27 
80994   12  27 
80994   8   27 
81231   10  27 
81231   23  27 
81243   16  27 
81243   3   27 
81479   14  27 
81479   19  27 
82237   3   27 
82237   16  27 
82374   13  27 
82374   7   27 
82485   8   27 
82485   12  27 
82734   4   27 
82734   20  27 
82982   9   27 
82982   15  27 
83231   10  27 
83231   23  27 
83479   14  27 
83479   19  27 
84000   24  27 
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84000   5   27 
84249   22  27 
84249   11  27 
84497   21  27 
84497   1   27 
84746   18  27 
84746   6   27 
84994   17  27 
84994   2   27 
85243   13  27 
85243   7   27 
86000   24  27 
86000   5   27 
86237   7   27 
86237   13  27 
86249   22  27 
86249   11  27 
86485   2   27 
86485   17  27 
86497   21  27 
86497   1   27 
86734   6   27 
86734   18  27 
86746   18  27 
86746   6   27 
86982   1   27 
86982   21  27 
86994   17  27 
86994   2   27 
87231   11  27 
87231   22  27 
87243   13  27 
87243   7   27 
87479   5   27 
87479   24  27 
88000   24  27 
88000   5   27 
88237   7   27 
88237   13  27 
88249   22  27 
88249   11  27 
88485   2   27 
88485   17  27 
88497   21  27 
88497   1   27 
88734   6   27 
88734   18  27 
88746   18  27 
88746   6   27 
88982   1   27 
88982   21  27 
88994   17  27 
88994   2   27 
89231   11  27 
89231   22  27 
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89243   13  27 
89243   7   27 
89479   5   27 
89479   24  27 
89568   18  27 
89568   6   27 
90000   24  27 
90000   5   27 
90237   7   27 
90237   13  27 
90249   22  27 
90249   11  27 
90485   2   27 
90485   17  27 
90497   21  27 
90497   1   27 
90734   6   27 
90734   18  27 
90746   18  27 
90746   6   27 
90982   1   27 
90982   21  27 
90994   17  27 
90994   2   27 
91231   11  27 
91231   22  27 
91243   13  27 
91243   7   27 
91479   5   27 
91479   24  27 
92000   24  27 
92000   5   27 
92237   7   27 
92237   13  27 
92249   22  27 
92249   11  27 
92485   2   27 
92485   17  27 
92497   21  27 
92497   1   27 
92734   6   27 
92734   18  27 
92746   18  27 
92746   6   27 
92982   1   27 
92982   21  27 
92994   17  27 
92994   2   27 
93231   11  27 
93231   22  27 
93243   13  27 
93243   7   27 
93479   5   27 
93479   24  27 
94237   7   27 
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94237   13  27 
94485   2   27 
94485   17  27 
94734   6   27 
94734   18  27 
94982   1   27 
94982   21  27 
95231   11  27 
95231   22  27 
95479   5   27 
95479   24  27 
96763   22  27 















%time   originating node        destination node 
Scenario_4 = [ 
0       19  27 
172     23  27 
344     15  27 
516     20  27 
688     12  27 
860     16  27 
1549    3   27 
1721    8   27 
1893    4   27 
2065    9   27 
2237    10  27 
2409    14  27 
0       14  27 
172     10  27 
344     9   27 
516     4   27 
688     8   27 
860     3   27 
1549    16  27 
1721    12  27 
1893    20  27 
2065    15  27 
2237    23  27 
2409    19  27 
2000    19  27 
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2172    23  27 
2344    15  27 
2516    20  27 
2688    12  27 
2860    16  27 
3549    3   27 
3721    8   27 
3893    4   27 
4065    9   27 
4237    10  27 
4409    14  27 
2000    14  27 
2172    10  27 
2344    9   27 
2516    4   27 
2688    8   27 
2860    3   27 
3549    16  27 
3721    12  27 
3893    20  27 
4065    15  27 
4237    23  27 
4409    19  27 
4000    19  27 
4172    23  27 
4344    15  27 
4516    20  27 
4688    12  27 
4860    16  27 
5549    3   27 
5721    8   27 
5893    4   27 
6065    9   27 
6237    10  27 
6409    14  27 
4000    14  27 
4172    10  27 
4344    9   27 
4516    4   27 
4688    8   27 
4860    3   27 
5549    16  27 
5721    12  27 
5893    20  27 
6065    15  27 
6237    23  27 
6409    19  27 
6000    19  27 
6172    23  27 
6344    15  27 
6516    20  27 
6688    12  27 
6860    16  27 
7549    3   27 
7721    8   27 
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7893    4   27 
8065    9   27 
8237    10  27 
8409    14  27 
6000    14  27 
6172    10  27 
6344    9   27 
6516    4   27 
6688    8   27 
6860    3   27 
7549    16  27 
7721    12  27 
7893    20  27 
8065    15  27 
8237    23  27 
8409    19  27 
8000    19  27 
8172    23  27 
8344    15  27 
8516    20  27 
8688    12  27 
8860    16  27 
9549    3   27 
9721    8   27 
9893    4   27 
10065   9   27 
10237   10  27 
10409   14  27 
8000    14  27 
8172    10  27 
8344    9   27 
8516    4   27 
8688    8   27 
8860    3   27 
9549    16  27 
9721    12  27 
9893    20  27 
10065   15  27 
10237   23  27 
10409   19  27 
12000   24  27 
12172   22  27 
12344   21  27 
12516   18  27 
12688   17  27 
12860   13  27 
13549   7   27 
13721   2   27 
13893   6   27 
14065   1   27 
14237   11  27 
14409   5   27 
12000   5   27 
12172   11  27 
12344   1   27 
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12516   6   27 
12688   2   27 
12860   7   27 
13549   13  27 
13721   17  27 
13893   18  27 
14065   21  27 
14237   22  27 
14409   24  27 
14000   24  27 
14172   22  27 
14344   21  27 
14516   18  27 
14688   17  27 
14860   13  27 
15549   7   27 
15721   2   27 
15893   6   27 
16065   1   27 
16237   11  27 
16409   5   27 
14000   5   27 
14172   11  27 
14344   1   27 
14516   6   27 
14688   2   27 
14860   7   27 
15549   13  27 
15721   17  27 
15893   18  27 
16065   21  27 
16237   22  27 
16409   24  27 
16000   24  27 
16172   22  27 
16344   21  27 
16516   18  27 
16688   17  27 
16860   13  27 
17549   7   27 
17721   2   27 
17893   6   27 
18065   1   27 
18237   11  27 
18409   5   27 
16000   5   27 
16172   11  27 
16344   1   27 
16516   6   27 
16688   2   27 
16860   7   27 
17549   13  27 
17721   17  27 
17893   18  27 
18065   21  27 
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18237   22  27 
18409   24  27 
18000   24  27 
18172   22  27 
18344   21  27 
18516   18  27 
18688   17  27 
18860   13  27 
19549   7   27 
19721   2   27 
19893   6   27 
20065   1   27 
20237   11  27 
20409   5   27 
18000   5   27 
18172   11  27 
18344   1   27 
18516   6   27 
18688   2   27 
18860   7   27 
19549   13  27 
19721   17  27 
19893   18  27 
20065   21  27 
20237   22  27 
20409   24  27 
20000   24  27 
20172   22  27 
20344   21  27 
20516   18  27 
20688   17  27 
20860   13  27 
21549   7   27 
21721   2   27 
21893   6   27 
22065   1   27 
22237   11  27 
22409   5   27 
20000   5   27 
20172   11  27 
20344   1   27 
20516   6   27 
20688   2   27 
20860   7   27 
21549   13  27 
21721   17  27 
21893   18  27 
22065   21  27 
22237   22  27 
22409   24  27 
24000   19  27 
24172   23  27 
24344   15  27 
24516   20  27 
24688   12  27 
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24860   16  27 
25549   3   27 
25721   8   27 
25893   4   27 
26065   9   27 
26237   10  27 
26409   14  27 
24000   14  27 
24172   10  27 
24344   9   27 
24516   4   27 
24688   8   27 
24860   3   27 
25549   16  27 
25721   12  27 
25893   20  27 
26065   15  27 
26237   23  27 
26409   19  27 
26000   19  27 
26172   23  27 
26344   15  27 
26516   20  27 
26688   12  27 
26860   16  27 
27549   3   27 
27721   8   27 
27893   4   27 
28065   9   27 
28237   10  27 
28409   14  27 
26000   14  27 
26172   10  27 
26344   9   27 
26516   4   27 
26688   8   27 
26860   3   27 
27549   16  27 
27721   12  27 
27893   20  27 
28065   15  27 
28237   23  27 
28409   19  27 
28000   19  27 
28172   23  27 
28344   15  27 
28516   20  27 
28688   12  27 
28860   16  27 
29549   3   27 
29721   8   27 
29893   4   27 
30065   9   27 
30237   10  27 
30409   14  27 
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28000   14  27 
28172   10  27 
28344   9   27 
28516   4   27 
28688   8   27 
28860   3   27 
29549   16  27 
29721   12  27 
29893   20  27 
30065   15  27 
30237   23  27 
30409   19  27 
30000   19  27 
30172   23  27 
30344   15  27 
30516   20  27 
30688   12  27 
30860   16  27 
31549   3   27 
31721   8   27 
31893   4   27 
32065   9   27 
32237   10  27 
32409   14  27 
30000   14  27 
30172   10  27 
30344   9   27 
30516   4   27 
30688   8   27 
30860   3   27 
31549   16  27 
31721   12  27 
31893   20  27 
32065   15  27 
32237   23  27 
32409   19  27 
32000   19  27 
32172   23  27 
32344   15  27 
32516   20  27 
32688   12  27 
32860   16  27 
33549   3   27 
33721   8   27 
33893   4   27 
34065   9   27 
34237   10  27 
34409   14  27 
32000   14  27 
32172   10  27 
32344   9   27 
32516   4   27 
32688   8   27 
32860   3   27 
33549   16  27 
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33721   12  27 
33893   20  27 
34065   15  27 
34237   23  27 
34409   19  27 
36000   24  27 
36172   22  27 
36344   21  27 
36516   18  27 
36688   17  27 
36860   13  27 
37549   7   27 
37721   2   27 
37893   6   27 
38065   1   27 
38237   11  27 
38409   5   27 
36000   5   27 
36172   11  27 
36344   1   27 
36516   6   27 
36688   2   27 
36860   7   27 
37549   13  27 
37721   17  27 
37893   18  27 
38065   21  27 
38237   22  27 
38409   24  27 
38000   24  27 
38172   22  27 
38344   21  27 
38516   18  27 
38688   17  27 
38860   13  27 
39549   7   27 
39721   2   27 
39893   6   27 
40065   1   27 
40237   11  27 
40409   5   27 
38000   5   27 
38172   11  27 
38344   1   27 
38516   6   27 
38688   2   27 
38860   7   27 
39549   13  27 
39721   17  27 
39893   18  27 
40065   21  27 
40237   22  27 
40409   24  27 
40000   24  27 
40172   22  27 
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40344   21  27 
40516   18  27 
40688   17  27 
40860   13  27 
41549   7   27 
41721   2   27 
41893   6   27 
42065   1   27 
42237   11  27 
42409   5   27 
40000   5   27 
40172   11  27 
40344   1   27 
40516   6   27 
40688   2   27 
40860   7   27 
41549   13  27 
41721   17  27 
41893   18  27 
42065   21  27 
42237   22  27 
42409   24  27 
42000   24  27 
42172   22  27 
42344   21  27 
42516   18  27 
42688   17  27 
42860   13  27 
43549   7   27 
43721   2   27 
43893   6   27 
44065   1   27 
44237   11  27 
44409   5   27 
42000   5   27 
42172   11  27 
42344   1   27 
42516   6   27 
42688   2   27 
42860   7   27 
43549   13  27 
43721   17  27 
43893   18  27 
44065   21  27 
44237   22  27 
44409   24  27 
44000   24  27 
44172   22  27 
44344   21  27 
44516   18  27 
44688   17  27 
44860   13  27 
45549   7   27 
45721   2   27 
45893   6   27 
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46065   1   27 
46237   11  27 
46409   5   27 
44000   5   27 
44172   11  27 
44344   1   27 
44516   6   27 
44688   2   27 
44860   7   27 
45549   13  27 
45721   17  27 
45893   18  27 
46065   21  27 
46237   22  27 
46409   24  27 
48000   19  27 
48172   23  27 
48344   15  27 
48516   20  27 
48688   12  27 
48860   16  27 
49549   3   27 
49721   8   27 
49893   4   27 
50065   9   27 
50237   10  27 
50409   14  27 
48000   14  27 
48172   10  27 
48344   9   27 
48516   4   27 
48688   8   27 
48860   3   27 
49549   16  27 
49721   12  27 
49893   20  27 
50065   15  27 
50237   23  27 
50409   19  27 
50000   19  27 
50172   23  27 
50344   15  27 
50516   20  27 
50688   12  27 
50860   16  27 
51549   3   27 
51721   8   27 
51893   4   27 
52065   9   27 
52237   10  27 
52409   14  27 
50000   14  27 
50172   10  27 
50344   9   27 
50516   4   27 
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50688   8   27 
50860   3   27 
51549   16  27 
51721   12  27 
51893   20  27 
52065   15  27 
52237   23  27 
52409   19  27 
52000   19  27 
52172   23  27 
52344   15  27 
52516   20  27 
52688   12  27 
52860   16  27 
53549   3   27 
53721   8   27 
53893   4   27 
54065   9   27 
54237   10  27 
54409   14  27 
52000   14  27 
52172   10  27 
52344   9   27 
52516   4   27 
52688   8   27 
52860   3   27 
53549   16  27 
53721   12  27 
53893   20  27 
54065   15  27 
54237   23  27 
54409   19  27 
54000   19  27 
54172   23  27 
54344   15  27 
54516   20  27 
54688   12  27 
54860   16  27 
55549   3   27 
55721   8   27 
55893   4   27 
56065   9   27 
56237   10  27 
56409   14  27 
54000   14  27 
54172   10  27 
54344   9   27 
54516   4   27 
54688   8   27 
54860   3   27 
55549   16  27 
55721   12  27 
55893   20  27 
56065   15  27 
56237   23  27 
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56409   19  27 
56000   19  27 
56172   23  27 
56344   15  27 
56516   20  27 
56688   12  27 
56860   16  27 
57549   3   27 
57721   8   27 
57893   4   27 
58065   9   27 
58237   10  27 
58409   14  27 
56000   14  27 
56172   10  27 
56344   9   27 
56516   4   27 
56688   8   27 
56860   3   27 
57549   16  27 
57721   12  27 
57893   20  27 
58065   15  27 
58237   23  27 
58409   19  27 
60000   24  27 
60172   22  27 
60344   21  27 
60516   18  27 
60688   17  27 
60860   13  27 
61549   7   27 
61721   2   27 
61893   6   27 
62065   1   27 
62237   11  27 
62409   5   27 
60000   5   27 
60172   11  27 
60344   1   27 
60516   6   27 
60688   2   27 
60860   7   27 
61549   13  27 
61721   17  27 
61893   18  27 
62065   21  27 
62237   22  27 
62409   24  27 
62000   24  27 
62172   22  27 
62344   21  27 
62516   18  27 
62688   17  27 
62860   13  27 
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63549   7   27 
63721   2   27 
63893   6   27 
64065   1   27 
64237   11  27 
64409   5   27 
62000   5   27 
62172   11  27 
62344   1   27 
62516   6   27 
62688   2   27 
62860   7   27 
63549   13  27 
63721   17  27 
63893   18  27 
64065   21  27 
64237   22  27 
64409   24  27 
64000   24  27 
64172   22  27 
64344   21  27 
64516   18  27 
64688   17  27 
64860   13  27 
65549   7   27 
65721   2   27 
65893   6   27 
66065   1   27 
66237   11  27 
66409   5   27 
64000   5   27 
64172   11  27 
64344   1   27 
64516   6   27 
64688   2   27 
64860   7   27 
65549   13  27 
65721   17  27 
65893   18  27 
66065   21  27 
66237   22  27 
66409   24  27 
66000   24  27 
66172   22  27 
66344   21  27 
66516   18  27 
66688   17  27 
66860   13  27 
67549   7   27 
67721   2   27 
67893   6   27 
68065   1   27 
68237   11  27 
68409   5   27 
66000   5   27 
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66172   11  27 
66344   1   27 
66516   6   27 
66688   2   27 
66860   7   27 
67549   13  27 
67721   17  27 
67893   18  27 
68065   21  27 
68237   22  27 
68409   24  27 
68000   24  27 
68172   22  27 
68344   21  27 
68516   18  27 
68688   17  27 
68860   13  27 
69549   7   27 
69721   2   27 
69893   6   27 
70065   1   27 
70237   11  27 
70409   5   27 
68000   5   27 
68172   11  27 
68344   1   27 
68516   6   27 
68688   2   27 
68860   7   27 
69549   13  27 
69721   17  27 
69893   18  27 
70065   21  27 
70237   22  27 
70409   24  27 
72000   19  27 
72172   23  27 
72344   15  27 
72516   20  27 
72688   12  27 
72860   16  27 
73549   3   27 
73721   8   27 
73893   4   27 
74065   9   27 
74237   10  27 
74409   14  27 
72000   14  27 
72172   10  27 
72344   9   27 
72516   4   27 
72688   8   27 
72860   3   27 
73549   16  27 
73721   12  27 
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73893   20  27 
74065   15  27 
74237   23  27 
74409   19  27 
74000   19  27 
74172   23  27 
74344   15  27 
74516   20  27 
74688   12  27 
74860   16  27 
75549   3   27 
75721   8   27 
75893   4   27 
76065   9   27 
76237   10  27 
76409   14  27 
74000   14  27 
74172   10  27 
74344   9   27 
74516   4   27 
74688   8   27 
74860   3   27 
75549   16  27 
75721   12  27 
75893   20  27 
76065   15  27 
76237   23  27 
76409   19  27 
76000   19  27 
76172   23  27 
76344   15  27 
76516   20  27 
76688   12  27 
76860   16  27 
77549   3   27 
77721   8   27 
77893   4   27 
78065   9   27 
78237   10  27 
78409   14  27 
76000   14  27 
76172   10  27 
76344   9   27 
76516   4   27 
76688   8   27 
76860   3   27 
77549   16  27 
77721   12  27 
77893   20  27 
78065   15  27 
78237   23  27 
78409   19  27 
78000   19  27 
78172   23  27 
78344   15  27 
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78516   20  27 
78688   12  27 
78860   16  27 
79549   3   27 
79721   8   27 
79893   4   27 
80065   9   27 
80237   10  27 
80409   14  27 
78000   14  27 
78172   10  27 
78344   9   27 
78516   4   27 
78688   8   27 
78860   3   27 
79549   16  27 
79721   12  27 
79893   20  27 
80065   15  27 
80237   23  27 
80409   19  27 
80000   19  27 
80172   23  27 
80344   15  27 
80516   20  27 
80688   12  27 
80860   16  27 
81549   3   27 
81721   8   27 
81893   4   27 
82065   9   27 
82237   10  27 
82409   14  27 
80000   14  27 
80172   10  27 
80344   9   27 
80516   4   27 
80688   8   27 
80860   3   27 
81549   16  27 
81721   12  27 
81893   20  27 
82065   15  27 
82237   23  27 
82409   19  27 
84000   24  27 
84172   22  27 
84344   21  27 
84516   18  27 
84688   17  27 
84860   13  27 
85549   7   27 
85721   2   27 
85893   6   27 
86065   1   27 
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86237   11  27 
86409   5   27 
84000   5   27 
84172   11  27 
84344   1   27 
84516   6   27 
84688   2   27 
84860   7   27 
85549   13  27 
85721   17  27 
85893   18  27 
86065   21  27 
86237   22  27 
86409   24  27 
86000   24  27 
86172   22  27 
86344   21  27 
86516   18  27 
86688   17  27 
86860   13  27 
87549   7   27 
87721   2   27 
87893   6   27 
88065   1   27 
88237   11  27 
88409   5   27 
86000   5   27 
86172   11  27 
86344   1   27 
86516   6   27 
86688   2   27 
86860   7   27 
87549   13  27 
87721   17  27 
87893   18  27 
88065   21  27 
88237   22  27 
88409   24  27 
88000   24  27 
88172   22  27 
88344   21  27 
88516   18  27 
88688   17  27 
88860   13  27 
89549   7   27 
89721   2   27 
89893   6   27 
90065   1   27 
90237   11  27 
90409   5   27 
88000   5   27 
88172   11  27 
88344   1   27 
88516   6   27 
88688   2   27 
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88860   7   27 
89549   13  27 
89721   17  27 
89893   18  27 
90065   21  27 
90237   22  27 
90409   24  27 
90000   24  27 
90172   22  27 
90344   21  27 
90516   18  27 
90688   17  27 
90860   13  27 
91549   7   27 
91721   2   27 
91893   6   27 
92065   1   27 
92237   11  27 
92409   5   27 
90000   5   27 
90172   11  27 
90344   1   27 
90516   6   27 
90688   2   27 
90860   7   27 
91549   13  27 
91721   17  27 
91893   18  27 
92065   21  27 
92237   22  27 
92409   24  27 
92000   24  27 
92172   22  27 
92344   21  27 
92516   18  27 
92688   17  27 
92860   13  27 
93549   7   27 
93721   2   27 
93893   6   27 
94065   1   27 
94237   11  27 
94409   5   27 
92000   5   27 
92172   11  27 
92344   1   27 
92516   6   27 
92688   2   27 
92860   7   27 
93549   13  27 
93721   17  27 
93893   18  27 
94065   21  27 
94237   22  27 
94409   24  27 
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50000   5   27 
57194   1   27 
64388   2   27 
82374   13  27 
89568   18  27 
96763   22  27 
50000   24  27 
57194   21  27 
64388   17  27 
82374   7   27 
89568   6   27 
96763   11  27 
30000   19  27 
37194   15  27 
44388   12  27 
62374   3   27 
69568   4   27 
76763   10  27 
30000   14  27 
37194   9   27 
44388   8   27 
62374   16  27 
69568   20  27 

















% Packet#   Timer   Status SrcNode     DestNode    RawPacket 






























[cc,dd] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
cc = cc+1; 
 
[b,c] = size(Energy_Table); 
    d = 0; 
for n= 1:b 
% We know the node needs to transmit but needs to see if another node 
% is transmitting 
if Energy_Table(n,1) == Rec_Node 
if Node_Status(Energy_Table(n,2),2) == 3; 




% checks ot see if it is able to spoof the node from the checks 
% performed above 
if  d == 0 && Spoof_Pack_Num > 0 && Timer_Spoof < Timer 
        Timer_Spoof = Timer + 1000; % another spoof can occur in 1000ms 
        Wait_Time(Rec_Node,2) = 0; 
 
        Spoof_Pack_Num = Spoof_Pack_Num - 1; %can place a limit on the 
number of spoofed frames by the user 
        [q,r] = size(Open_Packets); 
        q = q+1; 
        SpNum = q; 
        Open_Packets(q,1:7) = [q (Timer+4) 2 1 Spoofed_Node Rec_Node 
0]; %log for the open frames 
        Node_Status(Rec_Node,2:3) = [5 (Timer+4)]; % continuous node 
status log 
        Node_Status_Table(cc,1:4) = [Rec_Node,Timer,2,5]; % current 
node status log 
        Packet(q,1:1016) = Spoof_Packet(1:1016); %creates spoofed frame 
        Packets(q,1:3) = [q Spoofed_Node Rec_Node]; %frame is logged 
        fprintf('---At Time %i, Packet %i is a spoofed 
packet\n',Timer,q); 



























Timer_Spoof = 0; 
SpNum = 0; 
Rec_Node = 0; 
 
Spoof_Pack_Num = 100; %limits simulation to 100 injected frames 
% not testing a spoofed frame from BS 
if Spoofed_Node < 27 
    [a,b] = size(Routing_Table); 
for n = 1:a %find the next hop to go to from the spoofed node 
if Spoofed_Node == Routing_Table(n,1) && Routing_Table(n,2) == 1 
            Rec_Node = Routing_Table(n,3); 
end 
end 
% create spoofed frame 
    Spoof_Packet = Starter_Packet(1,1:1016); 
 
% Adds Source MAC Address  
        Spoof_Packet(17:80) = Node_MAC(Spoofed_Node,2:65); 
 
%Destination MAC Address   
        Spoof_Packet(81:144) = Node_MAC(Rec_Node,2:65); 
 
% Source Address 
        Spoof_Packet(169:184) =  Node_Address(Spoofed_Node,50:65); 
 
% Destination Address               
        Spoof_Packet(185:200) =  Node_Address(27,50:65); 
 
%Sequence Number         
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        Spoof_Packet(225:256) = randi([0,1],1,32);  
 
% Padding  
        Spoof_Packet(425:864) = randi([0 1],1,440); 
 
% Next Header 
        Spoof_Packet(993:1000) = randi([0 1],1,8); 
 
% Payload  
        Spoof_Packet(297:424) = randi([0,1],1,128); 
 
% Message Integrity Code  
        Spoof_Packet(865:992) = randi([0 1],1,128); 
 
% Field Check Sum (CRC)  
%Create the CRC for the Packet 
            crc1 = Spoof_Packet(1:1000); 
            crc = crc16(crc1); 




















% creates node within table to simulate the rogue node to conduct DOS 
% attack, initial set-up 
if n == 1 
    [a,b] = size(Energy_Table); 
    Energy_Table((a+1),1:2) = [28,DDOS_Node]; 
    Enc(DDOS_Node) = 0; 
 
%ensures node remains in transmitting status each cycle and that the 
%affected node remains in a receiving status 
elseif n == 2 
    Node_Status(DDOS_Node,2:3) = [5 Cycles]; 




















%Alerts user the attack was performed 
fprintf('---A MITM attack was executed for packet %3i\n',PN); 
fprintf(fileID,'---A MITM attack was executed for packet %3i\n',PN); 
%injects random information into the payload 
Packet(PN,297:864) = randi([0,1],1,568); 
crc = crc16(Packet(PN,1:1000)); 
%adjusts the crc to properly validate at follow-on node 
Packet(PN,1001:1016) = crc(1:16); 
 
[aa,bb] = size(MITMAtt); 
cc = 0; 
%Logs the frames in which the MITM was conducted on to analyze 
afterwards 
for n = 1:bb 
if MITMAtt(n) == PN 
      cc = 1; 
end 
end 
if cc == 0 








% Run Simulation % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
function Run_Simulation() 












%Gets last time a sensing event is obtained 
LastEvent = max(Events); 
 
%Adds time for the sesning event to be completed 
Cycles = LastEvent(1) + 10000;   %adds 10 seconds 
 
for n = 1:Cycles 
%Checks for errors from preious cycle and distributes the errors as 
%required  
    Check_For_Errors(Timer);    
 
%Adjusts the Node's status once it has reached the end of its process   
    Check_Node_Status(Timer);   
 
    a = randi(100,1); 
if Spoofed_Node < 27 
if a <= 1 && Node_Status(Rec_Node,2) == 2 && 
Node_Status(Spoofed_Node,2) == 0     




%Cycles through open packets to see if it is ready for the cycle    
    Check_For_Open_Packets(Timer);   
 
%Checks for new sensing events to be added to an open packet   
    Check_For_New_Events(Timer); 
 
%Adds the time to the specific energy use tables 
xxx = mod(Timer,5000); 
 
%alerts user the program is running and how far along it is 
xxxx = Timer /1000; 
if xxx == 0 
    fprintf('%i seconds have elapsed \n',xxxx); 
    fprintf(fileID,'%i seconds have elapsed \n',xxxx); 
end 
 
% checks status of DOS rogue and affected node 
if DDOS_Node < 28 
        DDOS(2); 
end 
 
%Logs energy use of the nodes at the time in the cycle 
      Check_For_Energy_Use();  
    Timer = Timer + 1; 
    LastEvent = max(Events); 
 
%ensures last event is complete before ending the program 
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% Checks all of the Open_Packets to show that there was an error in 
% receiving a packet. It is documented that the packet was received in 
% error but the node will continue its same processing sequence, it  
% will just fail in processing and the transmitting node will have to  
% transmit again. 
 
%{  
This is for me while programming to keep from checking another file.... 
Packet #   timer   event   # of trans     TransNode RecNode     Errors 
Open_Packets = [ 
    0       0       0           0           0           0        0 






[a,b] = size(Open_Packets);   %gets the number of the amount of open 
packets 
for n = 1:a     % cycles through all of the open packets 
    c = 0;      % variable 
if Open_Packets(n,3) == 2   % Checks if a packet is being transmitted 
for m = 1:a     % If a packet is being transmitted it is then checked 
against all other open packets 
if Open_Packets(m,3) == 2 && Open_Packets(n,5) ~= Open_Packets(m,5)  % 
If will cycle itself again to see if another node is transmitting 
% If another node is transmitting then it needs to check if 
% the receiving node is affected by cycling through all of 
% the potentialling affected nodes. 
            [d,e] = size(Energy_Table);   % Gets the size of the table 
for p = 1:d                     % Cycles through the table 
if Open_Packets(m,5) == Energy_Table(p,1)    
% Finds in the table the affected nodes 
if Energy_Table(p,2) == Open_Packets(n,6)  
% If a receiving node matches an affected node 
                          diff=(Open_Packets(m,2) - Open_Packets(n,2)); 
                          check = power(diff,2); 
if check < 17 
                            Open_Packets(n,3) = 3;   





if Open_Packets(n,5) == Energy_Table(p,1)    
% Finds in the table the affected nodes 
if Energy_Table(p,2) == Open_Packets(m,6)  
% If a receiving node matches an affected node 
                          diff=(Open_Packets(m,2) - Open_Packets(n,2)); 
                          check = power(diff,2); 
if check < 17 
                             Open_Packets(m,3) = 3;   

























for n=1:27      %Cycle through all of the nodes 
if Wait_Time(n,2) == 25;     
% If wait time reaches 25 ms then it will go to sleep 
            Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;      
% Resets wait time for next evolution 
            Node_Status(n,2) = 6;   % Status 6 is going to sleep 
                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 2 6]; 
            Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 1;    




% if the node is at 2 and still waiting, add 1 ms to energy use 
if Node_Status(n,2) == 2  && Node_Status(n,1) ~= 27   
 
            Wait_Time(n,2) = Wait_Time(n,2) + 1;     
% Adds 1 ms to the Wait time 
elseif Node_Status(n,3) <= Timer            % Checks if the node is 
ready to transition to the next stage 
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% If node is either at:  
%  0 = Node is asleep 
%  1 = finished waking up 
%  3 = finished transmitting 
%  4 = finished Processing 
%  5 = Finished receiving 
%  6 = Going to sleep 
%  7 = Waiting for Post Trans 
if Node_Status(n,2) == 1 
                    Node_Status(n,2) = 2;  
% change node to a waiting status making it available for  
% the next function 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 1 2];  
% entry into node status log 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 7 
                    Node_Status(n,2) = 2;    
% it is now in waiting phase to begin retransmission 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 7 2]; 
% entry into node status log 
                        Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;  
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 4 
                    Node_Status(n,2) = 2;    
% it is now in waiting phase to begin retransmission 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 4 2]; 
% entry into node status log 
                        Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;  
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 5  
% node is finished receiving 
                    Node_Status(n,2) = 4;    
% node is now processing 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 5 4]; 
% entry into node status log 
                        Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;  
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 3     
% if node is finished transmitting 
                    Node_Status(n,2) = 7;    
% it is now in a processing phase 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 3 7]; 
% entry into node status log 
                        Wait_Time(n,2) = 0;  
                    [c,d] = size(Open_Packets); 
for aa = 1:c 
if Open_Packets(aa,5) == Node_Status(n,1) 
if Open_Packets(aa,4)==1 || Open_Packets(aa,4)==5 
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 6;  
% Time after first transmission 
% seed number inserted for BS neighbor 
% nodes 
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26 
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                                     Node_Status(n,3) = 
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1); 
end 
 
elseif Open_Packets(aa,4) == 2 || Open_Packets(aa,4) == 6 
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 10; % Time 
after second transmission 
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26 
                                     Node_Status(n,3) = 
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1); %seed number 
end 
 
elseif Open_Packets(aa,4) == 3 || Open_Packets(aa,4) == 7 
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 20; % Time 
after third transmission 
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26 
                                     Node_Status(n,3) = 
Node_Status(n,3) + randi([1,4],1,1);%seed number 
end 
elseif Open_Packets(aa,4) == 4 || Open_Packets(aa,4) == 8 
                                Node_Status(n,3) = Timer + 40; % Time 
after fourth transmission 
if Node_Status(n,1) == 25 || Node_Status(n,1) == 26 
                                     Node_Status(n,3) = 







if Node_Status(n,2) == 6     
%if node has completed its going to sleep phase 
                    Node_Status(n,2) = 0;   % Node is now in sleep 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [n Timer 6 0];  














% Check to see if a packet is ready to move onto the next function 
%Packet #   timer   event   # of trans     TransNode RecNode     Errors 
%Open_Packets = [ 
%    0       0       0           0           0           0        0 
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%    ]; 
 
%   Node#   Status   Stat Time chg  Errors?           
%Node_Status = [ 






[a,b] = size(Open_Packets);   %gets the number of the amount of open 
packets 
for n = 1:a     % cycles through all of the open packets 
 
if Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer  && Open_Packets(n,7) <= 50  
% Checks if a packet is ready for next function 
 
 
%Packet is ready to transition from Wakeup 
if Open_Packets(n,3) == 0 && Open_Packets(n,1) > 0    
% Packet is made but has not been processed 
 
% if packet was in the wake up stage, it needs to move to processing  
% the packet 
%In order to move to processing the packet, the node must be waiting,  
%therefore must check if node is in phase 2, waiting. 
 
%Node is ready for the open packet to process 
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) == 2 && 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer 
                   Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) = 4;  
% Node is now processing original packet 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = 
[Open_Packets(n,5) Timer 2 4]; 
                   Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5),3) = Timer + 8;  
% Time to process for Node 
                   Open_Packets(n,2) = Timer + 8;  
% Time to process the packet 
                   Open_Packets(n,3) = [2];  




% Packet has finished processing and ready for transmission 
elseif Open_Packets(n,3) == 1 && Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer 
% Node can only go to next function if it is in state 2, 
% otherwise no need to check other functions 
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) == 4 && 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer 
 
% Function to transmit the packet and determine if it 
% can transmit, this will contain a lot of code to 
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% determine the energy of the affected nodes and etc. 
 
%Will need to place nodes in either receiving or 
%transmitting phases and then all into a processing 
%phase. 
                   Transmission(Open_Packets(n,1)); 
 
elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 2) == 2 && 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer 
                   Transmission(Open_Packets(n,1)); 
end 
 
% Packet has completed transmission and is ready to be post 
% processed by the Receiving Node 
elseif Open_Packets(n,3) == 2 && Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer 
%Check Packet Status 
                Open_Packets(n,3) = 3; 
                Process_Received_Packet(Open_Packets(n,1));  
% Sends to function to process the packet 
 
% Packet has completed processing and needs to be 
% transmitted 
elseif Open_Packets(n,3) == 3 && Open_Packets(n,2) <= Timer 
% Checks node status to see if it is ready to transmit 
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5),2 ) == 2 && 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,5), 3) <= Timer 


































PN = Packet_Number; 
source = 0; 
aaa = 0; 
 
% Checks for Receiving nodes status to see if it able to begin  
% processingand if its timer is good 
 
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6), 2) == 4 && 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6), 3) <= Timer 
% Check to see if there was an error for the packet or node 
if Open_Packets(PN,7) <= 49 && Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6),4) <= 99 
% No errors were found, receiving node is ready for processing 
               Node_Status(Open_Packets(PN,6),3) = Timer + 5;  
% Sets timer on the node 
               Open_Packets(PN,2) = Timer + 5;  
% Time to process the packet 
               Open_Packets(PN,3) = 3;  
% Sets status of the Packet to have been processed 
 
if MITM_Nodes(1) == Open_Packets(PN,5) && MITM_Nodes(2) == 
Open_Packets(PN,6) 
                    MITMAtt(1) = 0; 
                    MITM(PN); 
end 
%               % Add BER 
                Test_Packet(1,1:1016) = Packet(PN,1:1016); 
if SpNum == PN && Rec_Node == Open_Packets(PN,6) 
%          % Spoof skipped BER in order to properly inject the frame 
else 
for pp = 1:1016 
                        bb = Packet(PN,pp); 
                        cc = randi(100000,1);  
%performs the random BER on the frame being received 
if bb == 0 && cc <= 1 
                            fprintf('At time %i a BER was inserted for 
Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);  
                            fprintf(fileID,'At time %i a BER was 
inserted for Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);  
                            Test_Packet(pp) = 1; 
elseif bb == 1 && cc <=1 
                            fprintf('At time %i a BER was inserted for 
Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);  
                            fprintf(fileID,'At time %i a BER was 
inserted for Packet %i and bit # %i \n', Timer, PN, pp);  






                destmac(1:64) = Packet(PN,81:144); 
                dm = 0; 
                srcmac(1:64) = Packet(PN,17:80); 
                sm = 0; 
                destip(1:16) = Packet(PN,185:200); 
                di = 0; 
 
 
% checks to make sure addresses transmitted correctly 
for ad = 1:27 
if srcmac(1:64) == Node_MAC(ad,2:65) 
if Open_Packets(PN,5) == ad 
                           sm = 1; 
end 
end 
if destmac(1:64) == Node_MAC(ad,2:65) 
if Open_Packets(PN,6) == ad 




if destip(1:16) == Node_Address(27,50:65) 
                    di = 1; 
end 
 
                tot = sm + dm + di; 
 
%          % Checks CRC 
            crc = crc16(Test_Packet(1:1000)); 
if Packet(PN,1001:1016) == crc(1:16) 
                aaa = 1; 
else 
                fprintf('At time %i CRC Failed for Packet %i \n', 
Timer, PN); 
                fprintf(fileID,'At time %i CRC Failed for Packet %i 
\n', Timer, PN); 
end 
 
% Sends to function to change the packet headers for the 
% next transmission if it is not at the Base Station 
 
               source = Open_Packets(PN,5); 
 
%if everything checks out with addresses and CRC 
if Open_Packets(PN,6) ~= 27 && aaa == 1 && tot == 3 
                   Packet_Next_Hop(Open_Packets(PN,1)); 
                   crc = crc16(Packet(PN,1:1000)); 
                   Packet(PN,1001:1016) = crc; 
                   Open_Packets(PN,4) = 0; 
%if received by the BS and an error has occured logs the 
%error or logged as received 
elseif Open_Packets(PN,6) == 27 && Open_Packets(PN,4) == 1  
if aaa == 1 && tot == 3 
                       Open_Packets(PN,7) = 99; % received no error 
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else 







end% Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,6), 2) == 2 && 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(n,6), 3) <= Timer        
 
%Now to consider the nodes that were affected 
 
   [b,c] = size(Energy_Table); 
%Cycles through the table again to set statuses 
for n = 1:b 
 
% Checks for sending node 
if Energy_Table(n,1) ==  source; 
 
                AN = Energy_Table(n,2); % Affected Node 
 
% Node will now process the packet and discard since it is 
% not to the node 
if Node_Status(AN,2) == 4 && Open_Packets(PN,6) ~= AN 
 
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 5;  
% Adjusts time for nodes next function      
 
% Node is waiting to receive packet from receiving node to confirm that 
the packet was successfully forwarded     
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 7 
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 4;   
%Switch Node Status to Receiving 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 7 4]; 
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 5;  
% Adjusts time for node's next function 
 




end% Energy_Table(n,1) == a 













% Function to transmit the packet and determine if it 
% can transmit, this will contain a lot of code to 
% determine the energy of the affected nodes and etc. 
 
%Will need to place nodes in either receiving or 


















a = Packet_Number; 
PN = a; 
d = 0; 
SMA = 0; 
SIP = 0; 
 
if Open_Packets(PN,4) == 4 
[f,b] = size(Routing_Table); 
% checks for which route it should use 
    SMAC = Packet(PN,17:80); 
    SIPC = Packet(PN,169:184); 
for nn = 1:f    
if Open_Packets(PN,5) == Routing_Table(nn,1) && 2 == 
Routing_Table(nn,2) 
            Open_Packets(PN,6) = Routing_Table(nn,3); 
            Packet(PN,81:144) = Node_MAC(Open_Packets(PN,6),2:65); 




for mm = 1:27 
if SMAC(1:64) == Node_MAC(mm,2:65) 
            SMA = mm; 
end 
 
if SIPC == Node_Address(mm,50:65) 




if SIP == SMA 
        Packet(PN,162) = [2]; 
else 
        Packet(PN,161) = [2]; 
end 
 
%Adjust new CRC 
     crc = crc16(Packet(PN,1:1000)); 




%Frame had a collision on the last hop 
if Open_Packets(PN,4) >= 1 && Open_Packets(PN,6) == 27 
    Open_Packets(PN,7) = 97; 
    d = 1; 
end 
 
% frame has been transmitted 8 times and is going into storage for  
% futuretransmission 
if Open_Packets(PN,4) >= 8 && Open_Packets(PN,7) <= 49 
    Open_Packets(PN,7) = 98; 
    [j,k] = size(Events); 
if j <= 3000 
                tim = Timer + 1000 + randi(200,1); 
                [aa,bb] = size(Packet_Retrans_Tracker); 
                Packet_Retrans_Tracker((aa+1),1:4) = [PN, 00, 
Open_Packets(PN,5), Timer]; 
                Events((j+1),1:3) = [tim Open_Packets(PN,5) 27]; 
end 
    d = 1; 
end 
 
[b,c] = size(Energy_Table); 
 
%variable used to determine if another node is transmitting, if it is 
%transmitting d will equal 1, if any of the nodes are not transmitting  
% then the transmission can occur. 
 
for n= 1:b 
% We know the node needs to transmit but needs to see if another  
% node is transmitting 
if Energy_Table(n,1) == Open_Packets(a,5) 
if Node_Status(Energy_Table(n,2),2) == 3; 
            d = 1; 
if Open_Packets(a,5) == 25 || Open_Packets(a,5) == 26 
                 Open_Packets(a,2) = Timer + 10; 
else 







% If there isn't a surrounding node that is transmitting the node may  
% begin  to transmit. 
if d == 0 
%switch Transmitting node to transmitting status 
    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,5),2) = 3; 
    [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
    Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [Open_Packets(a,5) Timer 2 3]; 
    [g,h] = size(PCAP); 
    k = g + 1; 
    PCAP(k, 1:1021) = [a Timer Open_Packets(a,5) Open_Packets(a,6) 
Open_Packets(a,4) Packet(a,1:1016)];  
    NodeTX(Open_Packets(a,5),2) = NodeTX(Open_Packets(a,5),2) + 1; 
 
%Adjust timers for transmitting nodes 
    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,5),3) = Timer + 7; 
 
    Open_Packets(a,4) = Open_Packets(a,4) + 1; 
    Open_Packets(a,3) = 2; %Adjust packet status to transmitting 
    Open_Packets(a,2) = Timer + 7; %Adjust packet time 
 
%Cycles through the table again to set statuses 
for n = 1:b 
 
% Checks for sending node 
if Energy_Table(n,1) ==  Open_Packets(a,5) 
%Checks for affected nodes 




%When the receiving node is found, must check its status. 
% If receiving node is ready to receive, the status is 
% moved to receiving 
if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2 || 
Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 7 
% Receiving node is waiting and ready to receive 
                    NodeRX(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 
NodeRX(Open_Packets(a,6),2) + 1; 
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 5;   
% Switches Node Status to Receiving 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                         Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = 
[Open_Packets(a,6) Timer 2 5]; 
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),3) = Timer + 7;  




%Wake up the node 
elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 0 
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 1;    
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%Node is now being woken up 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = 
[Open_Packets(a,6) Timer 0 1]; 
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),3) = Timer + 1;  
% Time for node to wake up 
 
 
%Node is going to sleep     
elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 6 
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) = 1;    
%Node is now being woken up 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = 
[Open_Packets(a,6) Timer 6 1]; 
                    Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),3) = Timer + 1; % 
Time for node to wake back up 
 
end% if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2 
 
end% Energy_Table(n,2) == Open_Packets(a,6) 
 
if Energy_Table(n,2) ~= Open_Packets(a,6) 
                AN = Energy_Table(n,2); % Affected Node 
 
%When the receiving node is found, must check its status. 
% If receiving node is ready to receive, the status is 
% moved to receiving 
if Node_Status(AN,2) == 2 
                    NodeRX(AN,2) = NodeRX(AN,2) + 1; 
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 5;   
%Switches Node Status to Receiving                     
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 2 5]; 
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 7;  




%Wake up the node 
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 0 
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 1;    
%Node is now being woken up 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 0 1]; 
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 1;  
% Time for node to wake up   
 
%Node is receving another packet     
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 5 
 
 
%Node is going to sleep     
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elseif Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 6 
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 1;    
%Node is now being woken up 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 6 1]; 
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 1;  
% Time for node to wake back up 
 
% Node is waiting to receive packet from receiving node to confirm that 
the packet was successfully forwarded     
elseif Node_Status(AN,2) == 7 
                    Node_Status(AN,2) = 5;   
%Switches Node Status to Receiving 
                    NodeRX(AN,2) = NodeRX(AN,2) + 1; 
                        [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                        Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [AN Timer 7 5]; 
                    Node_Status(AN,3) = Timer + 7;  
% Adjusts time for nodes next function 
 
end% if Node_Status(Open_Packets(a,6),2) == 2 
 
end% Energy_Table(n,2) ~= Open_Packets(a,6)                 
 
end% Energy_Table(n,1) ==  Open_Packets(n,5) 











% Takes the packet and adjusts the source and dest MAC addresses 







PN = Packet_Number; 
 
[a,b] = size(Routing_Table); 
cat = 1; 
ch = 0; 
% checks for which route it should use 
for n = 1:a    
% checks for source in first col       
% checks for primary route 
% checks that the source is not the destination 
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if Open_Packets(PN,6) == Routing_Table(n,1) && cat == 
Routing_Table(n,2) && ch == 0 
%do not send to frame to node it previously received it from to 
%prevent looping 
if Open_Packets(PN,5) == Routing_Table(n,3) && ch == 0 
                cat = 2; 
else 
%changes out source and destination addresses for the next hop 
            Open_Packets(PN,5) = Open_Packets(PN,6); 
            Open_Packets(PN,6) = Routing_Table(n,3); 
            Packet(PN,17:80) = Node_MAC(Open_Packets(PN,5),2:65); 
            Packet(PN,81:144) = Node_MAC(Open_Packets(PN,6),2:65); 
            Hop_Limit = bi2de(Packet(PN,163:168)); 
            HLB = Hop_Limit - 1; %reduces hop limit field 
            Packet(PN,163:168) = de2bi(HLB,6); 
            ch = 1; 














% This function will create the new packet and check the status of the  
% nodeto determine if it is busy, asleep, or in a waiting phase in  


















% This section Creates the Packet 




for n = 1:e 
% Is the frame one of the original events or was it being stored to 
% be retransmitted later? 
if Timer == Events(n,1) && n <= Orig_Events % Orinial event 
 
            [a,b] = size(Packet);    
%gets the number of the amount of open packets 
            [q,r] = size(Open_Packets); 
            [ss,tt] = size(Packets); 
            ss=ss+1; 
 
            c = a + 1; 
            q = q + 1; 
 
 
%Creates new standard packet 
            Packet(c,1:1016) = Starter_Packet(1,1:1016); 
 
%Need to find next hop MAC Address 
            Next_Hop(1:64) = ones(1,64); 
            Source(1:64) = ones(1,64); 
            [z,y] = size(Routing_Table); 
            Next_Node = 0; 
for p = 1:z 
if Events(n,2) == Routing_Table(p,1) && Routing_Table(p,2) == 1 
                    Next_Hop = Node_MAC(Routing_Table(p,3),2:65); 
                    Next_Node = Routing_Table(p,3); 




% Adds Source MAC Address  
            Open_Packets(q,5) = [Events(n,2)]; 
 
            Packet(c,17:80) = Source; 
 
%Destination MAC Address   
            Open_Packets(q,1:7) = [q Timer 0 0 Events(n,2) Next_Node 
0]; 
            Packets((ss),1) = q; 
            Packets((ss),2) = Events(n,2); 
            Packets((ss),3) = Next_Node; 
 
            Packet(c,81:144) = Next_Hop; 
 
% Source Address 
            Packet(c,169:184) =  Node_Address(Events(n,2),50:65); 
 
% Destination Address               
            Packet(c,185:200) =  Node_Address(27,50:65); 
 
%Sequence Number         
            Packet(c,225:256) = de2bi([Node_Status(Events(n,2),5)],32);  
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            Node_Status(Events(n,2),5) = Node_Status(Events(n,2),5) + 
1; 
 
% Padding  
            Packet(c,425:864) = randi([0 1],1,440); 
 
% Next Header 
            Packet(c,993:1000) = randi([0 1],1,8); 
 
% Payload  
            Encryption_Decryption(c,1); 
            Packet(c,297:424) = Payload(c,1:128); 
 
% Message Integrity Code  
            Packet(c,865:992) = MAC(1:128); 
 
% Field Check Sum (CRC)  
%Create the CRC for the Packet 
                crc1 = Packet(c,1:1000); 
                crc = crc16(crc1); 
            Packet(c,1001:1016) = crc; 
 
% Create the original frame for comparrison 
            [g,h] = size(Packet); 
            Original_Packet(g,:) = Packet(c,:); 
 
 
% Node is awake and ready to send frame once processed 
if Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 2 
                Open_Packets(q,7) = [2]; 
                Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 8; 
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 4; 
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 8; 
                    [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                    Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [Open_Packets(q,5) 
Timer 2 4]; 
 
%node is asleep or going to sleep, needs to be woken up 
elseif Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 0 || Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 
6 
                Open_Packets(q,7) = [0]; 
                Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 1; 
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 1; 
                Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 1; 
                    [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                    Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = [Open_Packets(q,5) 
Timer 0 1]; 
end 
 
% Frame was stored and now being retransmitted 
elseif Timer == Events(n,1) && n > Orig_Events 
% log to track retransmitted frames 
            [dd,ee] = size(Packet_Retrans_Tracker); 
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% transfers the information from the original frame to the 
% new retransmitted frame 
for ff = 1:dd 
if Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,3) ==  Events(n,2) && 
Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,2) == 0 
                        [q,r] = size(Open_Packets); 
                        q = q + 1; 
                        Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,2) = q; 
                        [a,b] = size(Packet);    
%gets the number of the amount of open packets 
                        c = a + 1; 
                        [ss,tt] = size(Packets); 
                        ss=ss+1; 
%Creates new standard packet 
                        Packet(c,1:1016) = Starter_Packet(1,1:1016); 
%Need to find next hop MAC Address 
                        Next_Hop(1:64) = ones(1,64); 
                        Source(1:64) = ones(1,64); 
                        [z,y] = size(Routing_Table); 
                        Next_Node = 0; 
for p = 1:z 
if Events(n,2) == Routing_Table(p,1) && Routing_Table(p,2) == 1 
                                Next_Hop = 
Node_MAC(Routing_Table(p,3),2:65); 
                                Next_Node = Routing_Table(p,3); 





                        Open_Packets(q,5) = [Events(n,2)]; 
 
                        Packet(c,17:80) = Source; 
 
%Destination MAC Address   
                        Open_Packets(q,1:7) = [q Timer 0 0 Events(n,2) 
Next_Node 0]; 
                        Packets((ss),1) = q; 
                        Packets((ss),2) = Events(n,2); 
                        Packets((ss),3) = Next_Node; 
 
                        Packet(c,81:144) = Next_Hop; 
 
% Hop limit and path indication bits 
                        Packet(c,161:168) = 
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),161:168); 
 
% Source Address 
                        Packet(c,169:184) =  
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),169:184); 
 
% Destination Address               
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                        Packet(c,185:200) =  
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),185:200); 
 
%Sequence Number         




% Payload  
%Packet(c,297:424) = ones(1,128); 
                        Packet(c,297:424) = 
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),297:424); 
 
% Padding  
                        Packet(c,425:864) = 
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),425:864); 
%             Packet(c,425:864) = zeros(1,440); 
 
% Message Integrity Code  
                        Packet(c,865:992) = 
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),865:992); 
%             Packet(c,865:992) = ones(1,128); 
 
% Next Header 
                        Packet(c,993:1000) = 
Packet(Packet_Retrans_Tracker(ff,1),993:1000); 
 
% Field Check Sum (CRC)  
%Create the CRC for the Packet 
                            crc1 = Packet(c,1:1000); 
                            crc = crc16(crc1); 
                        Packet(c,1001:1016) = crc; 
 
% store as an original packet for comparison 
                        [g,h] = size(Packet); 
                        Original_Packet(g,:) = Packet(c,:); 
 
% node is awake and ready to transmit 
if Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 2 
                            Open_Packets(q,7) = [2]; 
                            Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 8; 
                            Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 4; 
                            Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 8; 
                                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = 
[Open_Packets(q,5) Timer 2 4]; 
 
%node is either asleep or going to sleep, 
%needs to be woken up 
elseif Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 0 || Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) == 
6 
                            Open_Packets(q,7) = [0]; 
                            Open_Packets(q,2) = Timer + 1; 
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                            Node_Status(Events(n,2),2) = 1; 
                            Node_Status(Events(n,2),3) = Timer + 1; 
                                [A,B] = size(Node_Status_Table); 
                                Node_Status_Table((A+1),1:4) = 















%At the end of the evolution the time is added for each node depending 
on 





for n=1:27      %Cycle through all of the nodes 
 
if Node_Status(n,2) == 0    % Node Asleep  
            Energy_Use(n,9) = Energy_Use(n,9) + 1;   
% Document the node is asleep 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 1 % Node Waking Up 
            Energy_Use(n,2) = Energy_Use(n,2) + 1;   
% Document the node is waking up 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 2 % Node Waiting 
            Energy_Use(n,6) = Energy_Use(n,6) + 1;   
% Document the node is Waiting 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 3 % Node Transmitting 
            Energy_Use(n,4) = Energy_Use(n,4) + 1;   
% Document the node is transmitting 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 4 % Node Processing 
            Energy_Use(n,3) = Energy_Use(n,3) + 1;   
% Document the node is processing 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 5 % Node Receiving 
            Energy_Use(n,5) = Energy_Use(n,5) + 1;   
% Document the node is receiving  
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 6 % Node Going to sleep 
            Energy_Use(n,7) = Energy_Use(n,7) + 1;   
% Document the node is going to sleep 
elseif Node_Status(n,2) == 7 % Node Waiting Post Transmission 
            Energy_Use(n,8) = Energy_Use(n,8) + 1;   















% This is what initiates the events. Events are put in to create the 
























c = 0; 
g = 0; 
[e,f] = size(Open_Packets); 
h = e-1; 
j = h-Orig_Events; 
z = 0; 
x = 0; 
for n = 2:e 
if Open_Packets(n,7) == 99 %frame properly received 
        c = c + 1; 
elseif Open_Packets(n,7) == 98  
% Transmitted 8 times unsuccessfully, placed in storage at node 
        g = g + 1; 
elseif Open_Packets(n,7) == 97  
% Failed to be received by the BS correctly (collision) 
        z = z + 1; 
elseif Open_Packets(n,7) == 96  
% CRC or BER on final hop to BS 
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d = c/h*100; 
    fprintf('\nA total of %i packets were sent and %i packets were 
received for a success rate of %3.2f%%. \n\n',h,c,d); 
    fprintf(fileID,'\nA total of %i packets were sent and %i packets 
were received for a success rate of %3.2f%%. \n\n',h,c,d); 
 
    fprintf('A total of %i packets were dropped within the final hop 
(was not fully received by BS). \n\n',z); 
    fprintf(fileID,'A total of %i packets were dropped within the final 
hop (was not fully received by BS). \n\n',z);     
 
    fprintf('A total of %i packets were dropped due to CRC or BER to 
header information within the final hop.  \n\n',x); 
    fprintf(fileID,'A total of %i packets were dropped due to CRC or 
BER to header information within the final hop.\n\n',x);  
 
[aaa,bbb] = size(Packet_Retrans_Tracker); 
if aaa > 1 
    ccc = aaa - 1; 
    fprintf('%i packets were stored and retransmitted at a later time. 
\n\n',ccc); 




%variables to analyze the path indication bits 
[a,b] = size(Packet); 
orig = 0; 
second = 0; 
orignode = 0; 
secnode = 0; 
or = 1; 
se = 1; 
 
 
for n = 1:a 
if Open_Packets(n,7) == 99 
% checks for secondary route along follow-on nodes 
if Packet(n,161) == 1 
for nn = 1:26 
if Node_Address(nn,50:65) == Packet(n,169:184) 
                    second = 1 + second; 
                    secnode(se) = nn; 




% checks for secondary route at originating nodes 
if Packet(n,162) == 1 
for nn = 1:26 
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if Node_Address(nn,50:65) == Packet(n,169:184) 
                    orig = orig + 1; 
                    orignode(or) = nn; 







% add to table for secondary routes used 
for n = 1:27 
    Sec_Route_Table(n,1:3) = [n 0 0]; 
end 
 
[aa,bb] = size(orignode); 
 
[cc,dd] = size(Routing_Table); 
 
% Calculates the table to show which nodes utilized the secondary  
% routesfrom the original node 
if orignode > 0 
for n = 1:bb 




%Calculates the table to show which nodes utilized the secondary routes 
% from the original nodes along the follow-on hops 
[aa,bb] = size(secnode); 
next_node = 0; 
if secnode > 0 
for n = 1:bb 





    fprintf('Table: The number of packets each node sent that took a 
secondary route to the Base Station.\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'Table: The number of packets each node sent that 
took a secondary route to the Base Station.\n'); 
    fprintf('Node \t Unsuccessful First Hop \t Unsuccessful Follow-On 
Hops \n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'Node \t Unsuccessful First Hop \t Unsuccessful 
Follow-On Hops \n'); 
for n = 1:26 
       fprintf(' %2i \t\t %3i \t\t\t\t %3i\n', Sec_Route_Table(n,1), 
Sec_Route_Table(n,2), Sec_Route_Table(n,3));  
       fprintf(fileID,' %2i \t\t %3i \t\t\t\t %3i\n', 
Sec_Route_Table(n,1), Sec_Route_Table(n,2), Sec_Route_Table(n,3)); 
end 
    fprintf('\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'\n'); 
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aaa = 0; 
bbb = 0; 
 
% Calculates the number of authenticated frames received by the MS 
Packet_Auth = 0; 
pa = 1; 
for ch = 2:e 
if Open_Packets(ch,7) == 99 
        bbb = bbb + 1; 
        Encryption_Decryption(ch,2); 
if MAC_F(ch,1:128) == MAC_Check(ch,1:128) 
if Payload_Out(ch,1:128) == Initial_Payload  
                aaa = aaa + 1; 
else 
                fprintf('\nPacket %i Failed Payload\n ',ch); 
                fprintf(fileID,'\nPacket %i Failed Payload\n ',ch); 
end 
else 
            Packet_Auth(pa) = Open_Packets(ch,1); 




fprintf('Out of the %i packets received, %i packets matched the 
original packet sent for a %3.2f%% success rate. 
\n\n',bbb,aaa,(aaa/bbb*100)); 
fprintf(fileID,'Out of the %i packets received, %i packets matched the 
original packet sent for a %3.2f%% success rate. 
\n\n',bbb,aaa,(aaa/bbb*100)); 
[aa,bb] = size(Packet_Auth); 
[dd,ee] = size(MITMAtt); 
ee = ee - 1; 
% Calculates the number of spoofed frames injected into the WSN 
if ee > 0 || Spoofed_Node < 27 
    fprintf('A MITM or Spoofing attack was conducted and %3i packets 
were not Authenticated.\n\n',bb); 
    fprintf(fileID,'A MITM or Spoofing attack was conducted and %3i 
packets were not Authenticated.\n\n',bb); 
    fprintf('The following packets failed Authentication\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'The following packets failed Authentication\n'); 
 
    cc = 1; 
for n = 1:bb 
        fprintf('%5i \t',Packet_Auth(n)); 
        fprintf(fileID,'%5i \t',Packet_Auth(n)); 
if cc == 10 
            fprintf('\n'); 
            fprintf(fileID,'\n'); 
            cc = 0; 
end 
        cc = cc + 1; 
end 
    fprintf('\n\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'\n\n'); 
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%creates table giving the number of unauthenticated frames from each 
%originating node 
    Node_Auth = zeros(1,26); 
    fprintf('The following nodes had packets that did not 
Authenticate\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'The following nodes had packets that did not 
Authenticate\n'); 
    fprintf('Node \t\t # Not Authenticated\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'Node \t\t # Not Authenticated\n');   
for n = 1:bb 
        num = Packet_Auth(n); 
        Node_Auth(Packets(num,2)) = Node_Auth(Packets(num,2)) + 1; 
end 
for n = 1:26 
        fprintf('%i \t\t %i \n',n,Node_Auth(n)); 
        fprintf(fileID,'%i \t\t %i \n',n,Node_Auth(n)); 
end 
    fprintf('\n\n'); 
    fprintf(fileID,'\n\n'); 
end 
 
fprintf('This simulation ran for a total of %i milliseconds or %5.2f 
seconds.\n',Timer, (Timer/1000)); 
fprintf(fileID,'This simulation ran for a total of %i milliseconds or 
%5.2f seconds.\n',Timer, (Timer/1000)); 
fprintf('Time each node spent in each phase in milliseconds \n Node\t   
WU\t Proc\t CSMA\t Tran\t   Rec\t\t RX-TX\t Wait\t GTSlp\t PTran\t 
Slp\n'); 
fprintf(fileID,'Time each node spent in each phase in milliseconds \n 
Node\t   WU\t Proc\t CSMA\t Tran\t\t   Rec\t RX-TX\t Wait\t GTSlp\t 
PTran\t Slp\n'); 
total = zeros(1,26); 
totalms = zeros(1,26); 
%Creates table to display the energy use by each node 
for n = 1:26 
    node = n; 
    wake = Energy_Use(n,2); 
    proc = Energy_Use(n,3) - (Enc(n) * 4); 
    trans = Energy_Use(n,4)-(NodeTX(n,2)*3); 
    rec = Energy_Use(n,5) - NodeRX(n,2)*3; 
    wait = Energy_Use(n,6) + NodeRX(n,2)*3; 
    gtslp = Energy_Use(n,7); 
    ptran = Energy_Use(n,8); 
    slp =Energy_Use(n,9); 
    csma = NodeTX(n,2)*2; 
    rxtx = NodeTX(n,2); 
    total(n) = wake * 20 + proc * 24 + csma*72 + rxtx*54 + trans * 90 + 
rec * 72+ gtslp * 20 + wait * 72 + ptran * 72 + Enc(n) * 7.47 * 4 / 
100; 
    totalms(n) = total(n)/Timer; 
    fprintf('%5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f \t 
%5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f\n', 
node,wake,proc,csma,trans,rec,rxtx,wait,gtslp,ptran,slp); 
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    fprintf(fileID,'%5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %5.0f \t %6.0f \t %5.0f 





fprintf('\nEnergy used by each node \n Node# \t\t Total mW * ms \t\t 
Total mW/ms \n'); 
fprintf(fileID,'\nEnergy used by each node \n Node# \t\t Total mW * ms 
\t\t Total mW/ms \n'); 
for n = 1:26 
    fprintf('%i \t\t %10.0f \t\t %3.2f\n',n,total(n),totalms(n)); 











% aes % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [output] = aes(s, oper, mode, input, iv, sbit) 
% AES Encrypt/decrypt array of bytes by AES. 
% output = aes(s, oper, mode, input, iv, sbit) 
% Encrypt/decrypt array of bytes by AES-128, AES-192, AES-256. 
% All NIST SP800-38A cipher modes supported (e.g. ECB, CBC, OFB, CFB, 
CTR). 
% Usage example:    out = aesdecrypt(s, 'dec', 'ecb', data) 
% s:                AES structure (generated by aesinit) 
% oper:             operation: 
%                   'e', 'enc', 'encrypt', 'E',... = encrypt 
%                   'd', 'dec', 'decrypt', 'D',... = decrypt 
% mode:             operation mode 
%                   'ecb' = Electronic Codebook Mode 
%                   'cbc' = Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
%                   'cfb' = Cipher Feedback Mode 
%                   'ofb' = Output Feedback Mode 
%                   'ctr' = Counter Mode 
%                   For counter mode you need external 
AES_GET_COUNTER() 
%                   counter function. 
% input:            plaintext/ciphertext byte-vector with length 
%                   multiple of 16 
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% iv:               initialize vector - some modes need it 
%                   ending initialize vector is stored in s.iv, so you 
%                   can use aes() repetitively to encode/decode 
%                   large vector: 
%                   out = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', input1, iv); 
%                   out = [out aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', input1, s.iv)]; 
%                   ... 
% sbit:             bit-width parameter for CFB mode 
% output:           ciphertext/plaintext byte-vector 
% 
% See 
% Morris Dworkin, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation 
% Methods and Techniques 
% NIST Special Publication 800-38A, 2001 Edition 
% for details. 
 
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
 
error(nargchk(4, 6, nargin)); 
 
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 
validateattributes(oper, {'char'}, {}); 
validateattributes(mode, {'char'}, {}); 
validateattributes(input, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<', 
256}); 
if (nargin >= 5) 
    validateattributes(iv, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, 
'<', 256}); 
if (length(iv) ~= 16) 
        error('Length of ''iv'' must be 16.'); 
end 
end 
if (nargin >= 6) 




if (mod(length(input), 16)) 




case {'encrypt', 'enc', 'e'} 
        oper = 0; 
case {'decrypt', 'dec', 'd'} 
        oper = 1; 
otherwise 
        error('Bad ''oper'' parameter.'); 
end 
 
blocks = length(input)/16; 






% Electronic Codebook Mode 
% ------------------------ 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        idx = 1:16; 
for i = 1:blocks 
if (oper) 
% decrypt 
                output(idx) = aesdecrypt(s,input(idx)); 
else 
% encrypt 
                output(idx) = aesencrypt(s,input(idx)); 
end 




% Cipher Block Chaining Mode 
% -------------------------- 
if (nargin < 5) 
            error('Missing initialization vector ''iv''.'); 
end 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        ob = iv; 
        idx = 1:16; 
for i = 1:blocks 
if (oper) 
% decrypt 
                in = input(idx); 
                output(idx) = bitxor(ob(:), aesdecrypt(s,in)'); 
                ob = in; 
else 
% encrypt 
                ob = bitxor(ob(:), input(idx)); 
                ob = aesencrypt(s, ob); 
                output(idx) = ob; 
end 
            idx = idx + 16; 
end 
% store iv for block passing 
        s.iv = ob; 
 
case {'cfb'} 
% Cipher Feedback Mode 
% -------------------- 
% Special mode with bit manipulations 
% sbit = 1..128 
if (nargin < 6) 
            error('Missing ''sbit'' parameter.'); 
end 
% get number of bits 
        bitlen = 8*length(input); 
% loop counter 
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        rounds = round(bitlen/sbit); 
% check  
if (rem(bitlen, sbit)) 
            error('Message length in bits is not multiple of 
''sbit''.'); 
end 
% convert input to bitstream 
        inputb = reshape(de2bi(input,8,2,'left-msb')',1,bitlen); 
% preset init. vector 
        ib = iv; 
        ibb = reshape(de2bi(ib,8,2,'left-msb')',1,128); 
% preset output binary stream 
        outputb = zeros(size(inputb)); 
for i = 1:rounds 
            iba = aesencrypt(s, ib); 
% convert to bit, MSB first 
            ibab = reshape(de2bi(iba,8,2,'left-msb')',1,128); 
% strip only sbit MSB bits 
% this goes to xor 
            ibab = ibab(1:sbit); 
% strip bits from input 
            inpb = inputb((i - 1)*sbit + (1:sbit)); 
% make xor 
            outb = bitxor(ibab, inpb); 
% write to output 
            outputb((i - 1)*sbit + (1:sbit)) = outb; 
if (oper) 
% decrypt 
% prepare new iv - bit shift 
                ibb = [ibb((1 + sbit):end) inpb]; 
else 
% encrypt 
% prepare new iv - bit shift 
                ibb = [ibb((1 + sbit):end) outb]; 
end 
% back to byte ary 
            ib = bi2de(vec2mat(ibb,8),'left-msb'); 
% loop 
end 
        output = bi2de(vec2mat(outputb,8),'left-msb'); 
% store iv for block passing 
        s.iv = ib; 
 
case {'ofb'} 
% Output Feedback Mode 
% -------------------- 
if (nargin < 5) 
            error('Missing initialization vector ''iv''.'); 
end 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        ib = iv; 
        idx = 1:16; 
for i = 1:blocks 
% encrypt, decrypt 
            ib = aesencrypt(s, ib); 
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            output(idx) = bitxor(ib(:), input(idx)); 
            idx = idx + 16; 
end 
% store iv for block passing 
        s.iv = ib; 
 
case {'ctr'} 
% Counter Mode 
% ------------ 
if (nargin < 5) 
            iv = 1; 
end 
        output = zeros(1,length(input)); 
        idx = 1:16; 
for i = (iv):(iv + blocks - 1) 
            ib = AES_GET_COUNTER(i); 
            ib = aesencrypt(s, ib); 
            output(idx) = bitxor(ib(:), input(idx)); 
            idx = idx + 16; 
end 
        s.iv = iv + blocks; 
 
otherwise 










% AES_GET_COUNTER % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [out] = AES_GET_COUNTER(i) 
% AES_GET_COUNTER Generates counter for aes.m - an example. 
% Example function implemented to simulate counter for aestest. 
% Change this function to correspond to your requirements. 
% i:           counter call number; 1, 2, 3,... 
% out:         counter value for given counter call 
 
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 









        out = counter; 
case 2 
        counter(15:16) = [255 0]; 
        out = counter; 
case 3 
        counter(15:16) = [255 1]; 
        out = counter; 
case 4 
        counter(15:16) = [255 2]; 
        out = counter; 
otherwise 










% aesdecrypt % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [out] = aesdecrypt(s, in) 
% AESDECRYPT Decrypt 16-bytes vector. 
% Usage:            out = aesdecrypt(s, in) 
% s:                AES structure 
% in:               input 16-bytes vector (ciphertext) 
% out:              output 16-bytes vector (plaintext) 
 
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
 
if (nargin ~= 2) 
    error('Bad number of input arguments.'); 
end 
 
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 




% copy input to local 
% 16 -> 4 x 4 
state = reshape(in, 4, 4); 
% Initial round 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(s.rounds*4 + (1:4)) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(s.rounds*4 + (1:4), :))'); 
% Loop over (s.rounds - 1) rounds 
for i = (s.rounds - 1):-1:1 
% ShiftRows 
    state = shift_rows(state, 1); 
% SubBytes - lookup table 
    state = s.inv_s_box(state + 1); 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(i*4 + (1:4)) 
    state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp((1:4) + 4*i, :))'); 
% MixColumns    




% Final round 
% ShiftRows 
state = shift_rows(state, 1); 
% SubBytes - lookup table 
state = s.inv_s_box(state + 1); 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(1:4) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(1:4, :))'); 
 
% copy local to output 
% 4 x 4 -> 16 




function out = mix_columns(in, s) 
% Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial 
mod_pol 
 
% Slow version 
% out = zeros(size(in)); 
% for col = 1:4 
%     for row = 1:4 
%         % for each element 
%         temp = 0; 
%         for i = 1:4 
%             % Multiplication in a finite field of 
%             % row vector of poly_mat and 
%             % column vector of the in 
%             % finally xor 
%             temp = bitxor(temp,... 
%                 poly_mult(s.inv_poly_mat(row, i),... 
%                 in(i, col),... 
%                 s.mod_pol, s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%         end 
%         % place to out 
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%         out(row, col) = temp; 
%     end 
% end 
 
% Faster implementation 
% out = zeros(size(in)); 
% for col = 1:4 
%     temp = poly_mult(14,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(11,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(13,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     out(1,col) = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(9,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = poly_mult(9,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(14,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(11,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     out(2,col) = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(13,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = poly_mult(13,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(9,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(14,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     out(3,col) = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(11,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = poly_mult(11,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(13,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(9,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 




% Faster faster implementation 
% out = zeros(size(in)); 
% for col = 1:4 
%     temp = s.mix_col14(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col11(in(2,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col13(in(3,col) + 1)); 
%     out(1,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col9(in(4,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = s.mix_col9(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col14(in(2,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col11(in(3,col) + 1)); 
%     out(2,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col13(in(4,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = s.mix_col13(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col9(in(2,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col14(in(3,col) + 1)); 
%     out(3,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col11(in(4,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = s.mix_col11(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col13(in(2,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col9(in(3,col) + 1)); 
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%     out(4,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col14(in(4,col) + 1)); 
% end 
 
% Faster faster faster implementation 
% slice1 = zeros(4,4); 
% slice2 = slice1; 
% slice3 = slice1; 
% slice4 = slice1; 
% for col = 1:4 
%     slice1(1,col) = s.mix_col14(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     slice2(1,col) = s.mix_col11(in(2,col) + 1); 
%     slice3(1,col) = s.mix_col13(in(3,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(1,col) = s.mix_col9(in(4,col) + 1); 
%     slice1(2,col) = s.mix_col9(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     slice2(2,col) = s.mix_col14(in(2,col) + 1); 
%     slice3(2,col) = s.mix_col11(in(3,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(2,col) = s.mix_col13(in(4,col) + 1); 
%     slice1(3,col) = s.mix_col13(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     slice2(3,col) = s.mix_col9(in(2,col) + 1); 
%     slice3(3,col) = s.mix_col14(in(3,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(3,col) = s.mix_col11(in(4,col) + 1); 
%     slice1(4,col) = s.mix_col11(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     slice2(4,col) = s.mix_col13(in(2,col) + 1); 
%     slice3(4,col) = s.mix_col9(in(3,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(4,col) = s.mix_col14(in(4,col) + 1); 
% end 
% out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(slice1, slice2), slice3), slice4); 
 
% Faster faster faster faster implementation 
out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(... 
    [s.mix_col14(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col9(in(1,1:4) + 1);  
s.mix_col13(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col11(in(1,1:4) + 1)],... 
    [s.mix_col11(in(2,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col14(in(2,1:4) + 1); 
s.mix_col9(in(2,1:4) + 1);  s.mix_col13(in(2,1:4) + 1)]),... 
    [s.mix_col13(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col11(in(3,1:4) + 1); 
s.mix_col14(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col9(in(3,1:4) + 1)]),... 
    [s.mix_col9(in(4,1:4) + 1);  s.mix_col13(in(4,1:4) + 1); 




function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol, aes_logt, aes_ilogt) 
% Multiplication in a finite field 
 
% Old slow implementation 
% p = 0; 
% for counter = 1:8 
%     if (rem(b,2)) 
%         p = bitxor(p,a); 
%         b = (b - 1)/2; 
%     else 
%         b = b/2; 
%     end 
%     a = 2*a; 
%     if (a>255) 
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%         a = bitxor(a,mod_pol); 
%     end 
% end 
 
% Faster implementaion 
if (a && b) 
    p = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(a + 1) + aes_logt(b + 1)), 255) + 1); 
else 





function out = shift_rows(in, dir) 
% ShiftRows cyclically shift the rows of the 4 x 4 matrix. 
% 
%   dir = 0 (to left) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
% 
%   dir ~= 0 (to right) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
% 
 
if (dir == 0) 
% left 
% use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]),4,4); 
% old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]); 
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4); 
else 
% right 
% use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]),4,4); 
% old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]); 











% aesencrypt % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [out] = aesencrypt(s, in) 
% AESENCRYPT  Encrypt 16-bytes vector. 
% Usage:            out = aesencrypt(s, in) 
% s:                AES structure 
% in:               input 16-bytes vector (plaintext) 
% out:              output 16-bytes vector (ciphertext) 
 
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
 
if (nargin ~= 2) 
    error('Bad number of input arguments.'); 
end 
 
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 
validateattributes(in, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<', 
256}); 
 
% copy input to local 
% 16 -> 4 x 4 
state = reshape(in, 4, 4); 
 
% Initial round 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(1:4) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(1:4, :))'); 
 
% Loop over (s.rounds - 1) rounds 
for i = 1:(s.rounds - 1) 
% SubBytes - lookup table 
    state = s.s_box(state + 1); 
% ShiftRows 
    state = shift_rows(state, 0); 
% MixColumns 
    state = mix_columns(state, s); 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(i*4 + (1:4)) 
    state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp((1:4) + 4*i, :))'); 
end 
 
% Final round 
% SubBytes - lookup table 
state = s.s_box(state + 1); 
% ShiftRows 
state = shift_rows(state, 0); 
% AddRoundKey keyexp(4*s.rounds + (1:4)) 
state = bitxor(state, (s.keyexp(4*s.rounds + (1:4), :))'); 
 211
 
% copy local to output 
% 4 x 4 -> 16 




function out = mix_columns(in, s) 
% Each column of the state is multiplied with a fixed polynomial 
mod_pol 
 
% Slow version 
% out = zeros(size(in)); 
% for col = 1:4 
%     for row = 1:4 
%         % for each element 
%         temp = 0; 
%         for i = 1:4 
%             % Multiplication in a finite field of 
%             % row vector of poly_mat and 
%             % column vector of the in 
%             % finally xor 
%             temp = bitxor(temp,... 
%                 poly_mult(s.poly_mat(row, i),... 
%                 in(i, col),... 
%                 s.mod_pol, s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%         end 
%         % place to out 
%         out(row, col) = temp; 
%     end 
% end 
 
% Faster implementation 
% out = zeros(size(in)); 
% for col = 1:4 
%     temp = bitxor(in(3,col),in(4,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(2,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     out(1,col) = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(3,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(4,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(2,in(2,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     out(2,col) = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(3,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(2,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(2,in(3,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     out(3,col) = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(3,in(4,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 
%     temp = bitxor(in(2,col),in(3,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, 
poly_mult(3,in(1,col),s.mod_pol,s.aes_logt,s.aes_ilogt)); 





% Faster faster implementation 
% out = zeros(size(in)); 
% for col = 1:4 
%     temp = bitxor(in(3,col),in(4,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(1,col) + 1)); 
%     out(1,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(2,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(4,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(2,col) + 1)); 
%     out(2,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(3,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(in(1,col),in(2,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(3,col) + 1)); 
%     out(3,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(4,col) + 1)); 
%     temp = bitxor(in(2,col),in(3,col)); 
%     temp = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col3(in(1,col) + 1)); 
%     out(4,col) = bitxor(temp, s.mix_col2(in(4,col) + 1)); 
% end 
 
% Faster faster faster implementation 
% slice1 = zeros(4,4); 
% slice2 = slice1; 
% slice3 = slice1; 
% slice4 = slice1; 
% for col = 1:4 
%     slice1(1,col) = in(3,col); 
%     slice2(1,col) = in(4,col); 
%     slice3(1,col) = s.mix_col2(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(1,col) = s.mix_col3(in(2,col) + 1); 
%     slice1(2,col) = in(1,col); 
%     slice2(2,col) = in(4,col); 
%     slice3(2,col) = s.mix_col2(in(2,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(2,col) = s.mix_col3(in(3,col) + 1); 
%     slice1(3,col) = in(1,col); 
%     slice2(3,col) = in(2,col); 
%     slice3(3,col) = s.mix_col2(in(3,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(3,col) = s.mix_col3(in(4,col) + 1); 
%     slice1(4,col) = in(2,col); 
%     slice2(4,col) = in(3,col); 
%     slice3(4,col) = s.mix_col3(in(1,col) + 1); 
%     slice4(4,col) = s.mix_col2(in(4,col) + 1); 
% end 
% out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor(slice1, slice2), slice3), slice4); 
 
% Faster faster faster faster implementation 
out = bitxor(bitxor(bitxor([in(3,1:4); in(1,1:4); in(1,1:4); 
in(2,1:4)],... 
    [in(4,1:4); in(4,1:4); in(2,1:4); in(3,1:4)]),... 
    [s.mix_col2(in(1,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col2(in(2,1:4) + 1); 
s.mix_col2(in(3,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col3(in(1,1:4) + 1)]),... 
    [s.mix_col3(in(2,1:4) + 1); s.mix_col3(in(3,1:4) + 1); 





function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol, aes_logt, aes_ilogt) 
% Multiplication in a finite field 
 
% Old slow implementation 
% p = 0; 
% for counter = 1:8 
%     if (rem(b,2)) 
%         p = bitxor(p,a); 
%         b = (b - 1)/2; 
%     else 
%         b = b/2; 
%     end 
%     a = 2*a; 
%     if (a>255) 
%         a = bitxor(a,mod_pol); 
%     end 
% end 
 
% Faster implementaion 
if (a && b) 
    p = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(a + 1) + aes_logt(b + 1)), 255) + 1); 
else 





function out = shift_rows(in, dir) 
% ShiftRows cyclically shift the rows of the 4 x 4 matrix. 
% 
%   dir = 0 (to left) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
% 
%   dir ~= 0 (to right) 
%  | 1 2 3 4 | 
%  | 4 1 2 3 | 
%  | 3 4 1 2 | 
%  | 2 3 4 1 | 
% 
 
if (dir == 0) 
% left 
% use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]),4,4); 
% old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 6 11 16 5 10 15 4 9 14 3 8 13 2 7 12]); 
%     out = reshape(temp,4,4); 
else 
% right 
% use linear indexing in 2d array 
    out = reshape(in([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]),4,4); 
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% old safe method 
%     temp = reshape(in,16,1); 
%     temp = temp([1 14 11 8 5 2 15 12 9 6 3 16 13 10 7 4]); 










% aesinfo % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [output] = aesinfo(s, verb) 
% AESINFO Display info about AES setting in AES structure. 
% Usage:            out = aesinfo(s) 
% s:                AES structure (generated by aesinit) 
% verb:             verbose = 0 ... only key displayed 
%                   verbose = 1 ... print all vectors/tables, words 
%                                   in little-endian byte order 
%                   verbose = 2 ... print all vectors/tables, words 
%                                   in big-endian byte order 
% output:           AES key length (128,192, or 256 bits) 
 
% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
 
error(nargchk(1, 2, nargin)); 
 
validateattributes(s, {'struct'}, {}); 
if (nargin >= 2) 
    validateattributes(verb, {'numeric'}, {'real', 'scalar', '>=', 0, 
'<=', 2}); 
else 
    verb = 0; 
end 
 
% to screen 
ID = 1; 
 
fprintf(ID, 'AES Type: AES-%d\n', s.length); 
fprintf(ID, 'AES Rounds: %d\n', s.rounds); 
fprintf(ID, 'GF(2^8) modulo poly: 0x%03x\n', s.mod_pol); 
fprintf(ID, 'Key (%d bits/%d bytes):\n', s.length, s.bytes); 
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printaryh(ID, 'key8', s.key, 1, 8, 1); 
if (verb) 
    printaryh(ID, 'key16', s.key, 2, 8, verb); 
    printaryh(ID, 'key32', s.key, 4, 4, verb); 
    fprintf(ID, 'Expanded Key (%d bytes/%d words):\n', numel(s.keyexp), 
numel(s.keyexp)/4); 
    printaryh(ID, 'expkey8', s.keyexp', 1, 8, verb); 
    printaryh(ID, 'expkey32', s.keyexp', 4, 4, verb); 
    fprintf(ID, 'Log table (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.aes_logt)); 
    printaryh(ID, 'logt8', s.aes_logt, 1, 8, verb); 
    fprintf(ID, 'Inverse log table (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.aes_ilogt)); 
    printaryh(ID, 'ilogt8', s.aes_ilogt, 1, 8, verb); 
    fprintf(ID, 'S-Box table (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.s_box)); 
    printaryh(ID, 'sbox8', s.s_box, 1, 8, verb); 
    fprintf(ID, 'Inverse S-Box table (%d bytes):\n', 
numel(s.inv_s_box)); 
    printaryh(ID, 'isbox8', s.inv_s_box, 1, 8, verb); 
if (0) 
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 2 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col2)); 
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol2', s.mix_col2, 1, 8, verb); 
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 3 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col3)); 
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol3', s.mix_col3, 1, 8, verb); 
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 9 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col9)); 
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol9', s.mix_col9, 1, 8, verb); 
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 11 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col11)); 
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol11', s.mix_col11, 1, 8, verb); 
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 13 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col13)); 
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol13', s.mix_col13, 1, 8, verb); 
        fprintf(ID, 'Mix-col 14 (%d bytes):\n', numel(s.mix_col14)); 
        printaryh(ID, 'mixcol14', s.mix_col14, 1, 8, verb); 
end 
end 




function printaryh(ID, name, data, pack, ionline, verb) 
% print byte ary data like C ary 
if (verb == 0) 
return; 
end 




        items = length(data); 
        vartype = 'u8'; 
        format = '0x%02x'; 
case 2 
        items = length(data)/2; 
        data = reshape(data,2,items)'; 
if (verb == 2) 
            data = fliplr(data); 
end 
        data = sum(data.*repmat([1 256], items, 1), 2); 
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        vartype = 'u16'; 
        format = '0x%04x'; 
case 4 
        items = length(data)/4; 
        data = reshape(data,4,items)'; 
if (verb == 2) 
            data = fliplr(data); 
end 
        data = sum(data.*repmat([1 256 65536 65536*256], items, 1), 2); 
        vartype = 'u32'; 
        format = '0x%08x'; 
otherwise 
        error('Usupported pack parameter.') 
end 
fprintf(ID, '%s %s[%d] = {\n', vartype, name, items); 
for i = 1:items 
if (rem(i - 1, ionline) == 0) 
        fprintf(ID,'        '); 
end 
    fprintf(ID, format, data(i)); 
if (i == items) 
        fprintf(ID,'};\n'); 
break; 
end 
if (rem(i, ionline) == 0) 
        fprintf(ID,',\n'); 
else 











% aesinit % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function s = aesinit(key) 
% AESINIT Generate structure with s-boxes, expanded key, etc. 
% Usage:            s = aesinit([23 34 168 ... 39]) 
% key:              16 (AES-128), 24 (AES-192), and 32 (AES-256) 
%                   items array with bytes of key 
% s:                AES structure for AES parameters and tables 
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% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/10/12 $ 
 
validateattributes(key,... 
    {'numeric'},... 
    {'real', 'vector', '>=', 0, '<=', 255}); 
 
key = key(:); 




        rounds = 10; 
case 24 
        rounds = 12; 
case 32 
        rounds = 14; 
otherwise 
        error('Only AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256 are supported.'); 
end 
 
% fill s structure 
s = {}; 
s.key = key; 
s.bytes = lengthkey; 
s.length = lengthkey * 8; 
s.rounds = rounds; 
% irreducible polynomial for multiplication in a finite field 0x11b 
% bin2dec('100011011'); 
s.mod_pol = 283; 
 
% s-box method 1 (slow) 
% --------------------- 
 
%     % multiplicative inverse table 
%     % first is zero, calculate rest 
%     inverse = zeros(1,256); 
%     for i = 2:256 
%         inverse(i) = find_inverse(i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
%     end 
%      
%     % generate s-box 
%     s_box = zeros(1,256); 
%     for i = 1:256 
%         % affine transformation 
%         s_box(i) = aff_trans(inverse(i)); 
%     end 
%     s.s_box = s_box; 
%      
%     % generate inverse s-box 
%     inv_s_box(s_box(1:256) + 1) = (1:256) - 1; 
%     s.inv_s_box = inv_s_box; 
 




% first build logarithm lookup table and its inverse 
aes_logt = zeros(1,256); 
aes_ilogt = zeros(1,256); 
gen = 1; 
for i = 0:255 
    aes_logt(gen + 1) = i; 
    aes_ilogt(i + 1) = gen; 
    gen = poly_mult(gen, 3, s.mod_pol); 
end 
% store log tables 
s.aes_logt = aes_logt; 
s.aes_ilogt = aes_ilogt; 
% build s-box and its inverse 
s_box = zeros(1,256); 
loctable = [1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128]; 
for i = 0:255 
if (i == 0) 
        inv = 0; 
else 
        inv = aes_ilogt(255 - aes_logt(i + 1) + 1); 
end 
    temp = 0; 
for bi = 0:7 
        temp2 = sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 4 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 5 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 6 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(inv, loctable(bi + 7 + 1))); 
        temp2 = temp2 + sign(bitand(99, loctable(bi + 1))); 
if (rem(temp2,2)) 
            temp = bitor(temp, loctable(bi + 1)); 
end 
end 
    s_box(i + 1) = temp; 
end 
inv_s_box(s_box(1:256) + 1) = (0:255); 
% table correction (must be) 
s_box(1 + 1) = 124; 
inv_s_box(124 + 1) = 1; 
inv_s_box(99 + 1) = 0; 
s.s_box = s_box; 
s.inv_s_box = inv_s_box; 
 
% tables for fast MixColumns 
mix_col2 = zeros(1,256); 
mix_col3 = mix_col2; 
mix_col9 = mix_col2; 
mix_col11 = mix_col2; 
mix_col13 = mix_col2; 
mix_col14 = mix_col2; 
for i = 1:256 
    mix_col2(i) = poly_mult(2, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col3(i) = poly_mult(3, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
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    mix_col9(i) = poly_mult(9, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col11(i) = poly_mult(11, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col13(i) = poly_mult(13, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
    mix_col14(i) = poly_mult(14, i - 1, s.mod_pol); 
end 
s.mix_col2 = mix_col2; 
s.mix_col3 = mix_col3; 
s.mix_col9 = mix_col9; 
s.mix_col11 = mix_col11; 
s.mix_col13 = mix_col13; 
s.mix_col14 = mix_col14; 
 
% expanded key 
s.keyexp = key_expansion(s.key, s.s_box, s.rounds, s.mod_pol, 
s.aes_logt, s.aes_ilogt); 
 
% poly & invpoly 
s.poly_mat = [... 
    2 3 1 1;... 
    1 2 3 1;... 
    1 1 2 3;... 
    3 1 1 2]; 
 
s.inv_poly_mat =[... 
    14 11 13  9;... 
    9  14 11 13;... 
    13  9 14 11;... 
    11 13  9 14]; 
 




function p = poly_mult(a, b, mod_pol) 
% Multiplication in a finite field 
% For loop multiplication - slower than log/ilog tables 
% but must be used for log/ilog tables generation 
 
p = 0; 
for counter = 1 : 8 
if (rem(b, 2)) 
        p = bitxor(p, a); 
        b = (b - 1)/2; 
else 
        b = b/2; 
end 
    a = 2*a; 
if (a > 255) 







function inv = find_inverse(in, mod_pol) 
% Multiplicative inverse for an element a of a finite field 
% very bad calculate & test method 
% Not used in faster version 
 
% loop over all possible bytes 
for inv = 1 : 255 
% calculate polynomial multiplication and test to be 1 
if (1 == poly_mult(in, inv, mod_pol)) 








function out = aff_trans(in) 
% Affine transformation over GF(2^8) 
% Not used for faster s-box generation 
 
% modulo polynomial for multiplication in a finite field 
% bin2dec('100000001'); 
mod_pol = 257; 
 
% multiplication polynomial 
% bin2dec('00011111'); 
mult_pol = 31; 
 
% addition polynomial 
% bin2dec('01100011'); 
add_pol = 99; 
 
% polynomial multiplication 
temp = poly_mult(in, mult_pol, mod_pol); 
 
% xor with addition polynomial 




function expkey = key_expansion(key, s_box, rounds, mod_pol, aes_logt, 
aes_ilogt) 
% Expansion of key 
 
% This is old version for AES-128 (192?, 256? not tested): 
% rcon = ones(1,rounds); 
% for i = 2:rounds 
%     rcon(i) = poly_mult(rcon(i - 1), 2, mod_pol); 
% end 
% % fill bytes 2, 3, and 4 by 0 
% rcon = [rcon(:), zeros(rounds, 3)]; 
%  
% kcol = length(key)/4; 
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% expkey = (reshape(key, kcol, 4))'; 
% for i = (kcol + 1):(4*rounds + 4) 
%     % copy the previous row of the expanded key into a buffer 
%     temp = expkey(i - 1, :); 
%     % each fourth row 
%     if (mod(i, 4) == 1) 
%         % shift temp 
%         temp = temp([2 3 4 1]); 
%         % s-box transform 
%         temp = s_box(temp + 1); 
%         % compute the current round constant 
%         r = rcon((i - 1)/4, :); 
%         % xor 
%         temp = bitxor(temp, r); 
%     else 
%         if ((kcol > 6) && (mod(i, kcol) == 0)) 
%             temp = s_box(temp); 
%         end 
%     end 
%     % generate new row of the expanded key 
%     expkey(i, :) = bitxor(expkey(i - 4, :), temp); 
% end 
 
% This is new faster version for all AES: 
rcon = 1; 
kcol = length(key)/4; 
expkey = (reshape(key,4,kcol))'; 
% traverse for all rounds 
for i = kcol:(4*(rounds + 1) - 1) 
% copy the previous row of the expanded key into a buffer 
    temp = expkey(i, :); 
% each kcol row 
if (mod(i, kcol) == 0) 
% rotate word 
        temp = temp([2 3 4 1]); 
% s-box transform 
        temp = s_box(temp + 1); 
% xor 
        temp(1) = bitxor(temp(1), rcon); 
% new rcon 
% 1. classic poly_mult 
% rcon = poly_mult(rcon, 2, mod_pol); 
% 2. or faster version with log/ilog tables 
% note rcon is never zero here 
% rcon = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(rcon + 1) + aes_logt(2 + 1)), 255) + 
1); 
        rcon = aes_ilogt(mod((aes_logt(rcon + 1) + 25), 255) + 1); 
else 
if ((kcol > 6) && (mod(i, kcol) == 4)) 
            temp = s_box(temp + 1); 
end 
end 
% generate new row of the expanded key 











% Encryption_Decryption % 




% Stepan Matejka, 2011, matejka[at]feld.cvut.cz % 
% $Revision: 1.1.0 $  $Date: 2011/11/20 $  % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function Encryption_Decryption(PN, Type) 














    Payload(1,1:128) = zeros(1,128); 
    MAC_F(1,1:128) =  zeros(1,128); 
    MAC_Check(1,1:128) =  zeros(1,128); 
 
    st = 297; 
    sst = st + 7; 
    aa = 1; 
for n = 1:16 
        pt(n) = bi2de(Packet(PN,st:sst)); 
        st = st + 8; 
        sst = st + 7; 
end 
 
for nn = 1:26 
if Packet(PN,169:184) == Node_Address(nn,50:65) 
            cc = 1; 
            ccc = 8; 
for nnn = 1:16 
                key(nnn) = bi2de(Keys(nn,cc:ccc)); 
                cc = cc + 8; 






    s = aesinit(key); 
    count = Packet(PN,169:296); 
    MAC_Out = Packet(PN,865:992); 
    st = 1; 
    sst = st + 7; 
    aa = 1; 
for n = 1:16 
        counter(n) = bi2de(count(st:sst)); 
         MAC_O(n) = bi2de(MAC_Out(st:sst)); 
        st = st + 8; 





    ivh1 = {'00''00''00''00''00''00''00''00'... 
'00''00''00''00''00''00''00''00'}; 





if Type == 1 
        ct1 = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', pt, iv1); 
        pt(17:32) = ct1(1:16); 
 
% MSG and IV go in 
        ct = aes(s, 'enc', 'ctr', pt); 
% Output is the cipher Text to be used as payload 
        nn = 1; 
        nnn = 8; 
         p = 17; 
 
for n  = 1:16 
            Payload(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct(n),8); 
            MAC(nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct(p),8); 
            nn = nn + 8; 
            nnn = nn + 7; 




elseif Type == 2 
 
        pt(17:32) = MAC_O; 
        outm(PN,1:16) = MAC_O; 
%         outp(PN,1:16) = pt(1:16); 
        ct2 = aes(s, 'dec', 'ctr', pt); 
% Gives cipher text 
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        p = 17; 
        nn = 1; 
        nnn = 8; 
for n  = 1:16 
            Payload_Out(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct2(n),8); 
            MAC_F(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(ct2(p),8); 
            nn = nn + 8; 
            nnn = nn + 7; 
            p = p + 1; 
end 
                nn = 1; 
        nnn = 8; 
        check = aes(s, 'enc', 'cbc', ct2(1:16), iv1); 
for n  = 1:16 
            MAC_Check(PN,nn:nnn) = de2bi(check(n),8); 
            nn = nn + 8; 









% crc16 % 
% Obtained/Adapted from: %  
% https://macroware.wordpress.com/2011/05/21/crc-calculation/ % 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [resto] = crc16(h) 
%Variable initialization (CRC16 polynomial) in format 
% [1 g1X g2X^2 g3X^3 g4X^4 g5X^5 g6X^6 g7X^7 g8X^8 g9X^9 g10X^10 
g11X^11 g12X^12 g13X^13 g14X^14 g15X^15 1X^16] 
gx=[1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1]; 
crcSize = 16; 
% message ux (lsb first) 
ux = h; 
%ux = [0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1   0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0] 
msgSize = 1000; 
bx=[zeros(1,16)]; 
% shift the message through the generator polynomial to determine the 
% remainder bx 
for i=1:msgSize 
    feedback = xor(ux(i), bx(16)); 
for j=crcSize:-1:2 
if (gx(j) == 1) 
            bx(j) = xor(bx(j-1), feedback); 
else 




    bx(1) = feedback; 
end 
%convert the resulting remainder to a hex representation 
remainder = uint16(0); 
j = crcSize; 
for i=0:crcSize-1 
    remainder = remainder + bx(j) * 2^i; 
    j = j - 1; 
end 
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